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08. Regulatory map (obligation → artefact → layer)

This chapter is the reverse index of every “Maps to” line in the book: for each obligation it names the engineering artefact that satisfies or supports it and the stack layer the artefact lives in.

Every other chapter maps forward: a capability, then the obligations it touches. This chapter maps backward: an obligation, then the artefact and the layer that answer it. The unit of the map is a row: an obligation, the engineering artefact that produces the evidence for it, and one of the five stack layers (chapter 04): 1 Govern-as-Code · 2 Inventory & Transparency · 3 Evals & Red Teaming as Evidence · 4 Runtime Controls & Observability · 5 Assurance & Continuous Compliance. The map is a crosswalk for finding the artefact that answers a question, not a certificate that the artefact makes you compliant. It indexes the AI-specific instruments first and then the data-protection, cyber-security, liability, consumer and sector law an AI system meets on day one, so that every row of the obligation register resolves to a table in this chapter. Chapter 19 teaches the data-protection rows in its obligation to artefact map, and chapter 20 the other law that already applies to AI (copyright, anti-discrimination, consumer protection and product liability).

From obligation to evidence A data-flow diagram generated by Archify. 01 / Frameworks 02 / Crosswalk 03 / Stack layers 04 / Evidence EU AI Act · post-Omnibus · 01 / Frameworks · law EU AI Act post-Omnibus law ISO/IEC 42001 · AIMS · Annex A · 01 / Frameworks · standard ISO/IEC 42001 AIMS · Annex A standard NIST AI RMF · four functions · 01 / Frameworks · framework NIST AI RMF four functions framework Obligation crosswalk · obligation → artefact → layer · 02 / Crosswalk · OSCAL Obligation crosswalk obligation → artefact → layer OSCAL Govern-as-Code · policy-as-code, QMS · 03 / Stack layers · Layer 01 Govern-as-Code policy-as-code, QMS Layer 01 Inventory & Transparency · registry · AIBOM · cards · 03 / Stack layers · Layer 02 Inventory & Transparency registry · AIBOM · cards Layer 02 Evals & Red Teaming · eval gate · red-team · 03 / Stack layers · Layer 03 Evals & Red Teaming eval gate · red-team Layer 03 Runtime Controls · guardrails · kill switch · 03 / Stack layers · Layer 04 Runtime Controls guardrails · kill switch Layer 04 Assurance & Compliance · assurance telemetry · 03 / Stack layers · Layer 05 Assurance & Compliance assurance telemetry Layer 05 Machine-readable evidence · OSCAL · audit = query · 04 / Evidence · assurance Machine-readable evidence OSCAL · audit = query assurance Arts. 9–73 Annex A four functions Art. 9 Art. 11 Art. 15 Art. 14 Art. 72 OSCAL logs Legend primary data data store data flow
From obligation to evidenceHow a regulatory obligation flows to the engineering artefact that satisfies or supports it and the stack layer that artefact lives in: the reverse index made visible. Generated from the Body of Knowledge.Open interactive diagram (opens in a new tab)

How to read this map

Read each row as a sentence: this obligation is answered by this artefact, which lives in this layer. Three cautions apply throughout.

  • Mappings are illustrative, not a claim of conformity. No artefact in this book guarantees compliance, and no standard cited here confers a presumption of conformity (see “What is NOT harmonised yet”). An artefact supports and evidences an obligation; the legal judgement of conformity stays with lawyers, notified bodies and authorities.
  • Dates are the post-Omnibus dates. Every EU AI Act date below reflects Regulation (EU) 2026/1744, the Digital Omnibus on AI, of 8 July 2026 (OJ L, 24 July 2026), in force 27 July 20261222. Where the Omnibus moved a date, the moved date is shown; where it did not, the row says so.
  • The competent authority differs by regime. For general-purpose AI (GPAI) the supervisor is the AI Office, and GPAI fines are formal Commission decisions under Article 10134. For high-risk systems the supervisors are national market-surveillance authorities, whose penalties run under Article 994. Member States choose their own; Spain, for example, set up a dedicated agency, AESIA (Agencia Española de Supervisión de Inteligencia Artificial), whose statute was approved by Royal Decree 729/202352. The map states the authority per row so the reader knows who asks.

EU AI Act, post-Omnibus

EU AI Act timeline, post-Omnibus Seven lanes of EU AI Act obligation families on one time axis, 2024 to 2030, with the Omnibus in force from 2026-07-27 and the deferred high-risk dates. EU AI Act · Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 as amended by Regulation (EU) 2026/1744 When each duty applies, 2024 to 2030 One lane per obligation family on one time axis, with the Digital Omnibus changes in force since 2026-07-27. Act in force 2024-08-01 Omnibus in force 2026-07-27 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 Prohibited practices Art. 5 2025-02-02 Original prohibitions apply 2026-12-02 New bans on NCII and CSAM AI literacy and bias-detection data Arts. 4, 4a 2025-02-02 AI literacy applies (Art. 4) 2026-07-27 Art. 4 reworded; new Art. 4a General-purpose AI models Arts. 52 to 55 2025-08-02 GPAI provider obligations apply 2026-08-02 Commission enforcement powers apply 2027-08-02 Models placed before 2025-08-02 comply Transparency for certain AI systems Art. 50 2026-08-02 Disclosure and marking apply (Art. 50) 2026-12-02 Marking grace ends for existing systems High-risk through use (Annex III) Arts. 6, 9 to 20, 22 to 27, 43, 47 to 49, 60, 71 to 73, 75, 86 2026-08-02 Real-world testing rules (Art. 60) 2027-12-02 Annex III duties apply; deferred from 2026-08-02 High-risk through products (Annex I) Arts. 6, 9 to 20, 22 to 26, 43, 47, 48, 72, 73, 75 2028-08-02 Annex I duties apply; deferred from 2027-08-02 Legacy high-risk systems for public authorities Art. 111(2) 2030-08-02 Systems already on the market must comply Duties apply Another dated step In application Omnibus in force Source: chapter 18, The post-Omnibus timeline, and chapter 08, EU AI Act, post-Omnibus. Commission, notified-body and Annex X dates are in the chapter 18 table, not drawn. As of 2026-09-24 · a reading aid, not legal advice
EU AI Act timeline, post-OmnibusWhen each family of EU AI Act obligations applies, from the entry into force in 2024 to the legacy public-authority deadline in 2030, one lane per family, as of 2026-09-24. Find the lanes your systems sit in and plan the evidence for the next date on each. Drawn from chapters 18 and 08.Full-size poster, downloads and citation
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Seven lanes on one time axis, as of 2026-09-24. The Act entered into force on 2024-08-01 and the Digital Omnibus (Regulation (EU) 2026/1744) on 2026-07-27. Prohibited practices (Art. 5): the original prohibitions from 2025-02-02, and new bans on AI-generated non-consensual intimate imagery (NCII) and child sexual abuse material (CSAM) from 2026-12-02. AI literacy and bias-detection data (Arts. 4 and 4a): AI literacy from 2025-02-02; Art. 4 reworded and the new Art. 4a from 2026-07-27. General-purpose AI models (Arts. 52 to 55): obligations from 2025-08-02, Commission enforcement powers from 2026-08-02, and models placed before 2025-08-02 must comply by 2027-08-02. Transparency for certain AI systems (Art. 50): from 2026-08-02, with the marking grace for existing systems ending on 2026-12-02. High-risk through use (Annex III): the rules for testing in real-world conditions (Art. 60) from 2026-08-02, and the Annex III duties from 2027-12-02, deferred by the Omnibus from 2026-08-02. High-risk through products (Annex I): from 2028-08-02, deferred from 2027-08-02. Legacy high-risk systems intended for use by public authorities must comply by 2030-08-02 (Art. 111(2)). A filled dot marks the date a family starts to apply and a ring another dated step. Chapter 18 also lists Commission, notified-body and Annex X dates that the poster does not draw.

For a teaching walk-through of the Act before this reverse index maps it (scope, the risk ladder, value-chain roles, deployer duties, enforcement and the full post-Omnibus timeline), see chapter 18, which walks the Act end to end.

High-risk obligations (Articles 9–15, 17, 25, 26, 27, 49, 71, 72, 73) apply to Annex III systems from 2 December 2027 and to Annex I embedded systems from 2 August 2028, both deferred by the Omnibus from 2 August 2026 and 2 August 2027 respectively12. The amended Art. 113(c) defers Chapter III, Sections 1 to 3: classification, the requirements of Articles 8 to 15 and the duties of providers, deployers and other operators in Articles 16 to 2722. The high-risk duties that sit elsewhere (conformity assessment, the declaration, CE marking and registration in Articles 43 to 49 and 71, post-market monitoring and incident reporting in Articles 72, 73 and 75(1a), and the right to explanation in Article 86) belong to chapters that formally apply from 2 August 2026, but they have work to do only once a system is classified high-risk, so the map dates them by the classification date. That is this map’s reading; confirm it with counsel (verify)2263. Articles 26(11), 27, 49, 71 and 86 concern Annex III systems only, so the 2 August 2028 date does not reach them. The GPAI obligations (Articles 53, 55) have applied since 2 August 2025, with Commission enforcement powers live since 2 August 20263; providers of models placed on the market before 2 August 2025 comply by 2 August 2027 (Art. 111(3))63. Transparency (Article 50) went live on 2 August 2026 and was not moved5. Legacy public-authority high-risk systems keep their original 2 August 2030 date2.

The Duty holder column names who the obligation binds, which is a different axis from who enforces it. The high-risk design-and-build duties (Articles 9 to 15 and 17) fall on the provider; Articles 26 and 27 fall on the deployer; Articles 4, 5 and 50 bind both; and Articles 53 and 55 bind the GPAI provider. Article 25 sits across the value chain: it sets the conditions under which a distributor, importer or deployer itself becomes a provider and inherits the provider duties. Articles 22 to 24 bind the authorised representative of a non-EU provider, the importer and the distributor, and Article 54 the authorised representative of a non-EU GPAI provider. This matters for the engineer because the artefacts you can produce depend on which hat your organisation wears: a deployer cannot draw up the provider’s technical documentation, but it must run the Article 26 monitoring and the Article 27 FRIA; and when the model is procured, most of the provider-side evidence becomes something you collect rather than produce (see the Vendor / Model Due-Diligence Gate in chapter 05).

Article 16 is the umbrella for the provider’s high-risk duties. Apart from point (l), accessibility, which has its own row, it adds no artefact of its own; it gathers the obligations the rows below break out article by article: the requirements of Articles 9 to 15 and 17, documentation keeping and logs (Articles 18 and 19), corrective action (Article 20), the conformity assessment (Article 43), the EU declaration of conformity and CE marking (Articles 47 and 48), registration (Articles 49 and 71), post-market monitoring (Article 72) and serious-incident reporting (Article 73). So it reads here as a cross-reference, not a row2263.

ArticleObligationEngineering artefactLayerDuty holderApplies (post-Omnibus)Authority
Art. 3(1)Scope: decide, system by system, whether it is an AI system under the Art. 3(1) definition before any other duty is assessedDefinitional decision record in the registry: definition applied, elements found, excluded family if any, reason, decider, date2Provider + deployer (scoping)2025-02-02 (Chapter I) 63National MSA
Art. 4AI literacy: take measures to support the development of AI literacy among staff and operatorsLiteracy programme as code; role-based training records; onboarding gates1Provider + deployer2025-02-02; reworded 2026-07-27 (in force) 62263Provider/deployer duty; national MSA
Art. 4aLawful basis to process special-category data for bias detection in high-risk systems, with pseudonymisation and deletion once bias is correctedData governance controls; pseudonymisation and retention-as-code; data card noting basis and deletion2Provider2026-07-27 (new, in force) 2National MSA / DPAs
Art. 5Prohibited practices; new bans on AI-generated non-consensual intimate imagery (NCII) and CSAMPolicy-as-code blocklist; input/output guardrails; refusal and abuse detection1 · 4Provider + deployer2026-12-02 (new bans); earlier prohibitions from 2025-02-02 2National MSA
Art. 6Classification rules for high-risk AI systems, incl. the Annex III (standalone) route and Annex I (safety-component) routeRisk-tiering as code; high-risk classification decision record; register entry flagging Annex III status1 · 2Provider2027-12-02 (Annex III) 122National MSA
Art. 6(3)–(4)A provider that finds an Annex III system not high-risk under the Art. 6(3) filter documents the assessment before placing it on the market and registers it under Art. 49(2); a system that profiles natural persons is always high-riskClassification decision record (Annex III point, Art. 6(3) condition, explicit profiling flag); Art. 49(2) registration entry pushed from the registry1 · 2Provider2027-12-02 (Annex III) 63National MSA
Art. 9Risk management system across the high-risk lifecycleRisk register as code; threat models; linkage to FRIA and eval results1 · 3Provider2027-12-02 (Annex III) 1National MSA
Art. 10Data and data governance; representative, relevant, error-checked datasetsData cards; lineage; bias and quality tests in CI2 · 3Provider2027-12-02 (Annex III) 1National MSA
Art. 11Technical documentation (Annex IV) drawn up and kept up to dateAIBOM (CycloneDX ML-BOM, SPDX 3.0 AI); auto-generated technical documentation; model cards2Provider2027-12-02 (Annex III) 1National MSA
Art. 12Record-keeping: automatic logging of events over the system’s lifetimeStructured, signed logs; OpenTelemetry traces; tamper-evident event store4Provider2027-12-02 (Annex III) 1National MSA
Art. 13Transparency and provision of information to deployersInstructions for use as code; model and data cards; capability and limitation notes2Provider2027-12-02 (Annex III) 1National MSA
Art. 14Human oversight designed into the systemHuman-in-the-loop checkpoints; kill switch; override and escalation paths4Provider2027-12-02 (Annex III) 1National MSA
Art. 15Accuracy, robustness and cybersecurityEval gate; adversarial red-team suite; robustness and security controls; regression evals3 · 4Provider2027-12-02 (Annex III) 1National MSA
Art. 15(4)Systems that continue to learn after placing on the market are built to eliminate or reduce the risk of biased outputs feeding future inputs (feedback loops), with mitigation measuresFeedback-loop fairness monitor; retraining-data bias check; agent memory write gate with provenance and rollback to a known-good snapshot3 · 4Provider2027-12-02 (Annex III) 63National MSA
Art. 16(l)Providers ensure the high-risk system complies with the accessibility requirements of Directives (EU) 2016/2102 and (EU) 2019/882Accessibility test results for every notice, instruction and explanation shown to people, run in the pipeline; accessible explanation templates2 · 3Provider2027-12-02 (Annex III) 63National MSA
Art. 17Quality management systemQMS-as-code; versioned policies; pipeline controls and change management1 · 5Provider2027-12-02 (Annex III) 1National MSA
Art. 17(1)(m)The QMS includes an accountability framework setting out the responsibilities of management and other staff for every aspect of the QMSRACI as code compiled into registry owner fields and code-owner rules; committee decision records1 · 2Provider2027-12-02 (Annex III) 63National MSA
Art. 18Keep the technical documentation, the QMS documentation, notified-body changes and decisions and the EU declaration at the disposal of national authorities for 10 years after placing on the marketRetention-as-code for the technical file, QMS records, notified-body decisions and the EU declaration (10 years); write-once evidence store2 · 5Provider2027-12-02 (Annex III) 63National MSA
Art. 19Keep the automatically generated logs under the provider’s control for a period appropriate to the intended purpose, at least six months unless other law provides otherwiseLog-retention policy as code (at least six months, set by intended purpose); tamper-evident log store4 · 5Provider2027-12-02 (Annex III) 63National MSA
Art. 20A provider with reason to consider a high-risk system non-conforming immediately brings it into conformity, withdraws, disables or recalls it and informs distributors and deployers; where the system presents a risk, it investigates and informs the market-surveillance authorityCAPA record; withdraw, disable or recall runbook; notification of distributors and deployers1 · 5Provider2027-12-02 (Annex III) 63National MSA
Art. 22A provider established outside the Union appoints, by written mandate, an authorised representative in the Union before making the system available; the representative keeps the declaration, documentation and certificate for 10 yearsWritten mandate; 10-year copies of the declaration, technical documentation and certificate; authority contact route5Non-EU provider + authorised representative2027-12-02 (Annex III) 63National MSA
Art. 23Before placing a high-risk system on the market, the importer verifies the conformity assessment, the Annex IV documentation, the CE marking, the declaration and instructions and the authorised representative, and keeps copies for 10 yearsImport verification record against each check; 10-year document copies2 · 5Importer2027-12-02 (Annex III) 63National MSA
Art. 24Before making a high-risk system available, the distributor verifies the CE marking, the declaration and the instructions, and holds back, withdraws or recalls a system it considers non-conformingDistribution check record; hold, withdraw or recall workflow2 · 5Distributor2027-12-02 (Annex III) 63National MSA
Art. 25Responsibilities along the AI value chain: when a distributor, importer or deployer becomes a provider, and the information a provider must pass to actors downstreamValue-chain due-diligence gate; provider/deployer responsibility allocation; AIBOM and model/data cards collected from upstream providers2 · 5Provider + value-chain actors2027-12-02 (Annex III) 23National MSA
Art. 26Deployer obligations for high-risk systems: use per the instructions for use (Art. 26(1)); the paragraph rows below break out oversight, input data, monitoring, logs and noticesDeployment registry; monitoring hooks; assigned oversight and logging retention2 · 4Deployer2027-12-02 (Annex III) 1National MSA
Art. 26(2)Deployers assign human oversight to natural persons with the necessary competence, training and authority, and the necessary supportOversight assignment in the registry; role-based training records with expiry; approver roster per checkpoint class with authority to pause or refuse1 · 4Deployer2027-12-02 (Annex III) 63National MSA
Art. 26(4)To the extent the deployer controls the input data, it ensures the data are relevant and sufficiently representative for the intended purposeInput-data checks against the population in the deployment record; drift monitors on inputs2 · 3Deployer2027-12-02 (Annex III) 63National MSA
Art. 26(5)Deployers monitor operation per the instructions; on reason to consider a risk they inform the provider or distributor and the authority and suspend use; a serious incident goes to the provider first, and Art. 73 applies to the deployer if the provider cannot be reachedMonitoring plan with signal owners; tested suspension path (feature flag, traffic switch); provider incident contact in the registry; pre-filled risk and serious-incident notices2 · 4 · 5Deployer2027-12-02 (Annex III) 6357National MSA
Art. 26(6)Deployers keep the logs under their control for a period appropriate to the intended purpose, at least six months unless other law provides otherwiseRetention-as-code schedule; tamper-evident log store; legal hold while an incident is open4 · 5Deployer2027-12-02 (Annex III) 63National MSA
Art. 26(7)Before putting a high-risk system into service at the workplace, deployers who are employers inform workers’ representatives and the affected workersWorker-information record dated before first use and linked to the registry entry; HR intake trigger for Annex III point 4 systems2Deployer (employer)2027-12-02 (Annex III) 63National MSA
Art. 26(11)Deployers of Annex III systems that make or assist decisions about natural persons inform those persons that they are subject to the systemAI-use notice at the decision point; notice templates versioned as code; notice delivery log2 · 4Deployer2027-12-02 (Annex III) 63National MSA
Art. 27Fundamental Rights Impact Assessment (FRIA) for deployers of Annex III systemsFRIA-as-code from a template; cross-reference to a GDPR Art. 35 DPIA1 · 2Deployer2027-12-02 (Annex III) 7National MSA
Art. 43Conformity assessment before placing on the market (internal control, or a notified body for Annex III point 1 biometrics)Conformity-assessment workflow; internal-control or notified-body evidence pack; traceability to Annex IV documentation1 · 5Provider2027-12-02 (Annex III) 122National MSA
Art. 43(4)A system already assessed undergoes a new conformity assessment on substantial modification; changes pre-determined in the technical documentation of a system that continues to learn are not substantial modificationsChange-classification policy on merge; pre-determined change envelope as code; reassessment trigger in the registry1 · 5Provider2027-12-02 (Annex III) 63National MSA
Art. 47EU declaration of conformity drawn up on completing the assessmentAuto-generated EU declaration of conformity from the evidence; CE-marking record2 · 5Provider2027-12-02 (Annex III) 122National MSA
Art. 48Affix the CE marking visibly, legibly and indelibly (a digital marking for digitally provided systems), followed by the notified body’s number where applicableCE-marking record (physical or digital) generated with the EU declaration; notified-body number where applicable2 · 5Provider2027-12-02 (Annex III) 63National MSA
Art. 49 / Art. 71Registration of high-risk systems in the EU databaseAgent/model registry with an API that feeds registration; owner and status per entry2Provider; public-authority deployer2027-12-02 (Annex III) 1National MSA; Commission (database)
Art. 50Transparency for certain AI systems: chatbot disclosure; marking and labelling of synthetic contentContent labelling and machine-readable marking (e.g. C2PA-style); chatbot disclosure banner4 · 2Provider + deployer2026-08-02; marking grace for existing systems to 2026-12-02 25National MSA
Art. 52Notify the Commission without delay, and within two weeks, once a GPAI model meets the Art. 51(1)(a) condition or it becomes known that it willCompute ledger per model lineage with a planned-compute threshold alert; notification record filed within two weeks2 · 5GPAI providerObligations from 2025-08-02; enforcement from 2026-08-02 633AI Office
Art. 53GPAI provider obligations, incl. a public summary of training content on an AI Office templateModel cards; training-content summary; AIBOM and dataset provenance2GPAI providerObligations from 2025-08-02; enforcement from 2026-08-02 3AI Office
Art. 53(1)(c)GPAI providers put in place a policy to comply with Union copyright law, incl. identifying and complying with reservations of rights under Art. 4(3) of Directive (EU) 2019/790Versioned copyright policy; crawler decision logs; training-data rights ledger with the reservation-check result1 · 2 · 5GPAI providerObligations from 2025-08-02; enforcement from 2026-08-02 6373AI Office
Art. 54A GPAI provider established outside the Union appoints, by written mandate, an authorised representative before placing the model on the Union market; the representative keeps the Annex XI documentation for 10 yearsWritten mandate; Annex XI documentation copy kept 10 years; AI Office contact route5Non-EU GPAI provider + authorised representativeObligations from 2025-08-02; enforcement from 2026-08-02 63AI Office
Art. 55GPAI models with systemic risk: model evaluation incl. adversarial testing; Union-level risk assessment; serious-incident reporting; cybersecurity of the modelEval and red-team suite; incident pipeline on the Commission serious-incident reporting template; weight-security controls; threat model3 · 4 · 5GPAI provider (systemic risk)Obligations from 2025-08-02; enforcement from 2026-08-02 326AI Office
Art. 60Testing of high-risk (Annex III) AI systems in real-world conditions outside AI regulatory sandboxesReal-world testing plan; Art. 61 informed-consent records; test monitoring, logging and incident hooks3 · 4Provider / prospective provider2026-08-02 22National MSA
Art. 72Post-market monitoring for high-risk systemsContinuous assurance telemetry; monitoring plan; drift and performance signals5Provider2027-12-02 (Annex III) 1National MSA
Art. 73Serious-incident reporting for high-risk systems (deadlines in the reporting-clock table below)Incident detection and triage pipeline; reporting-clock automation; evidence capture5 · 4Provider2027-12-02 (Annex III) 1National MSA
Art. 73(6)After reporting a serious incident the provider investigates without delay (risk assessment, corrective action) and does not alter the system in a way that may affect the evaluation of causes before informing the authoritiesEvidence-preservation step: model, prompt, policy and retrieval-index snapshots; sealed traces; fix shipped on a new version4 · 5Provider2027-12-02 (Annex III) 63National MSA
Art. 75(1a)Providers of high-risk systems under the AI Office’s exclusive competence (systems built on their own GPAI model, and systems in designated very large online platforms or search engines) report serious incidents to the AI Office, with Art. 73(2) to (9) applying mutatis mutandisIncident pipeline routing by a registry competence flag (national MSA or AI Office)2 · 5Provider (systems under AI Office competence)2027-12-02 (Annex III); new by the Omnibus (reading, verify) 22AI Office
Art. 86A person subject to a deployer’s decision based on an Annex III system (except point 2) with legal or similarly significant adverse effects may obtain clear and meaningful explanations of the system’s role and the main elements of the decision, where Union law does not already give the rightExplanation record per decision (system and model version, reason codes, determinative or advisory role, human decider); request-handling workflow and response log2 · 4 · 5Deployer2027-12-02 (Annex III); Chapter IX applies from 2026-08-02 (reading, verify) 6322National MSA
Art. 87Directive (EU) 2019/1937 applies to reports of AI Act infringements and to the protection of the people who make themInternal reporting channel run as a case system with the directive’s clocks encoded; sealed reporter identity; retaliation monitoring; routing to the incident pipeline1 · 5Legal entities with internal reporting channels under Directive (EU) 2019/19372026-08-02 6364Authorities designated under Directive (EU) 2019/1937

Several rows are built out in full elsewhere in the book:

The Omnibus also changed rows the table compresses to one line22. For Art. 6, a safety component must now have the purpose of preventing or mitigating risks to health and safety, or be one whose failure endangers them (Art. 3(14), Art. 6(1a) to 6(1c)); that narrowing applies to the Annex I route from 2 August 2028, and machinery moved from Section A to Section B of Annex I. The Annex VIII, Section B registration record for systems that rely on the Art. 6(3) filter lost the summary of grounds and the list of Member States. For Art. 25, the initial provider’s duty to cooperate now names documentation sufficient to assess compliance, known limitations and failure modes, and targeted technical access for testing (Art. 25(2)); the information and access must be fixed in a written agreement (Art. 25(4)), and breaches of both paragraphs are fined under Art. 99(4)(da).

The Article 73 clock runs by incident class. The provider notifies the market-surveillance authority of the Member State where the incident occurred immediately once it establishes a causal link between the system and the incident, or the reasonable likelihood of one, and in any event within an outer deadline that runs from the moment the provider or, where applicable, the deployer becomes aware of the incident, not from the causal finding57. A deployer that identifies a serious incident informs the provider first, then the importer or distributor and the market-surveillance authority; if it cannot reach the provider, Article 73 applies to the deployer mutatis mutandis (Art. 26(5))57:

Incident classReporting deadlineWho reportsArtefact
Serious incident (general)Immediately on a causal link or its reasonable likelihood; no later than 15 days after awarenessProvider → national MSA; the deployer if it cannot reach the provider (Art. 26(5))Incident triage pipeline; reporting-clock automation
Widespread infringement, or serious and irreversible disruption of critical infrastructureImmediately; no later than 2 days after awarenessProvider → national MSA; the deployer if it cannot reach the provider (Art. 26(5))Same pipeline, escalated-severity path
Death of a personImmediately on establishing or suspecting a causal link; no later than 10 days after awarenessProvider → national MSA; the deployer if it cannot reach the provider (Art. 26(5))Same pipeline, priority path

The Omnibus left these deadlines unchanged. For high-risk systems under the AI Office’s exclusive competence, its new Art. 75(1a) sends the report to the AI Office instead, with Art. 73(2) to (9) applying mutatis mutandis, and the AI Office passes it on to the market-surveillance authority of the Member State where the provider is established22. An incident rarely starts only one clock: chapter 17 lays the Article 73 clock beside the GDPR, NIS2, DORA, CRA and GPAI clocks in the overlapping clocks, and the incident record schema holds the timestamps each one needs.

Two cross-cutting provisions frame the penalties. Under Art. 101, the Commission may fine GPAI providers up to 3% of worldwide annual turnover or EUR 15 million, whichever is higher34. Under the Omnibus’s new Art. 75a–75d, the AI Office gains investigation powers, binding commitments and non-compliance decisions over the AI systems for which the amended Art. 75(1) makes it exclusively competent (systems built on a GPAI model by the same provider or undertaking, and systems in designated very large online platforms or search engines), not over GPAI models in general. Periodic penalty payments reach up to 5% of average daily income or worldwide annual turnover per day for a continuing breach (Art. 75c(5)). The Omnibus entered into force on 27 July 2026, and Chapter IX, where these articles sit, applies from 2 August 2026 under Art. 113822. High-risk administrative fines run under Art. 99 (ceilings of 7%, 3% and 1% of turnover depending on the breach), imposed by national authorities4. Chapter 18 sets out who supervises what and the AI Office’s direct powers.

The Article 73 clock The Article 73 serious-incident reporting windows by incident class (2, 10 and no later than 15 days), with the incident pipeline that meets them. Article 73 · serious-incident reporting Serious incident Classify Widespread infringement 2 days Death of a person 10 days Otherwise no later than 15 days Incident pipeline Classify before you report. As of 2026-09-24
The Article 73 clockThe serious-incident reporting windows for high-risk systems, by incident class, and the pipeline that meets them. Your pipeline must classify the incident before it can report. Drawn from chapter 08, as of 2026-09-24.Permalink, downloads and citation
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The serious-incident reporting windows for high-risk systems under Article 73, by incident class. A widespread infringement: 2 days. On the death of a person: 10 days. Otherwise: no later than 15 days. The engineering artefact that meets them is the incident detection and triage pipeline with reporting-clock automation and evidence capture, which must classify the incident before it can report.

Who enforces, and the ceilings Three enforcement tracks: GPAI providers and the AI Office, high-risk systems and national market-surveillance authorities, and US frontier developers under SB 53 and the state Attorney General, each with its penalty ceiling. Duty holder, authority, ceiling GPAI providers since 2 Aug 2026 AI Office (European Commission) Art. 101 fines: up to 3% of worldwide annual turnover or EUR 15M, whichever higher Art. 75a–75d: periodic penalties up to 5% of average daily turnover per day High-risk systems per Member State National market-surveillance authority for example AESIA in Spain Art. 99 fines: ceilings of 7%, 3% and 1% of turnover, depending on the breach US frontier developers SB 53 State Attorney General Up to USD 1M per violation
Who enforces, and the ceilingsWho enforces each regime and how high its penalties can go: the AI Office for GPAI providers, national market-surveillance authorities for high-risk systems and the state Attorney General under California's SB 53, as of 2026-09-24. Record for each system which authority asks, so its evidence is ready for that authority. Drawn from chapter 08.Permalink, downloads and citation
Text description

Three enforcement tracks, as of 2026-09-24. GPAI providers answer to the AI Office: Commission enforcement powers have been live since 2 August 2026; under Art. 101 the Commission may fine GPAI providers up to 3% of worldwide annual turnover or EUR 15 million, whichever is higher; and the Omnibus's new Art. 75a to 75d give the AI Office investigation powers backed by periodic penalty payments of up to 5% of average daily turnover per day for a continuing breach, in force since 27 July 2026. High-risk systems answer to national market-surveillance authorities, which each Member State chooses (Spain, for example, set up AESIA); their administrative fines run under Art. 99, with ceilings of 7%, 3% and 1% of turnover depending on the breach. Large frontier developers under California's SB 53 answer to the Attorney General, with penalties of up to USD 1 million per violation.

GPAI Code of Practice

The GPAI Code of Practice, published 10 July 2025, is the voluntary instrument providers use to demonstrate compliance with the GPAI obligations until harmonised standards exist. It has three chapters910.

ChapterWhat it asks forEngineering artefactLayer
Safety and Security (systemic-risk models only)A Safety and Security Framework; model evaluations incl. adversarial testing; systemic-risk assessment and mitigation; serious-incident reporting; model and infrastructure securityEval and red-team suite; adversarial testing harness; incident pipeline; weight-security controls3 · 4 · 5
TransparencyUp-to-date model documentation for the AI Office and downstream deployersModel cards; structured model documentation; AIBOM2
CopyrightA policy to comply with Union copyright law, incl. respecting reservations of rightsTraining-data provenance and licence records; policy-as-code for source filtering1 · 2
Safety and Security, Commitment 9 (serious-incident reporting)Report serious incidents to the AI Office within 2, 5, 10 or 15 days by incident class, with intermediate reports at least every four weeks while unresolved and a final report within 60 days of resolution; keep the records at least five years 65Incident pipeline on the Commission template fields; per-class clocks; five-year retention policy; downstream reporting channel4 · 5
Safety and Security, Appendix 1.3 and 1.4 (autonomy, tool use, loss of control)Sources of systemic risk to consider include the capability to operate autonomously, propensities such as colluding with other AI systems, and affordances such as access to tools and physical systems and the level of human oversight; loss of control is a specified systemic risk 65Provider evaluations of autonomy and tool use, requested at the vendor due-diligence gate and filed with the agent registry entry3 · 5

The Code is voluntary; signing it is one route to demonstrating compliance, not a legal presumption of conformity9. Signatory status is dynamic and counted per the Commission’s official list10.

For serious-incident reporting specifically, the Commission published a reporting template on 4 November 2025 for serious incidents involving GPAI models with systemic risk. It aligns to the Article 55 reporting duty and to Commitment 9 of the Code’s Safety and Security chapter, and is the concrete artefact the incident pipeline emits, the same template named in the Article 55 row above26. One internal incident record can feed this template and every other regime’s report. Commitment 9 of the Safety and Security chapter sets the clocks (2, 5, 10 or 15 days by incident class, intermediate reports at least every four weeks, a final report within 60 days of resolution) and a retention of at least five years, and its Appendix 1 lists the capability to operate autonomously and access to tools among the sources of systemic risk and loss of control among the specified risks, which is why the two rows above matter to anyone who deploys agents on a GPAI model65. Chapter 17 sets Commitment 9 beside the other regimes in the overlapping clocks, and chapter 23 reads Appendix 1 for agents in EU AI Act hooks for agents.

Data protection and other EU law

An AI system placed on the EU market meets more law than the AI Act on day one. The rows below index the obligations the v0.5.0 chapters teach: the GDPR, the cyber-security and incident-reporting regimes, and the liability, copyright, consumer and sector law that already reaches AI. They answer to their own supervisors (data protection authorities, CSIRTs and financial supervisors, courts and consumer authorities), not to the AI Act’s market-surveillance authorities, and several apply through national transposition, so the “Applies” column says so. Mappings are illustrative, not a claim of conformity.

The GDPR

The GDPR has applied since 25 May 201866. Chapter 19 walks every row below, with the EDPB’s anonymity test for trained models67, in privacy and data protection law applied to AI; chapter 16 builds the explanation and contest records of Arts. 15(1)(h) and 22 in data protection: the GDPR and the UK regime.

ArticleWhat it asks forEngineering artefactLayerWho is boundApplies
Art. 5(1)(b) and 6(4)Personal data are collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and not further processed incompatibly; Art. 6(4) sets the compatibility test for reuse, such as training on data collected for another purpose 66Purpose tags on datasets; purpose-match policy in training and indexing pipelines; compatibility assessment record1 · 2Controller2018-05-25
Art. 6A lawful basis for each processing operation, assessed separately for training, fine-tuning, retrieval and inference 6667Basis registry per dataset and stage; versioned legitimate-interest assessment2Controller2018-05-25
Art. 7Where consent is the basis, the controller can demonstrate it, and withdrawing consent is as easy as giving it 66Consent-purpose log joined to datasets and model versions; withdrawal propagated to the pipelines2 · 5Controller2018-05-25
Art. 9Processing special-category data, incl. biometric data for unique identification, is prohibited unless an Art. 9(2) condition applies, which reaches sensitive data a model infers 66Proxy test in CI; inference policy with a runtime output classifier; Art. 9(2) condition record1 · 3 · 4Controller2018-05-25
Arts. 13–14Inform data subjects of purposes, bases, recipients and retention and, for automated decision-making, give meaningful information about the logic involved (Arts. 13(2)(f), 14(2)(g)) 66Notice generated from the registry entry; model card; automated-decision notice per system2Controller2018-05-25
Art. 15(1)(h)On request, confirm automated decision-making and give meaningful information about the logic involved and its significance and envisaged consequences 66Per-request explanation generated from the decision record; system-level automated-decision notice4 · 5Controller2018-05-25
Arts. 15–17 and 21Access, rectification, erasure and objection requests reach every place the data lives: corpus, snapshots, retrieval index, logs and, where it holds personal data, the model 66Request workflow across corpus, snapshots, retrieval index, logs and weights; fulfilment record4 · 5Controller2018-05-25
Art. 22A right not to be subject to a decision based solely on automated processing with legal or similarly significant effects, except on contract, law or explicit consent; then human intervention, the right to express a view and to contest (Art. 22(3)) 66Decision record with reason codes; contest channel and human review log; appeal outcomes by group4 · 5Controller2018-05-25
Art. 5(1)(c) and 25Adequate, relevant and limited data, with technical and organisational measures built in at design and set by default 66Feature justification record; PII and special-category filters; retention as code1 · 3Controller2018-05-25
Art. 5(2)A controller that claims a trained model holds no personal data must be able to demonstrate it; the EDPB sets an anonymity test and the evidence it expects 6667Anonymity evidence pack; membership-inference and extraction evals in the eval gate3 · 5Controller (model developer)2018-05-25
Art. 28Use only processors with sufficient guarantees, under a contract that fixes instructions, sub-processors, security, assistance and deletion 66AI vendor clause checklist in the due-diligence gate (no training, retention, region, sub-processors, change notice)2 · 5Controller; processor2018-05-25
Art. 30Controllers and processors keep a record of the processing activities under their responsibility 66Records generated per processing moment from the registry and data cards2 · 5Controller; processor2018-05-25
Arts. 33–34Notify the supervisory authority without undue delay and, where feasible, within 72 hours of awareness; tell data subjects without undue delay when the breach is likely to result in a high risk 66Personal-data-breach branch of the incident pipeline with its own 72-hour timer; data-subject notice template4 · 5Controller (the processor notifies the controller)2018-05-25
Arts. 35–36Assess the impact before processing likely to result in a high risk, and consult the supervisory authority where the residual risk stays high 66AI DPIA template with AI-specific fields, cross-referenced by the FRIA; recorded decision when no DPIA is needed1 · 2Controller2018-05-25
Arts. 44–49Transfers outside the EEA only on an adequacy decision, appropriate safeguards (such as standard contractual clauses or binding corporate rules) or a narrow derogation; sending personal data to a model hosted outside the EEA can be a transfer 66Transfer register; residency and routing policy as code; transfer impact assessment1 · 4 · 5Controller; processor2018-05-25

Cyber-security and incident-reporting law

NIS2 binds essential and important entities through national law, which Member States apply from 18 October 202468; DORA has applied to financial entities since 17 January 202569, with the incident time limits fixed in Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/30170; and the Cyber Resilience Act’s reporting duty applies from 11 September 2026, ahead of the rest of that Regulation on 11 December 202771. An AI incident can start several of these clocks at once: chapter 17 lays them side by side in the overlapping clocks, and chapter 15 covers continuity when the provider fails.

ArticleWhat it asks forEngineering artefactLayerWho is boundApplies
NIS2 Art. 21(2)(c)–(d)Risk-management measures include business continuity (backup, disaster recovery, crisis management) and supply-chain security with direct suppliers and service providers, which covers AI and model services 68Continuity plan for AI dependencies with tested fallbacks; supplier assessments for model and platform providers4 · 5Essential and important entities2024-10-18, through national law
NIS2 Art. 23An early warning within 24 hours of becoming aware of a significant incident, an incident notification within 72 hours and a final report within one month of the notification, incl. the root cause 68Per-regime clock on the incident record; significance determination with an owner; cause coding reused in the final report5Essential and important entities2024-10-18, through national law
DORA Art. 19Report major ICT-related incidents: initial notification within 4 hours of classification as major and no later than 24 hours from awareness (within 4 hours of a classification made after those 24 hours), intermediate report within 72 hours of the initial notification, final report within one month of the latest intermediate report 6970Classification record with a timestamp; per-regime clock; consistent cause coding for recurring-incident aggregation5Financial entities2025-01-17
DORA Art. 28(3), 28(8)Keep a register of information on all contractual arrangements for ICT services from third-party providers, and exit strategies for ICT services that support critical or important functions 69Register entries for AI and model services; exit plan and exit-drill record2 · 5Financial entities2025-01-17
CRA Art. 14Notify actively exploited vulnerabilities and severe incidents through the single reporting platform: early warning within 24 hours, notification within 72 hours, final report 14 days after a fix is available (vulnerability) or one month after the notification (incident) 71Vulnerability and incident clocks on the incident record; submission through the single reporting platform4 · 5Manufacturers of products with digital elements2026-09-11; the rest from 2027-12-11

The revised Product Liability Directive treats software, AI systems included, as a product and applies to products placed on the market after 9 December 202672. The text-and-data-mining exception of the DSM Directive yields to a rightholder’s reservation73, which is the rule Art. 53(1)(c) of the AI Act points to. The Digital Services Act, the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, the Platform Work Directive and the revised Consumer Credit Directive add duties for platforms, traders, digital labour platforms and creditors74757677. Chapter 20 teaches them: copyright and training data, the EU Product Liability Directive, duty to warn after updates, the EU: UCPD, DSA and the AI Act, employment and credit and lending.

ArticleWhat it asks forEngineering artefactLayerWho is boundApplies
PLD Art. 4(1)Software is a product, so the manufacturer of an AI system is strictly liable for damage caused by a defect in a product placed on the market or put into service after 2026-12-09 72Defect-liability review at design; contractual recourse; residual risk in the register1 · 5Manufacturers and other economic operatorsProducts placed on the market after 2026-12-09
PLD Arts. 9–10A court can order the defendant to disclose relevant evidence at its disposal; failing to disclose it is one of the conditions under which the product is presumed defective 72Defence file per release: AIBOM with hashes, eval history, failure-mode analysis, signed logs, instructions for use, kept for the liability period2 · 3 · 5Manufacturers, incl. providers of AI systems and substantial modifiersProducts placed on the market after 2026-12-09
PLD Art. 11(2)The manufacturer cannot rely on the defect arising after placing on the market where it is due to software, incl. its updates or upgrades, or to missing safety updates, that remain within its control 72Change log; regression evals per release; patch decision records; versioned warnings3 · 4 · 5ManufacturersProducts placed on the market after 2026-12-09
DSM Directive Art. 4(3)The general text-and-data-mining exception applies only where rightholders have not expressly reserved use in an appropriate manner, such as machine-readable means for content made publicly available online 73Crawler policy-as-code honouring reservations; training-data rights ledger with the reservation-check result, method and date1 · 2Anyone mining works, incl. model developersTransposition deadline 2021-06-07
DSA Art. 25Online platforms do not design, organise or operate their interfaces in a way that deceives or manipulates users or impairs their free and informed decisions 74Interface review record; red-team eval for manipulative outputs3 · 5Providers of online platforms2024-02-17
DSA Art. 27Online platforms set out in their terms the main parameters of their recommender systems and any options users have to modify them 74Recommender parameter card generated from the ranking configuration; log of the options offered to users2 · 4Providers of online platforms2024-02-17
UCPD Arts. 5–7, Annex INo commercial practice contrary to professional diligence, or misleading, that distorts the average consumer’s decisions, incl. AI-generated claims and chatbot answers; stating that reviews are genuine without reasonable checks, and false reviews, are blacklisted (Annex I points 23b and 23c) 75Claims register linked to eval results; review-provenance checks; chatbot answer evals on product claims1 · 3 · 4Traders dealing with consumers2007-12-12; review points since Directive (EU) 2019/2161
Platform Work Directive Arts. 7, 9–11Limits on the personal data platforms may process through automated systems, transparency about those systems, human oversight with an impact evaluation at least every two years, and explanation and human review of decisions 76Registry of automated systems with their main parameters; data-category deny list; two-yearly impact evaluation; explanation and human review log1 · 2 · 3 · 5Digital labour platformsTransposition by 2026-12-02
CCD2 Art. 18(8)Where the creditworthiness assessment involves automated processing, the consumer may request human intervention, a clear explanation of the assessment and its logic, and a review of the decision 77Explanation artefact per model version; review path and log3 · 4 · 5Creditors2026-11-20

ISO/IEC 42001, 42005 and 42006

ISO/IEC 42001:2023 is the AI management-system (AIMS) standard; its Annex A groups control objectives into nine areas (A.2–A.10). It is a management-system standard, not the Article 17 QMS, and its European adoption (EN ISO/IEC 42001:2026) confers no presumption of conformity1112.

Annex A areaFocusEngineering artefactLayer
A.2 Policies related to AIAI policy set and its governancePolicy-as-code library; versioned policy repository1
A.3 Internal organizationRoles, responsibilities, reportingOperating model; RACI; ownership in the registry1 · 2
A.4 Resources for AI systemsData, tooling, compute, human resources documentedResource inventory; AIBOM; environment manifests2
A.5 Assessing impacts of AI systemsImpact assessment processImpact assessment as code; FRIA/DPIA linkage (ISO/IEC 42005)1 · 3
A.6 AI system life cycleResponsible design, development, deploymentPipeline controls; eval gates; change management1 · 3 · 4
A.7 Data for AI systemsData quality, provenance, preparationData cards; lineage; data quality tests2 · 3
A.8 Information for interested partiesTransparency and reporting to stakeholdersModel/data cards; machine-readable disclosures2
A.9 Use of AI systemsResponsible-use controls and monitoringRuntime guardrails; usage telemetry4
A.10 Third-party and customer relationshipsManaging supplier and customer responsibilitiesSupplier AIBOM; contractual and technical control mapping2 · 5

ISO/IEC 42005:2025 provides guidance for AI system impact assessment and is the natural companion to Article 27 (FRIA) and Annex A.513. The operating model and RACI of the A.3 row are built in a lifecycle RACI (chapter 12), and chapter 22 places these standards in the ISO/IEC family as a whole.

Two further ISO/IEC standards sit alongside the AIMS. ISO/IEC 42006:2025 sets the requirements for the bodies that audit and certify AI management systems: building on ISO/IEC 17021-1, it is the answer to “who may credibly certify you to 42001”, since it fixes the competence and consistency a certification body must show. ISO/IEC 23894:2023 gives guidance on AI risk management, adapting ISO 31000 to AI; it is the risk-process companion to Article 9 and to the NIST AI RMF2728. The table also carries ISO/IEC 42005:2025, the impact-assessment guidance13, and ISO/IEC 22989:2022, the concepts and terminology standard whose AI stakeholder roles and life-cycle vocabulary a registry can reuse field for field78.

StandardWhat it isEngineering artefactLayer
ISO/IEC 42006:2025Requirements for bodies auditing and certifying AI management systems (who may credibly certify you to 42001)Accredited certification scope; auditor-competence evidence; certificate register5
ISO/IEC 23894:2023Guidance on AI risk management (companion to ISO 31000)Risk register as code; AI risk taxonomy; linkage to EU AI Act Art. 9 and the NIST AI RMF1 · 3
ISO/IEC 42005:2025Guidance for assessing the impacts of an AI system on individuals, groups and society across its life cycle (companion to Art. 27 and Annex A.5) 13Impact assessment as code from a template; FRIA and DPIA cross-references; re-assessment triggers1 · 3
ISO/IEC 22989:2022A shared vocabulary for AI concepts, the AI system life cycle and AI stakeholder roles 78Registry field names and role vocabulary aligned to the standard’s terms; glossary cross-references2

Maps to: these controls are realised through layers 1, 2, 3 and 5 of the stack; the impact-assessment control (A.5 / ISO 42005) supports EU AI Act Art. 27. Mappings are illustrative, not a claim of conformity.

NIST AI RMF

The NIST AI Risk Management Framework 1.0 (January 2023; there is no 2.0) organises risk work into four functions. It is voluntary and US-origin, and it maps cleanly onto the five-layer stack14. As of 2026-09-24, NIST’s framework page states that AI RMF 1.0 “is being revised as part of the White House AI Action Plan”; no revised text had been published, so 1.0 remains the version to cite and to pin in control metadata59. Chapter 22 covers the NIST AI RMF in depth: the seven trustworthy characteristics, the 19 categories of the Core, the Playbook and the profiles.

FunctionWhat it asks forEngineering artefactLayer
GOVERNA culture and structure for managing AI riskPolicy-as-code; operating model; registry ownership1 · 2
MAPContext and risk framing for each AI systemThreat models; use-case and impact mapping; data/model cards2 · 3
MEASUREAnalyse, benchmark and monitor riskEval gates; adversarial red-team suite; metrics per failure mode3
MANAGEPrioritise, respond and recoverRuntime guardrails; incident pipeline; continuous assurance4 · 5

Newer NIST AI work

Beyond the RMF, three newer NIST efforts bear on the stack. Two are still in draft, and the copy says so. The AI Agent Standards Initiative, launched by NIST’s Center for AI Standards and Innovation (CAISI) on 17 February 2026, targets interoperable, secure standards for AI agents: identity, authentication, authorisation and agent security29. The draft IR 8596 Cyber AI Profile (initial preliminary draft, 16 December 2025; comments closed 30 January 2026, and still the current version as of 2026-09-24) is a Cybersecurity Framework (CSF 2.0) profile for AI, organised around Secure, Defend and Thwart30. The draft AI 800-1 (Managing Misuse Risk for Dual-Use Foundation Models; second public draft, January 2025; no final version published as of 2026-09-24) is voluntary guidance for identifying, measuring and mitigating misuse risk across the AI lifecycle31. The older Generative AI Profile, NIST AI 600-1 (26 July 2024), is the RMF’s companion for generative AI: 12 risks and suggested actions coded to the four functions, and the table carries it too79.

NIST itemWhat it isEngineering artefactLayer
AI Agent Standards Initiative (2026)CAISI initiative on interoperable, secure AI agents: identity, authentication, agent securityAgent registry; non-human-identity controls; agent authentication and authorisation; adversarial agent evals3 · 4
IR 8596 Cyber AI Profile (draft)CSF 2.0 profile for AI (Secure / Defend / Thwart)AI-system security controls; runtime observability; threat detection mapped to CSF 2.03 · 4
AI 800-1 (draft)Managing Misuse Risk for Dual-Use Foundation Models (voluntary guidance)Misuse red-team suite; capability and dangerous-capability evals; safety framework3
AI 600-1 Generative AI Profile (2024)Suggested actions for 12 risks that generative AI creates or exacerbates, coded to the Govern, Map, Measure and Manage functions 79Generative-AI eval suites named after the profile’s action ids (e.g. confabulation, information integrity); a risk-register entry per profile risk1 · 3

CSA AICM and STAR for AI

The Cloud Security Alliance’s AI Controls Matrix (AICM) v1.1, published 22 June 2026, defines 247 control objectives across 18 domains, and the STAR for AI programme provides the assurance scheme around it, in three levels: a Level 1 self-assessment, a Level 1 “Valid-AI-ted” automated validation, and a Level 2 that adds ISO/IEC 42001 certification1583.

CSA artefactWhat it isEngineering artefactLayer
AICM v1.1247 control objectives across 18 domains, spanning governance, data, model and runtimeControl catalogue mapped to policy-as-code and evals; crosswalk to ISO 42001 / NIST AI RMF1 · 3 · 5
STAR for AIAssurance and certification programme on the AICM: Level 1 self-assessment, Level 1 Valid-AI-ted (automated validation) and Level 2 (ISO/IEC 42001 certification plus the validated assessment) 83Machine-readable evidence submission; continuous assurance telemetry5
Agent controls (AICM v1.1, ATF, AARM)Agent-specific AICM controls (e.g. IAM-18 Agent Access Restriction, AIS-11 Agents Security Boundaries), with the Agentic Trust Framework v1 (earned autonomy tiers) and the AARM runtime-interception specification 808182Agent-specific control definitions; policy-as-code for agent scope and tools; runtime guardrails1 · 4
Catastrophic Risk AnnexEnhanced AICM controls for high-autonomy systems with catastrophic-risk potentialEnhanced controls for high-autonomy systems; kill switch and oversight controls; pilot-audit evidence4 · 5

Two lines of work push the AICM toward agents and frontier risk. For agents, the controls sit inside the matrix itself (for example IAM-18 Agent Access Restriction and AIS-11 Agents Security Boundaries)80, and the CSA’s agentic control-plane programme adds two published specifications, the Agentic Trust Framework (zero trust for agents with earned autonomy tiers) and AARM (interception of agent actions before they execute)328182. Earlier editions of this map listed a proposed “Agentic Control Supplement” to the AICM; it could not be matched to a CSA primary document as of 2026-09-24, so the row now names what is published (verify). For frontier risk, the Catastrophic Risk Annex adds a set of enhanced controls for high-autonomy systems, meant to be proven through pilot audits rather than asserted33.

OWASP GenAI Security Project

OWASP’s GenAI Security Project supplies the threat vocabulary the controls are built against, plus two formats (the Agent Control Standard and an AIBOM) that the stack consumes directly161754. Chapter 23 maps each agentic entry to its controls in threats mapped to controls.

OWASP artefactWhat it isEngineering artefactLayer
Top 10 for Agentic Applications 2026Agent threat catalogue (ASI01 Agent Goal Hijack … ASI10 Rogue Agents)Agent threat model; adversarial evals; runtime guardrails; kill switch3 · 4
Top 10 for LLM Applications 2026LLM threat catalogue (incl. Excessive Agency at #3)Prompt-injection and output-handling controls; eval gate3 · 4
Agent Control Standard (ACS)A standard for expressing agent controlsMachine-readable control definitions for agents1 · 4
AIBOMAI bill-of-materials format and generatorAIBOM at build (CycloneDX ML-BOM, SPDX 3.0 AI)2

US federal and state laws

The United States has no horizontal federal AI statute; the binding AI-specific rules are state laws, and they differ in scope. Two bind only frontier developers, with the heaviest duties on the large ones; the rest reach ordinary developers, deployers and operators, and federal law that predates AI (fair lending, credit reporting, employment discrimination, the FTC Act) already reaches AI decisions. The tables below carry them all as rows. Chapter 21 teaches them: the federal layer (executive orders, the OMB memoranda that bind agencies and their vendors, and the federal push against state AI laws) and the state laws that bind private organisations, each with its scope, dates, duties and enforcement.

Frontier-developer laws

Two US state laws bind only frontier developers, with the heaviest duties on the large ones, not general deployers: a narrower scope than the EU AI Act’s risk-tiering. They ask large frontier developers to publish safety frameworks and every frontier developer to report critical safety incidents to the state181925. California’s whistleblower protection is met in practice by a channel for raising concerns (chapter 12). The frontier safety frameworks crosswalk maps three published frameworks to the NIST AI RMF and ISO/IEC 42001, as a coverage map rather than a conformity claim.

LawScopeObligationEngineering artefactLayer
California SB 53 (TFAIA), in force 2026-01-01Frontier developers (models trained above ~10^26 FLOP); the framework duty binds large frontier developers (developer revenue over USD 500M)Publish a frontier AI framework; report critical safety incidents to the Office of Emergency Services within 15 days; whistleblower protection; up to USD 1M per violation, AG-enforced 56Published safety framework; incident pipeline reporting to the state; transparency artefacts5 · 4
California SB 53 whistleblower protections (Labor Code 1107–1107.2), in force 2026-01-01Frontier developers; the anonymous process binds large frontier developersNo rule, policy or contract that prevents covered employees from disclosing catastrophic-risk concerns, and no retaliation; notice of rights; large frontier developers run an anonymous internal process with monthly updates to the reporter, shared with officers and directors at least quarterly 56Anonymous internal reporting channel with status updates; notice acknowledgment records; quarterly summary to officers and directors1 · 5
New York RAISE Act (S6953B), signed 2025-12-19Frontier developers (models trained above 10^26 operations) report incidents within 72 hours; the framework duty binds large frontier developers (annual revenue over USD 500M); thresholds of the chapter amendment signed 2026-03-27Publish a frontier AI safety and security framework; disclose safety incidents within 72 hours. A chapter amendment signed 2026-03-27 sets the effective date at 2027-01-01 and creates an oversight office within the New York Department of Financial Services (DFS) 192425Published frontier AI safety framework; 72-hour incident and disclosure pipeline reporting to the DFS oversight office5 · 4

Other state AI laws

These state laws reach beyond frontier developers to ordinary developers, deployers and operators: Texas and Colorado; California’s training-data, provenance and companion-chatbot laws; New York’s companion rules; Illinois; New York City’s Local Law 144; and Utah5584858688899091. Chapter 21 sets each one out with its enforcement in its table of state laws, and compares the hiring rules in one hiring tool, four regimes.

LawScopeObligationEngineering artefactLayer
Texas TRAIGA (HB 149), in force 2026-01-01Developers and deployers doing business in TexasIntent-based prohibitions on developing or deploying AI (behaviour manipulation, unlawful discrimination); social scoring banned for governmental entities; AI-use disclosure by government agencies and health care providers; a regulatory sandbox; Attorney-General enforcement; local AI rules preempted 35Prohibited-use policy-as-code; AI-use disclosure controls; complaint and incident handling1 · 4
Colorado SB 26-189 (automated decision-making technology), effective 2027-01-01, replacing SB 24-205Developers and deployers of ADMT in consequential decisionsDeveloper documentation to deployers and notice of material updates; deployer notice of ADMT use; a plain-language explanation within 30 days of an adverse outcome; correction, human review and reconsideration; records kept at least three years. SB 26-189 (signed 2026-05-14) repealed and re-enacted SB 24-205, whose duty of care against algorithmic discrimination had been delayed to 2026-06-30 and whose enforcement a federal court had blocked 3655ADMT inventory; developer documentation pack; notice and adverse-outcome explanation templates; human-review queue; three-year record store2 · 4 · 5
California AB 2013 (training-data transparency), due 2026-01-01Developers of generative AI systems released since 2022-01-01Developers post a summary of the datasets used to train a generative AI system made available to Californians (sources, size, data types, IP and personal information, synthetic data) on or before 2026-01-01 and on each substantial modification 84Data card per dataset, published at release; training-data rights ledger2
California AI Transparency Act (SB 942 as amended by AB 853), operative 2026-08-02Covered providers of public generative AI systems; large online platforms; capture-device makersCovered providers offer a free AI-detection tool and embed latent disclosures, with an optional manifest disclosure, in generated image, video and audio; large online platforms and capture devices follow later 85Provenance pipeline writing latent metadata; public detection endpoint; platform-side provenance display3 · 4
California SB 243 (companion chatbots), chaptered 2025-10-13Operators of companion chatbotsDisclose AI where a reasonable person could be misled; for known minors, remind at least every three hours and prevent sexually explicit content; run a suicide and self-harm protocol with crisis referral; annual reports from 2027-07-01 86Companion-mode policy; reminder timer; crisis-referral classifier and log; annual report1 · 4 · 5
New York GBL Article 47 (AI companion models), in force 2025-11-05 (verify)Operators of AI companionsDetect suicidal ideation and self-harm and refer users to crisis services; tell users they are not talking to a human at the start and at least every three hours 88Crisis-referral classifier and log; notice timer4 · 5
Illinois HB 3773 (Human Rights Act amendment), effective 2026-01-01EmployersEmployers may not use AI with a discriminatory effect on protected classes in recruitment, hiring, promotion, discipline or other terms of employment, nor ZIP codes as a proxy, and must notify employees and applicants 89118AI-in-HR inventory; adverse-impact eval per protected class; notice record2 · 3 · 4
NYC Local Law 144 (automated employment decision tools), enforced since 2023-07-05Employers and employment agencies using AEDTs for New York City rolesAn independent bias audit within one year before use, a published summary of the results, and notice to candidates and employees 10 business days before use 90Impact-ratio eval by sex, race/ethnicity and intersectional category; published audit summary; notice record3 · 5
Utah AI disclosure law (SB 226), effective 2025-05-07Suppliers using generative AI in consumer transactions; regulated occupationsDisclose generative AI when a person clearly and unambiguously asks; regulated occupations disclose it prominently in a high-risk AI interaction; clear disclosure at the outset is a safe harbour 91Disclosure component with an interaction-risk flag; conversation log showing the disclosure4

State privacy and sector laws

State privacy statutes reach AI through profiling opt-outs, assessments, consent and review rights, and one sector law reaches insurers’ models. Chapter 19 compares them in the United States and chapter 20 covers housing, insurance and public services.

LawScopeObligationEngineering artefactLayer
California CPPA regulations (ADMT), duties from 2027-01-01Businesses subject to the CCPABusinesses using ADMT for significant decisions give a pre-use notice, an opt-out or a human appeal, and access to information about the ADMT 87ADMT register; pre-use notice; opt-out or appeal workflow; ADMT access response2 · 4 · 5
California CPPA regulations (risk assessments), effective 2026-01-01Businesses subject to the CCPAA risk assessment before processing that presents significant risk, incl. using ADMT for significant decisions; attestations and summaries submitted to the Agency 87Risk assessment per triggering activity; submission record5
Virginia CDPA (§ 59.1-580), from 2023-01-01ControllersControllers document data protection assessments for targeted advertising, sale, profiling that presents a reasonably foreseeable risk, and sensitive data, for processing created after 2023-01-01, and give them to the Attorney General on request 93Assessment template per processing activity; profiling register1 · 5
Colorado Privacy Act (SB21-190), effective 2023-07-01ControllersConsumers may opt out of profiling in furtherance of decisions with legal or similarly significant effects, incl. through a universal opt-out mechanism; controllers run data protection assessments for processing that presents a heightened risk 94Opt-out flag honoured at inference; assessment template; intake data-class flags1 · 2 · 4 · 5
Minnesota CDPA (§ 325M.14), effective 2025-07-31ControllersA consumer may question the result of profiling, be told the reason, review the personal data used, correct it and have the decision re-evaluated 95Reason-and-review workflow with re-evaluation on corrected data4 · 5
Illinois BIPA (740 ILCS 14), in force 2008-10-03Private entitiesInformed written consent before collecting biometric identifiers, a retention and destruction schedule, and secure storage; a private right of action with statutory damages 96119Written-consent capture; retention schedule as code; destruction log1 · 2
Washington My Health My Data Act (RCW 19.373), from 2024-03-31Regulated entitiesConsent to collect and separate consent to share consumer health data, incl. data derived or extrapolated by algorithms or machine learning, and a signed authorisation for any sale 97Separate consent records for collection and sharing; signed sale authorisation; intake flags for derived health data1 · 2
Colorado SB21-169 (insurers), effective 2021-09-07InsurersInsurers may not unfairly discriminate through external consumer data, algorithms or predictive models; they keep a risk-management framework, test for unfair discrimination and file a chief-risk-officer attestation under rules adopted per line of insurance 92Inventory of external data sources and models; disparity testing; chief-risk-officer attestation record2 · 3 · 5

Federal law that already reaches AI

Federal agencies are bound by OMB memoranda9899. For private organisations the federal rules that reach AI are older, technology-neutral law: adverse-action notices in lending and credit reporting, disparate impact in employment, the FTC Act’s ban on deceptive practices, and the TAKE IT DOWN Act’s removal duty100101102103104105106. Chapter 21 covers the federal layer; chapter 16 builds the reason codes of credit adverse-action notices and the four-fifths rule; chapter 20 covers claims substantiation and deepfakes and synthetic media.

LawScopeObligationEngineering artefactLayer
OMB M-25-21 (federal use of AI), issued 2025-04-03US federal agencies (their AI vendors by contract)Federal agencies apply minimum practices to high-impact AI: pre-deployment testing, an AI impact assessment, ongoing monitoring, operator training, human oversight with a fail-safe where practicable, remedies or appeals, and consultation of end users, documented within 365 days 98Use-case inventory entry; pre-deployment test report; AI impact assessment; monitoring plan; appeal path2 · 3 · 4 · 5
OMB M-26-04 (LLM procurement), issued 2025-12-11US federal agencies and LLM vendorsSolicitations for large language models request, as a minimum, the vendor’s acceptable use policy, model, system or data cards, end-user resources and a feedback mechanism 99Acceptable use policy; model, system or data cards; end-user resources; feedback channel2 · 5
ECOA Regulation B (12 CFR 1002.9)CreditorsA creditor that takes adverse action gives a statement of specific principal reasons, or the right to one within 30 days; citing internal standards or a failed score is insufficient, whatever model made the decision 100Reason-code service versioned with the model; reason-code fidelity eval; notice template3 · 4 · 5
FCRA (15 U.S.C. 1681m(a))Users of consumer reportsA user of a consumer report that takes adverse action gives notice, discloses the numerical credit score used and its key factors, names the reporting agency and states the right to a free report and to dispute 101Score and key-factor record per adverse decision; notice template4
Title VII s. 703(k) and UGESP (29 CFR 1607.4(D))EmployersA selection procedure with disparate impact is unlawful unless job-related and consistent with business necessity, and a less discriminatory alternative can still be required; a selection rate under four-fifths of the highest group’s rate is generally regarded as evidence of adverse impact 102103Adverse-impact-ratio eval per group with counts and confidence intervals; job-relatedness validation; alternatives search log3 · 5
FTC Act s. 5 (15 U.S.C. 45)Businesses making AI claimsDeceptive acts or practices are unlawful: claims about an AI system’s accuracy, performance or fairness need competent and reliable evidence before they are made 104105Claims register linked to current eval runs; substantiation gate on release copy1 · 3 · 5
TAKE IT DOWN Act (Public Law 119-12), process due 2026-05-19Covered platformsCovered platforms run a notice-and-removal process and remove reported non-consensual intimate images, incl. AI-generated forgeries, and known identical copies within 48 hours of a valid request 106Takedown pipeline with a 48-hour clock, owner and log; matching of identical copies4 · 5

Federal audit and oversight

Auditors bring their own lens. The GAO AI Accountability Framework (GAO-21-519SP, 30 June 2021) binds no one, but it is what the US Government Accountability Office, inspectors general and third-party assessors use to audit an AI system, and it holds “other entities” to the same practices as federal agencies120. It has four principles (governance, data, performance, monitoring) and 31 key practices, each with questions for the entity and audit procedures for the assessor. An entity that can answer those questions from its own records is ready for the audit. It does not replace the NIST AI RMF (the operational risk process) or a binding law such as the EU AI Act; it is the check applied to both.

FrameworkScopeWhat it asks forEngineering artefactLayer
GAO AI Accountability Framework, principle 1 (governance), practices 1.1 to 1.9Federal agencies and other entities; auditors and third-party assessorsClear goals, roles and delegation of authority, values, a multidisciplinary workforce, stakeholder involvement and an AI-specific risk management plan, plus documented technical specifications, compliance with applicable law and transparency to external stakeholders 120Registry entry with owner and intended purpose; RACI; risk register as code; compliance mapping; published system card1 · 2 · 5
GAO AI Accountability Framework, principle 2 (data), practices 2.1 to 2.8Federal agencies and other entities; auditors and third-party assessorsDocument the sources and origins of development data and assess their reliability, categorisation, variable selection and any synthetic, imputed or augmented data; assess the dependencies, bias, security and privacy of the data used in operation 120Dataset datasheet with lineage; data-quality and representativeness evals; data-flow map2 · 3
GAO AI Accountability Framework, principle 3 (performance), practices 3.1 to 3.9Federal agencies and other entities; auditors and third-party assessorsCatalogue components, define precise, consistent and reproducible metrics, assess each component and the whole system against them, identify biases and define procedures for human supervision 120Eval suite with versioned metrics per component and system; bias eval; human-oversight procedure3 · 4
GAO AI Accountability Framework, principle 4 (monitoring), practices 4.1 to 4.5Federal agencies and other entities; auditors and third-party assessorsPlan continuous or routine monitoring, set the acceptable range of data and model drift, document monitoring results and corrective actions, and reassess the system’s utility and the conditions for scaling it 120Monitoring plan with drift thresholds; monitoring log with corrective actions; periodic review record4 · 5

Other jurisdictions

The map’s spine is the EU AI Act, but a governance function working across borders answers to more than one regime. These rows are stamped as of 2026-09-24; where a rule is still moving, the copy says so.

Jurisdiction / instrumentStatus (as of 2026-09-24)What it asks forEngineering artefactLayer
South Korea: AI Basic ActIn force 2026-01-2234, with its Enforcement Decree62; the ministry (MSIT) announced a guidance period of at least one year in which fact-finding and fines are held back except in exceptional cases, while the duties apply58; detail in chapter 21Baseline duties for AI operators, heightened duties for “high-impact” AI in sensitive sectors, and AI-content labellingRisk register for high-impact AI; AI-use notification; AI-content labelling1 · 2 · 4
Singapore: IMDA Model AI Governance Framework for Generative AIVoluntary; published May 2024 39Governance dimensions incl. testing, transparency, incident reporting, security and content provenanceEval suite; model cards; content provenance and watermarking2 · 3 · 4
ETSI EN 304 223 (Securing AI)Published (V2.1.1, Dec 2025) 40Baseline cyber-security requirements across the AI lifecycle (13 principles over five stages)AI-system security controls across the lifecycle; supply-chain and AIBOM checks; runtime hardening4
Singapore: IMDA Model AI Governance Framework for Agentic AI (identity and authorisations)Voluntary; version 1.5 published 2026-05-20 107Each agent has a unique, accounted-for identity, catalogued and centrally managed; authorisations are scoped, time- or session-bound, non-transferable and bounded by the authorising humanAgent registry with a workload identity per agent; delegated, short-lived credentials never broader than the user2 · 4
Singapore: IMDA Model AI Governance Framework for Agentic AI (human checkpoints)Voluntary; version 1.5 published 2026-05-20 107Significant checkpoints for high-stakes, irreversible, outlier and user-defined actions, with approvals that are contextual and digestible and enforced through system-level controlsCheckpoint classes in the tool gateway; approval log; oversight metrics4 · 5
Canada: Directive on Automated Decision-Making (federal institutions)In effect since 2019-04-01; modified 2025-06-24 108Complete, approve and publish an algorithmic impact assessment before production; apply the Appendix C requirements for the impact level (notice, explanation, peer review, human intervention); offer recourse and report on effectivenessPublished AIA rendered from a shared impact fact base; notice and explanation templates; peer-review record; recourse path; re-assessment triggers as code1 · 2 · 5
Brazil: LGPD Art. 20 (review of automated decisions)In force 2020-09-18 (verify); sanctions from 2021-08-01 109A data subject may request review of decisions taken solely on automated processing that affect their interests, incl. profiling, and the controller gives clear information on the criteria and procedures usedReview workflow; statement of criteria and procedures per system4 · 5

South Korea, article by article

The AI Basic Act’s operator duties sit in Articles 31 to 36, with the mechanics in the Enforcement Decree3462. All of them have applied since 22 January 2026; what MSIT holds back during its guidance period of at least one year is fact-finding and fines, not the duties58. Chapter 21 walks each article in South Korea: the AI Basic Act.

ArticleWho is boundWhat it asks forEngineering artefactLayer
Art. 31(1)AI business operatorsTell users in advance that a product or service runs on high-impact or generative AI, in the product, the terms, the screen or the place of supply (Decree Art. 23(1)); a missing notice is finable (Art. 43) 3462Notice component in UI, terms and contracts; notice inventory per user surface2 · 4
Art. 31(2)–(3)Operators providing generative AIIndicate that outputs are AI-generated, and notify or label realistic synthetic sound, images or video so users can recognise them; a machine-readable mark alone needs at least one text or voice notice (Decree Art. 23(2)–(3)) 3462Provenance pipeline: visible label or machine-readable mark plus at least one text or voice notice3 · 4
Art. 32Operators of qualifying high-compute systemsSystems with at least 10^26 FLOP of cumulative training compute, built with the most advanced technology and posing broad and serious risk (Decree Art. 24), identify, assess and mitigate risks across the lifecycle and report the results to MSIT 3462Lifecycle risk register; safety-incident monitoring; results report to MSIT3 · 4 · 5
Art. 33AI business operatorsReview in advance whether a system is high-impact AI and optionally ask MSIT to confirm; MSIT replies within 30 days, extendable once (Decree Art. 25) 3462Classification decision record per system: Art. 2(4) area, risk rationale, training-data overview, MSIT reply1 · 2
Art. 34Operators of high-impact AIA risk management plan, an explanation plan, a user-protection plan, human management and supervision, and documents showing the measures; publish the main content and keep the evidence for five years (Decree Art. 27) 3462Risk management, explanation and user-protection plans; named human overseer; published summary; five-year evidence store1 · 2 · 4 · 5
Art. 35Operators of high-impact AIEndeavour to assess the effect on fundamental rights before providing high-impact AI, covering the seven elements of Decree Art. 28 3462Impact assessment carrying the seven decree elements1 · 5
Art. 36Foreign AI business operators above a thresholdAn operator with no address or establishment in Korea that meets a decree threshold (revenue, AI-service revenue, daily users or a past fine; Decree Art. 29) designates a domestic representative in writing and reports it to MSIT 3462Designation filed with MSIT; evidence-access runbook for the representative5

United Kingdom

The UK has no horizontal AI act. It governs AI through existing sector regulators (the ICO, the FCA, the MHRA and others), coordinated centrally, plus the AI Security Institute (renamed from the AI Safety Institute in February 2025) for frontier-model evaluation38. For automated decision-making, the Data (Use and Access) Act 2025 replaced UK GDPR Article 22 with new Articles 22A–22D (in force 5 February 2026): a permission-plus-safeguards model for significant, solely automated decisions, with tighter conditions where special-category data is used. The safeguards (a meaningful-human-review path, a channel to make representations and to contest, and a decision notice) are the artefact the engineer builds37. Chapter 19 sets Articles 22A–22D beside the GDPR and the US regimes in the regimes side by side, and chapter 16 turns the safeguards into explanation and contest records in data protection: the GDPR and the UK regime. UK consumer law reaches AI-generated reviews: the Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act 2024 bans fake and concealed-incentive reviews from 6 April 2025111, taught in chapter 20 under the United Kingdom: DMCC Act.

Jurisdiction / instrumentStatus (as of 2026-09-24)What it asks forEngineering artefactLayer
UK: Data (Use and Access) Act 2025, UK GDPR Arts. 22A–22DIn force 2026-02-05 37A permission-plus-safeguards model for significant, solely automated decisions, with tighter conditions where special-category data is usedADM safeguards: meaningful-human-review path, contest and representation channel, decision notice4 · 2
UK: Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act 2024, s. 225 and Sch. 20 para. 13In force 2025-04-06 111Unfair commercial practices are prohibited, and Schedule 20 bans submitting or commissioning fake consumer reviews and concealed-incentive reviews, which reaches reviews generated by AIPolicy blocking review generation; review-provenance log1 · 4

China

China governs AI in two tiers, and this map keeps them apart. The binding tier is a set of departmental rules issued by the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) with co-issuers, on algorithmic recommendation (2022), deep synthesis (2023), generative AI services (2023) and the labelling of AI-generated synthetic content (2025); several are territorial, and the Interim Measures for Generative AI Services apply only to services offered “to the public within the PRC”434445. The labelling duty is backed by a mandatory national standard, GB 45438-2025, that carries the metadata fields the measure requires4647. The voluntary tier is the recommended standard GB/T 45654-2025 48 and the TC260 AI Safety Governance Framework4142. The Cybersecurity Law, amended by the NPC Standing Committee on 2025-10-28 and in force 2026-01-01, adds a programmatic Article 20 on AI that does not by itself create operator duties49; the most recent binding rule, the Interim Measures for Anthropomorphic Interaction Services (in force 2026-07-15), is narrow in scope (services that offer sustained emotional interaction); it has a row below and chapter 21 sets it out under China: what chapter 08 does not already cover50. Personal information is governed by the Personal Information Protection Law, whose Article 24 on automated decision-making also has a row110. The framework 3.0 (14 September 2026) is a TC260 technical document published under CAC guidance and described as “a reference for developers, providers and users”: it sets a three-block risk taxonomy (inherent, application and secondary), grades risk qualitatively by scenario, intelligence level and scale with no compute or parameter threshold, treats open-source models as a distinct risk profile and names computing-power security as a risk category, and its Appendix 2 walks the agent lifecycle from design to decommissioning42. Practitioner commentary reported agents and physically interactive systems as the headline change in the new version51.

The instruments above resolve to obligation-to-artefact rows in the same shape as the other jurisdictions:

Jurisdiction / instrumentStatus (as of 2026-09-20)What it asks forEngineering artefactLayer
China: Provisions on the Administration of Algorithmic Recommendation in Internet Information Services (CAC, MIIT, MPS and SAMR Order No. 9)Binding; in force 2022-03-01 43Algorithm filing for services with public-opinion attributes or social-mobilisation capacity, security assessment, display of the filing number, and a user option to switch off personalised recommendationAlgorithm inventory with filing record and number; security-assessment evidence pack; opt-out control at runtime1 · 2 · 4
China: Provisions on the Administration of Deep Synthesis in Internet Information Services (CAC, MIIT and MPS Order No. 12)Binding; in force 2023-01-10 44Conspicuous labels where synthetic content could mislead the public and non-removable technical marks; training-data management; separate consent for face and voice editing; filing and security assessment for opinion-shaping functionsContent-provenance pipeline (visible label plus metadata mark); training-data governance record; consent gate; pre-release security assessment2 · 3 · 4
China: Interim Measures for the Administration of Generative AI Services (CAC and six other bodies, Order No. 15)Binding; in force 2023-08-15; applies to services offered to the public within the PRC 45Lawful-source training data and foundation models; content labelling under the deep-synthesis rules; security assessment and algorithm filing for opinion-shaping services; stop, remove, retrain and report on illegal contentData-lineage and licensing record; eval gate on generated content; incident pipeline with a retraining loop; filing record2 · 3 · 4 · 5
China: Measures for Labelling AI-Generated Synthetic Content, with mandatory standard GB 45438-2025Binding; in force 2025-09-01, the standard implemented the same day 4647Explicit labels (text, audio or graphic) and implicit metadata labels carrying the provider’s name or code and a content number; distribution platforms verify metadata and flag suspected AI contentProvenance and watermarking pipeline emitting the GB 45438 metadata fields; platform-side detection and flagging3 · 4
China: GB/T 45654-2025 Basic security requirements for generative AI servicesRecommended (voluntary) national standard; implemented 2025-11-01 48Training-corpus source and content screening, model-safety requirements and the evaluation methods that underpin the security assessmentCorpus-screening record; eval question banks; security-assessment report3 · 5
China: TC260 AI Safety Governance Framework 3.0Voluntary; published 2026-09-14, building on 1.0 (2024) and 2.0 (2025) 4142A three-block risk taxonomy (inherent, application, secondary), technological and governance countermeasures and role-based guidelines; operators keep logs for at least six months and audit them, monitor risk in real time, keep a traceable chain of responsibility and assess resilience (§5.3)Risk register keyed to the framework’s taxonomy; log-retention policy (six months) with audit; real-time risk monitoring; resilience assessment1 · 4 · 5
China: Personal Information Protection Law, Arts. 24 and 55–56Binding; in force 2021-11-01 110Automated decisions stay transparent and fair, with no unreasonable differential treatment in prices or terms; targeted pushes offer a non-personalised option or an easy refusal; individuals may request an explanation and refuse solely automated decisions with a significant impact; an impact assessment beforehand, kept at least three yearsExplanation service and manual-decision route; non-personalised option at runtime; impact assessment record kept three years2 · 4 · 5
China: Interim Measures for the Administration of Anthropomorphic Interaction Services (CAC, NDRC, MIIT, MPS and SAMR)Binding; in force 2026-07-15 50A minors’ mode; AI signals and a reminder after two hours of continuous use; an easy exit; a security assessment at 1 million registered or 100,000 monthly active users; filingMinors’-mode configuration; reminder timer; user-count threshold monitor; security-assessment report; filing record1 · 2 · 4 · 5
China: TC260 Framework 3.0, Appendix 2 (agentic AI risk management)Voluntary; published 2026-09-14 42Unique identity and least-privilege permissions per agent by decision mode; human checkpoints with tamper-proof approval logs and deny-by-default; tool and skill verification; runtime guardrails (alert, restrict, intercept, suspend, terminate); memory isolation with no credentials in memory; mutual authentication; sandbox validation, red teaming and re-validation on major change; controlled decommissioningAgent registry with identity and scope; approval-log store; tool allow-list with integrity checks; runtime guardrails and kill switch; memory-scope policy; decommissioning runbook2 · 3 · 4 · 5

Appendix 2’s agent controls line up with the two agentic references this chapter already carries, the OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications 16 and the NIST AI Agent Standards Initiative29:

Agent controlTC260 Framework 3.0, Appendix 2 42OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications 2026 16NIST AI Agent Standards Initiative 29Layer
Identity and least privilegeII.2: unique identity per agent, permissions by decision mode, credentials revoked at task endASI03 Identity and Privilege AbuseAgent identity, authentication, authorisation2 · 4
Human checkpoints and approval logsII.3: tiered controls, human control checkpoints, tamper-proof approval logs, deny by defaultASI09 Human-Agent Trust Exploitation; ASI01 Agent Goal HijackNone4 · 5
Tools, skills and supply chainII.4: tool verification, fair tool selection, anomaly detection, skill managementASI02 Tool Misuse and Exploitation; ASI04 Agentic Supply Chain VulnerabilitiesAgent security2 · 4
Runtime guardrails and execution limitsII.5(1)(2)(5)(6): input control, guardrails, step/frequency/duration limits, sandbox isolationASI01 Agent Goal Hijack; ASI05 Unexpected Code Execution (RCE); ASI08 Cascading Failures; ASI10 Rogue AgentsNone4
MemoryII.5(3): retention windows, isolation across users and tasks, no credentials in memoryASI06 Memory & Context PoisoningNone3 · 4
Agent–model–tool communicationII.5(4): mutual authentication, integrity, replay resistanceASI07 Insecure Inter-Agent CommunicationAuthentication4
Monitoring, audit, sandbox, red teaming, incident responseII.6: anomaly blocking, log management, security auditing, sandbox validation, red teaming, emergency plans, re-validation on major changeCross-cuttingAdversarial agent evals3 · 5
DecommissioningII.7: complete shutdown, data backup, environment cleanupASI10 Rogue Agents (residual agents)None2 · 4

Chapter 23 compares these agent-control sources with the CSA’s and Singapore’s in frameworks written for agents.

Treaty and international soft law

Three international instruments carry duties an engineer can evidence. The Council of Europe Framework Convention (CETS No. 225) binds Parties, not companies, and is not yet in force; inside the EU it is implemented through the AI Act112113. The OECD AI Principles, revised on 3 May 2024, and the G7 Hiroshima Code of Conduct of 30 October 2023 are voluntary114115. Chapter 22 teaches them in what the Convention asks for, the five principles and five recommendations and the G7 Hiroshima Process.

Instrument and clauseStatus (as of 2026-09-24)What it asks forEngineering artefactLayer
Council of Europe Convention Art. 14(2)(a)–(b)Not in force (as of 2026-09-24) 112113Document relevant information about systems that can significantly affect human rights, sufficient for affected people to contest the decisionsDecision record per consequential output; contest path with the record attached2 · 5
Council of Europe Convention Art. 15(2)Not in force (as of 2026-09-24) 112113Notify people that they are interacting with an AI system, as appropriateInteraction disclosure enforced at runtime4
Council of Europe Convention Art. 16(1)–(2)(a)–(f)Not in force (as of 2026-09-24) 112113Iterative, graduated risk and impact management: context, severity and probability, stakeholder views, monitoring and documentationRisk register as code; impact assessment linked to the registry; monitoring against a baseline1 · 2 · 4
Council of Europe Convention Art. 16(2)(g)Not in force (as of 2026-09-24) 112113Test systems before first use and when they are significantly modified, where appropriateEval gate on release and on material change3
OECD AI Principles, principle 1.4(b)Non-binding; revised 2024-05-03 114Mechanisms let AI systems that risk undue harm be overridden, repaired and/or decommissioned safelyTested kill switch; decommissioning record in the registry2 · 4
OECD AI Principles, principle 1.5(b)–(c)Non-binding; revised 2024-05-03 114Traceability of datasets, processes and decisions, and systematic risk management at each phase of the lifecycleEvidence store keyed to registry ids; risk register as code; supplier records1 · 5
G7 Hiroshima Code of Conduct, action 1Voluntary; agreed 2023-10-30 115Identify, evaluate and mitigate risks across the lifecycle, incl. testing before deploymentAdversarial red-team suite; eval gate3
G7 Hiroshima Code of Conduct, actions 2 and 4Voluntary; agreed 2023-10-30 115Identify and mitigate vulnerabilities, incidents and misuse after deployment, and share information and report incidents responsiblyRuntime monitoring; incident pipeline with an external-sharing branch4 · 5
G7 Hiroshima Code of Conduct, action 3Voluntary; agreed 2023-10-30 115116Publicly report capabilities, limitations and appropriate and inappropriate uses; the OECD reporting framework has collected such reports since 2025Model card published from the registry2
G7 Hiroshima Code of Conduct, action 7Voluntary; agreed 2023-10-30 115Deploy content authentication and provenance mechanisms where feasibleProvenance marking at output; verification test4

Mappings are illustrative, not a claim of conformity.

What is NOT harmonised yet

The map has a hole, and it is important to state it plainly rather than paper over it.

  • No harmonised standard is cited in the Official Journal. As of 2026-09-24, Article 40’s presumption of conformity is available to no one, because no harmonised standard has been OJ-cited20.
  • EN 18286 is published but not cited. The Article 17 QMS standard EN 18286:2026 was published in July 2026 (the first JTC 21 AI Act standard to reach publication), but it is not yet cited in the Official Journal, so it carries no presumption of conformity2021.
  • The other JTC 21 drafts are at or before Enquiry. As of 2026-09-24, as reported by a pan-European standards information point, the Enquiry votes on prEN 18228 (Art. 9, risk management) and prEN 18282 (Art. 15, cybersecurity) closed on 30 Jul 2026 and on prEN 18229-1 (Art. 12, logging) on 20 Aug 2026; prEN 18229-3 (Art. 14, human oversight) entered Enquiry on 30 Jul 2026; and prEN 18229-4 and -5 (Art. 15, accuracy and robustness) were approved as new projects on 24 Jun 202660, consistent with the public tracker that had them at Enquiry in mid-202653. CEN and CENELEC may publish a priority deliverable directly after a positive Enquiry vote and target them for Q4 202661; publication would still not be an OJ citation. Chapter 22 tracks every deliverable and the status of the JTC 21 harmonised standards, and explains how the presumption of conformity works.
  • ISO/IEC 42001 is not the Article 17 QMS. Certifying to EN ISO/IEC 42001:2026 evidences an AI management system; it does not confer an AI Act presumption of conformity, because it is not a harmonised standard and its scope differs from the Article 17 QMS1112.
  • The Code of Practice is voluntary. Signing the GPAI Code is a way to demonstrate compliance with GPAI obligations; it is not a legal presumption of conformity9.
  • China’s framework does not cross-reference the Western instruments. The TC260 AI Safety Governance Framework 3.0 cites no ISO/IEC 42001, ISO/IEC 23894, NIST AI RMF or EU AI Act (its named reference points are the Global AI Governance Initiative and UN-centred channels), and it does not name China’s own binding rules either42. A crosswalk between the two stacks is something the engineer builds; neither side’s documents supply it.

The register carries the three JTC 21 deliverables the book relies on, with their status as of 2026-09-24202160:

DeliverableWhat it isStatus (as of 2026-09-24)Engineering artefactLayer
EN 18286:2026Quality-management-system requirements supporting Art. 17; published but not cited in the Official Journal, so it carries no presumption of conformityPublished July 2026; not OJ-cited 2120QMS processes run as pipeline stages; design and change-control evidence1 · 5
prEN 18228Draft harmonised standard for the risk management system of Art. 9Draft; Enquiry vote closed 2026-07-30, as reported 60Provider risk file per system; acceptability criteria as code; control monitoring1 · 3 · 5
prEN 18229-1Draft harmonised standard for the record-keeping of Art. 12Draft; Enquiry vote closed 2026-08-20, as reported 60Logging specification per system; structured, signed event logs mapped to the draft4

The practical reading: for the period this edition covers, you cannot buy a presumption of conformity off the shelf. The obligation-to-artefact rows above are how a governance function evidences the obligation on its own merits while the harmonised standards are still being written.

Maps to: this chapter is the reverse index for the whole book; every EU AI Act article, the GPAI Code of Practice, the GDPR, NIS2, DORA, the CRA, the Product Liability, DSM, Unfair Commercial Practices, Platform Work and Consumer Credit Directives, the DSA, ISO/IEC 42001, 42005, 42006, 23894 and 22989, NIST AI RMF and the newer NIST AI work, CSA AICM, OWASP GenAI/Agentic, the CEN-CENELEC JTC 21 deliverables, the US federal and state laws, the other jurisdictions and the treaty and soft-law instruments named above map onto the five-layer stack (chapter 04) and the pattern catalogue (chapter 05). Mappings are illustrative, not a claim of conformity.

What you can do this week

  1. Find your rows. For one system, list the rows of this map that apply to it, by role and risk class, with the date from which each applies.
  2. Name one artefact per row. Next to each row, write the artefact that evidences it today, or mark the gap.
  3. Put the dates in the pipeline. Store each applicable date as data that your policy checks read, so an obligation that starts to apply shows up as a failing check, not a surprise.
  4. Evidence one obligation on its merits. For the obligation you most expected a harmonised standard to cover, write down how you evidence it today without a presumption of conformity.
  5. Re-read on change. When a date or a row in this map changes, re-run the first step for your systems and record the difference.

Sources

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Cite this chapter

García Aibar, J. (2026). Regulatory map (obligation → artefact → layer). In AI Governance Engineering: The Thesis & Body of Knowledge (v0.5.0). https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.22956197. https://aigovernanceengineer.com/bok/regulatory-map. CC BY 4.0

BibTeX

@misc{aige2026bok,
  author  = {Jorge García Aibar},
  title   = {{AI Governance Engineering: The Thesis \& Body of Knowledge}},
  chapter = {Regulatory map (obligation → artefact → layer)},
  year    = {2026},
  version = {0.5.0},
  doi     = {10.5281/zenodo.22956197},
  url     = {https://aigovernanceengineer.com/bok/regulatory-map},
  note    = {Version 0.5.0}
}