08. Regulatory map (obligation → artefact → layer)
This chapter is the reverse index of every “Maps to” line in the book: for each obligation it names the engineering artefact that satisfies or supports it and the stack layer the artefact lives in.
New to the field? Start with AI governance explained.
Key terms in this chapter
Every other chapter maps forward: a capability, then the obligations it touches. This chapter maps backward: an obligation, then the artefact and the layer that answer it. The unit of the map is a row: an obligation, the engineering artefact that produces the evidence for it, and one of the five stack layers (chapter 04): 1 Govern-as-Code · 2 Inventory & Transparency · 3 Evals & Red Teaming as Evidence · 4 Runtime Controls & Observability · 5 Assurance & Continuous Compliance. The map is a crosswalk for finding the artefact that answers a question, not a certificate that the artefact makes you compliant. It indexes the AI-specific instruments first and then the data-protection, cyber-security, liability, consumer and sector law an AI system meets on day one, so that every row of the obligation register resolves to a table in this chapter. Chapter 19 teaches the data-protection rows in its obligation to artefact map, and chapter 20 the other law that already applies to AI (copyright, anti-discrimination, consumer protection and product liability).
How to read this map
Read each row as a sentence: this obligation is answered by this artefact, which lives in this layer. Three cautions apply throughout.
- Mappings are illustrative, not a claim of conformity. No artefact in this book guarantees compliance, and no standard cited here confers a presumption of conformity (see “What is NOT harmonised yet”). An artefact supports and evidences an obligation; the legal judgement of conformity stays with lawyers, notified bodies and authorities.
- Dates are the post-Omnibus dates. Every EU AI Act date below reflects Regulation (EU) 2026/1744, the Digital Omnibus on AI, of 8 July 2026 (OJ L, 24 July 2026), in force 27 July 20261222. Where the Omnibus moved a date, the moved date is shown; where it did not, the row says so.
- The competent authority differs by regime. For general-purpose AI (GPAI) the supervisor is the AI Office, and GPAI fines are formal Commission decisions under Article 10134. For high-risk systems the supervisors are national market-surveillance authorities, whose penalties run under Article 994. Member States choose their own; Spain, for example, set up a dedicated agency, AESIA (Agencia Española de Supervisión de Inteligencia Artificial), whose statute was approved by Royal Decree 729/202352. The map states the authority per row so the reader knows who asks.
EU AI Act, post-Omnibus
Text description
Seven lanes on one time axis, as of 2026-09-24. The Act entered into force on 2024-08-01 and the Digital Omnibus (Regulation (EU) 2026/1744) on 2026-07-27. Prohibited practices (Art. 5): the original prohibitions from 2025-02-02, and new bans on AI-generated non-consensual intimate imagery (NCII) and child sexual abuse material (CSAM) from 2026-12-02. AI literacy and bias-detection data (Arts. 4 and 4a): AI literacy from 2025-02-02; Art. 4 reworded and the new Art. 4a from 2026-07-27. General-purpose AI models (Arts. 52 to 55): obligations from 2025-08-02, Commission enforcement powers from 2026-08-02, and models placed before 2025-08-02 must comply by 2027-08-02. Transparency for certain AI systems (Art. 50): from 2026-08-02, with the marking grace for existing systems ending on 2026-12-02. High-risk through use (Annex III): the rules for testing in real-world conditions (Art. 60) from 2026-08-02, and the Annex III duties from 2027-12-02, deferred by the Omnibus from 2026-08-02. High-risk through products (Annex I): from 2028-08-02, deferred from 2027-08-02. Legacy high-risk systems intended for use by public authorities must comply by 2030-08-02 (Art. 111(2)). A filled dot marks the date a family starts to apply and a ring another dated step. Chapter 18 also lists Commission, notified-body and Annex X dates that the poster does not draw.
For a teaching walk-through of the Act before this reverse index maps it (scope, the risk ladder, value-chain roles, deployer duties, enforcement and the full post-Omnibus timeline), see chapter 18, which walks the Act end to end.
High-risk obligations (Articles 9–15, 17, 25, 26, 27, 49, 71, 72, 73) apply to Annex III systems from
2 December 2027 and to Annex I embedded systems from 2 August 2028, both deferred by the
Omnibus from 2 August 2026 and 2 August 2027 respectively12. The amended Art. 113(c) defers
Chapter III, Sections 1 to 3: classification, the requirements of Articles 8 to 15 and the duties of
providers, deployers and other operators in Articles 16 to 2722. The high-risk duties that sit
elsewhere (conformity assessment, the declaration, CE marking and registration in Articles 43 to 49
and 71, post-market monitoring and incident reporting in Articles 72, 73 and 75(1a), and the right to
explanation in Article 86) belong to chapters that formally apply from 2 August 2026, but they have
work to do only once a system is classified high-risk, so the map dates them by the classification
date. That is this map’s reading; confirm it with counsel (verify)2263. Articles 26(11), 27, 49,
71 and 86 concern Annex III systems only, so the 2 August 2028 date does not reach them. The GPAI
obligations (Articles 53, 55) have applied since 2 August 2025, with Commission enforcement powers
live since 2 August 20263; providers of models placed on the market before 2 August 2025 comply by
2 August 2027 (Art. 111(3))63.
Transparency (Article 50) went live on 2 August 2026 and was not moved5. Legacy public-authority
high-risk systems keep their original 2 August 2030 date2.
The Duty holder column names who the obligation binds, which is a different axis from who enforces it. The high-risk design-and-build duties (Articles 9 to 15 and 17) fall on the provider; Articles 26 and 27 fall on the deployer; Articles 4, 5 and 50 bind both; and Articles 53 and 55 bind the GPAI provider. Article 25 sits across the value chain: it sets the conditions under which a distributor, importer or deployer itself becomes a provider and inherits the provider duties. Articles 22 to 24 bind the authorised representative of a non-EU provider, the importer and the distributor, and Article 54 the authorised representative of a non-EU GPAI provider. This matters for the engineer because the artefacts you can produce depend on which hat your organisation wears: a deployer cannot draw up the provider’s technical documentation, but it must run the Article 26 monitoring and the Article 27 FRIA; and when the model is procured, most of the provider-side evidence becomes something you collect rather than produce (see the Vendor / Model Due-Diligence Gate in chapter 05).
Article 16 is the umbrella for the provider’s high-risk duties. Apart from point (l), accessibility, which has its own row, it adds no artefact of its own; it gathers the obligations the rows below break out article by article: the requirements of Articles 9 to 15 and 17, documentation keeping and logs (Articles 18 and 19), corrective action (Article 20), the conformity assessment (Article 43), the EU declaration of conformity and CE marking (Articles 47 and 48), registration (Articles 49 and 71), post-market monitoring (Article 72) and serious-incident reporting (Article 73). So it reads here as a cross-reference, not a row2263.
| Article | Obligation | Engineering artefact | Layer | Duty holder | Applies (post-Omnibus) | Authority |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Art. 3(1) | Scope: decide, system by system, whether it is an AI system under the Art. 3(1) definition before any other duty is assessed | Definitional decision record in the registry: definition applied, elements found, excluded family if any, reason, decider, date | 2 | Provider + deployer (scoping) | 2025-02-02 (Chapter I) 63 | National MSA |
Art. 4 | AI literacy: take measures to support the development of AI literacy among staff and operators | Literacy programme as code; role-based training records; onboarding gates | 1 | Provider + deployer | 2025-02-02; reworded 2026-07-27 (in force) 62263 | Provider/deployer duty; national MSA |
Art. 4a | Lawful basis to process special-category data for bias detection in high-risk systems, with pseudonymisation and deletion once bias is corrected | Data governance controls; pseudonymisation and retention-as-code; data card noting basis and deletion | 2 | Provider | 2026-07-27 (new, in force) 2 | National MSA / DPAs |
Art. 5 | Prohibited practices; new bans on AI-generated non-consensual intimate imagery (NCII) and CSAM | Policy-as-code blocklist; input/output guardrails; refusal and abuse detection | 1 · 4 | Provider + deployer | 2026-12-02 (new bans); earlier prohibitions from 2025-02-02 2 | National MSA |
Art. 6 | Classification rules for high-risk AI systems, incl. the Annex III (standalone) route and Annex I (safety-component) route | Risk-tiering as code; high-risk classification decision record; register entry flagging Annex III status | 1 · 2 | Provider | 2027-12-02 (Annex III) 122 | National MSA |
Art. 6(3)–(4) | A provider that finds an Annex III system not high-risk under the Art. 6(3) filter documents the assessment before placing it on the market and registers it under Art. 49(2); a system that profiles natural persons is always high-risk | Classification decision record (Annex III point, Art. 6(3) condition, explicit profiling flag); Art. 49(2) registration entry pushed from the registry | 1 · 2 | Provider | 2027-12-02 (Annex III) 63 | National MSA |
Art. 9 | Risk management system across the high-risk lifecycle | Risk register as code; threat models; linkage to FRIA and eval results | 1 · 3 | Provider | 2027-12-02 (Annex III) 1 | National MSA |
Art. 10 | Data and data governance; representative, relevant, error-checked datasets | Data cards; lineage; bias and quality tests in CI | 2 · 3 | Provider | 2027-12-02 (Annex III) 1 | National MSA |
Art. 11 | Technical documentation (Annex IV) drawn up and kept up to date | AIBOM (CycloneDX ML-BOM, SPDX 3.0 AI); auto-generated technical documentation; model cards | 2 | Provider | 2027-12-02 (Annex III) 1 | National MSA |
Art. 12 | Record-keeping: automatic logging of events over the system’s lifetime | Structured, signed logs; OpenTelemetry traces; tamper-evident event store | 4 | Provider | 2027-12-02 (Annex III) 1 | National MSA |
Art. 13 | Transparency and provision of information to deployers | Instructions for use as code; model and data cards; capability and limitation notes | 2 | Provider | 2027-12-02 (Annex III) 1 | National MSA |
Art. 14 | Human oversight designed into the system | Human-in-the-loop checkpoints; kill switch; override and escalation paths | 4 | Provider | 2027-12-02 (Annex III) 1 | National MSA |
Art. 15 | Accuracy, robustness and cybersecurity | Eval gate; adversarial red-team suite; robustness and security controls; regression evals | 3 · 4 | Provider | 2027-12-02 (Annex III) 1 | National MSA |
Art. 15(4) | Systems that continue to learn after placing on the market are built to eliminate or reduce the risk of biased outputs feeding future inputs (feedback loops), with mitigation measures | Feedback-loop fairness monitor; retraining-data bias check; agent memory write gate with provenance and rollback to a known-good snapshot | 3 · 4 | Provider | 2027-12-02 (Annex III) 63 | National MSA |
Art. 16(l) | Providers ensure the high-risk system complies with the accessibility requirements of Directives (EU) 2016/2102 and (EU) 2019/882 | Accessibility test results for every notice, instruction and explanation shown to people, run in the pipeline; accessible explanation templates | 2 · 3 | Provider | 2027-12-02 (Annex III) 63 | National MSA |
Art. 17 | Quality management system | QMS-as-code; versioned policies; pipeline controls and change management | 1 · 5 | Provider | 2027-12-02 (Annex III) 1 | National MSA |
Art. 17(1)(m) | The QMS includes an accountability framework setting out the responsibilities of management and other staff for every aspect of the QMS | RACI as code compiled into registry owner fields and code-owner rules; committee decision records | 1 · 2 | Provider | 2027-12-02 (Annex III) 63 | National MSA |
Art. 18 | Keep the technical documentation, the QMS documentation, notified-body changes and decisions and the EU declaration at the disposal of national authorities for 10 years after placing on the market | Retention-as-code for the technical file, QMS records, notified-body decisions and the EU declaration (10 years); write-once evidence store | 2 · 5 | Provider | 2027-12-02 (Annex III) 63 | National MSA |
Art. 19 | Keep the automatically generated logs under the provider’s control for a period appropriate to the intended purpose, at least six months unless other law provides otherwise | Log-retention policy as code (at least six months, set by intended purpose); tamper-evident log store | 4 · 5 | Provider | 2027-12-02 (Annex III) 63 | National MSA |
Art. 20 | A provider with reason to consider a high-risk system non-conforming immediately brings it into conformity, withdraws, disables or recalls it and informs distributors and deployers; where the system presents a risk, it investigates and informs the market-surveillance authority | CAPA record; withdraw, disable or recall runbook; notification of distributors and deployers | 1 · 5 | Provider | 2027-12-02 (Annex III) 63 | National MSA |
Art. 22 | A provider established outside the Union appoints, by written mandate, an authorised representative in the Union before making the system available; the representative keeps the declaration, documentation and certificate for 10 years | Written mandate; 10-year copies of the declaration, technical documentation and certificate; authority contact route | 5 | Non-EU provider + authorised representative | 2027-12-02 (Annex III) 63 | National MSA |
Art. 23 | Before placing a high-risk system on the market, the importer verifies the conformity assessment, the Annex IV documentation, the CE marking, the declaration and instructions and the authorised representative, and keeps copies for 10 years | Import verification record against each check; 10-year document copies | 2 · 5 | Importer | 2027-12-02 (Annex III) 63 | National MSA |
Art. 24 | Before making a high-risk system available, the distributor verifies the CE marking, the declaration and the instructions, and holds back, withdraws or recalls a system it considers non-conforming | Distribution check record; hold, withdraw or recall workflow | 2 · 5 | Distributor | 2027-12-02 (Annex III) 63 | National MSA |
Art. 25 | Responsibilities along the AI value chain: when a distributor, importer or deployer becomes a provider, and the information a provider must pass to actors downstream | Value-chain due-diligence gate; provider/deployer responsibility allocation; AIBOM and model/data cards collected from upstream providers | 2 · 5 | Provider + value-chain actors | 2027-12-02 (Annex III) 23 | National MSA |
Art. 26 | Deployer obligations for high-risk systems: use per the instructions for use (Art. 26(1)); the paragraph rows below break out oversight, input data, monitoring, logs and notices | Deployment registry; monitoring hooks; assigned oversight and logging retention | 2 · 4 | Deployer | 2027-12-02 (Annex III) 1 | National MSA |
Art. 26(2) | Deployers assign human oversight to natural persons with the necessary competence, training and authority, and the necessary support | Oversight assignment in the registry; role-based training records with expiry; approver roster per checkpoint class with authority to pause or refuse | 1 · 4 | Deployer | 2027-12-02 (Annex III) 63 | National MSA |
Art. 26(4) | To the extent the deployer controls the input data, it ensures the data are relevant and sufficiently representative for the intended purpose | Input-data checks against the population in the deployment record; drift monitors on inputs | 2 · 3 | Deployer | 2027-12-02 (Annex III) 63 | National MSA |
Art. 26(5) | Deployers monitor operation per the instructions; on reason to consider a risk they inform the provider or distributor and the authority and suspend use; a serious incident goes to the provider first, and Art. 73 applies to the deployer if the provider cannot be reached | Monitoring plan with signal owners; tested suspension path (feature flag, traffic switch); provider incident contact in the registry; pre-filled risk and serious-incident notices | 2 · 4 · 5 | Deployer | 2027-12-02 (Annex III) 6357 | National MSA |
Art. 26(6) | Deployers keep the logs under their control for a period appropriate to the intended purpose, at least six months unless other law provides otherwise | Retention-as-code schedule; tamper-evident log store; legal hold while an incident is open | 4 · 5 | Deployer | 2027-12-02 (Annex III) 63 | National MSA |
Art. 26(7) | Before putting a high-risk system into service at the workplace, deployers who are employers inform workers’ representatives and the affected workers | Worker-information record dated before first use and linked to the registry entry; HR intake trigger for Annex III point 4 systems | 2 | Deployer (employer) | 2027-12-02 (Annex III) 63 | National MSA |
Art. 26(11) | Deployers of Annex III systems that make or assist decisions about natural persons inform those persons that they are subject to the system | AI-use notice at the decision point; notice templates versioned as code; notice delivery log | 2 · 4 | Deployer | 2027-12-02 (Annex III) 63 | National MSA |
Art. 27 | Fundamental Rights Impact Assessment (FRIA) for deployers of Annex III systems | FRIA-as-code from a template; cross-reference to a GDPR Art. 35 DPIA | 1 · 2 | Deployer | 2027-12-02 (Annex III) 7 | National MSA |
Art. 43 | Conformity assessment before placing on the market (internal control, or a notified body for Annex III point 1 biometrics) | Conformity-assessment workflow; internal-control or notified-body evidence pack; traceability to Annex IV documentation | 1 · 5 | Provider | 2027-12-02 (Annex III) 122 | National MSA |
Art. 43(4) | A system already assessed undergoes a new conformity assessment on substantial modification; changes pre-determined in the technical documentation of a system that continues to learn are not substantial modifications | Change-classification policy on merge; pre-determined change envelope as code; reassessment trigger in the registry | 1 · 5 | Provider | 2027-12-02 (Annex III) 63 | National MSA |
Art. 47 | EU declaration of conformity drawn up on completing the assessment | Auto-generated EU declaration of conformity from the evidence; CE-marking record | 2 · 5 | Provider | 2027-12-02 (Annex III) 122 | National MSA |
Art. 48 | Affix the CE marking visibly, legibly and indelibly (a digital marking for digitally provided systems), followed by the notified body’s number where applicable | CE-marking record (physical or digital) generated with the EU declaration; notified-body number where applicable | 2 · 5 | Provider | 2027-12-02 (Annex III) 63 | National MSA |
Art. 49 / Art. 71 | Registration of high-risk systems in the EU database | Agent/model registry with an API that feeds registration; owner and status per entry | 2 | Provider; public-authority deployer | 2027-12-02 (Annex III) 1 | National MSA; Commission (database) |
Art. 50 | Transparency for certain AI systems: chatbot disclosure; marking and labelling of synthetic content | Content labelling and machine-readable marking (e.g. C2PA-style); chatbot disclosure banner | 4 · 2 | Provider + deployer | 2026-08-02; marking grace for existing systems to 2026-12-02 25 | National MSA |
Art. 52 | Notify the Commission without delay, and within two weeks, once a GPAI model meets the Art. 51(1)(a) condition or it becomes known that it will | Compute ledger per model lineage with a planned-compute threshold alert; notification record filed within two weeks | 2 · 5 | GPAI provider | Obligations from 2025-08-02; enforcement from 2026-08-02 633 | AI Office |
Art. 53 | GPAI provider obligations, incl. a public summary of training content on an AI Office template | Model cards; training-content summary; AIBOM and dataset provenance | 2 | GPAI provider | Obligations from 2025-08-02; enforcement from 2026-08-02 3 | AI Office |
Art. 53(1)(c) | GPAI providers put in place a policy to comply with Union copyright law, incl. identifying and complying with reservations of rights under Art. 4(3) of Directive (EU) 2019/790 | Versioned copyright policy; crawler decision logs; training-data rights ledger with the reservation-check result | 1 · 2 · 5 | GPAI provider | Obligations from 2025-08-02; enforcement from 2026-08-02 6373 | AI Office |
Art. 54 | A GPAI provider established outside the Union appoints, by written mandate, an authorised representative before placing the model on the Union market; the representative keeps the Annex XI documentation for 10 years | Written mandate; Annex XI documentation copy kept 10 years; AI Office contact route | 5 | Non-EU GPAI provider + authorised representative | Obligations from 2025-08-02; enforcement from 2026-08-02 63 | AI Office |
Art. 55 | GPAI models with systemic risk: model evaluation incl. adversarial testing; Union-level risk assessment; serious-incident reporting; cybersecurity of the model | Eval and red-team suite; incident pipeline on the Commission serious-incident reporting template; weight-security controls; threat model | 3 · 4 · 5 | GPAI provider (systemic risk) | Obligations from 2025-08-02; enforcement from 2026-08-02 326 | AI Office |
Art. 60 | Testing of high-risk (Annex III) AI systems in real-world conditions outside AI regulatory sandboxes | Real-world testing plan; Art. 61 informed-consent records; test monitoring, logging and incident hooks | 3 · 4 | Provider / prospective provider | 2026-08-02 22 | National MSA |
Art. 72 | Post-market monitoring for high-risk systems | Continuous assurance telemetry; monitoring plan; drift and performance signals | 5 | Provider | 2027-12-02 (Annex III) 1 | National MSA |
Art. 73 | Serious-incident reporting for high-risk systems (deadlines in the reporting-clock table below) | Incident detection and triage pipeline; reporting-clock automation; evidence capture | 5 · 4 | Provider | 2027-12-02 (Annex III) 1 | National MSA |
Art. 73(6) | After reporting a serious incident the provider investigates without delay (risk assessment, corrective action) and does not alter the system in a way that may affect the evaluation of causes before informing the authorities | Evidence-preservation step: model, prompt, policy and retrieval-index snapshots; sealed traces; fix shipped on a new version | 4 · 5 | Provider | 2027-12-02 (Annex III) 63 | National MSA |
Art. 75(1a) | Providers of high-risk systems under the AI Office’s exclusive competence (systems built on their own GPAI model, and systems in designated very large online platforms or search engines) report serious incidents to the AI Office, with Art. 73(2) to (9) applying mutatis mutandis | Incident pipeline routing by a registry competence flag (national MSA or AI Office) | 2 · 5 | Provider (systems under AI Office competence) | 2027-12-02 (Annex III); new by the Omnibus (reading, verify) 22 | AI Office |
Art. 86 | A person subject to a deployer’s decision based on an Annex III system (except point 2) with legal or similarly significant adverse effects may obtain clear and meaningful explanations of the system’s role and the main elements of the decision, where Union law does not already give the right | Explanation record per decision (system and model version, reason codes, determinative or advisory role, human decider); request-handling workflow and response log | 2 · 4 · 5 | Deployer | 2027-12-02 (Annex III); Chapter IX applies from 2026-08-02 (reading, verify) 6322 | National MSA |
Art. 87 | Directive (EU) 2019/1937 applies to reports of AI Act infringements and to the protection of the people who make them | Internal reporting channel run as a case system with the directive’s clocks encoded; sealed reporter identity; retaliation monitoring; routing to the incident pipeline | 1 · 5 | Legal entities with internal reporting channels under Directive (EU) 2019/1937 | 2026-08-02 6364 | Authorities designated under Directive (EU) 2019/1937 |
Several rows are built out in full elsewhere in the book:
Art. 4: the literacy programme as code is AI literacy as code in chapter 12, and the role-based training records have a literacy curriculum template.Art. 4aandArt. 10: the lawful basis for special-category data for bias detection is in chapter 19; the data needed to test for bias, and where bias enters the lifecycle, are in chapter 16 (protected characteristics, proxies and the data you need to test).Art. 6: the Article 6(3) filter and the profiling override are walked through in chapter 18.Art. 9: the risk register as code is the risk register as an evidence record in chapter 13; the same artefact answers the ISO/IEC 23894 row below.Art. 11,Art. 43andArt. 47: Annex IV, element by element and conformity, in order are in chapter 14.Art. 13: instructions for use as code have a JSON Schema and filled example; what they must say to deployers and affected people is in the EU AI Act, Articles 13 and 86 (chapter 16).Art. 25: when a value-chain actor becomes a provider is set out in chapter 18.Art. 26: the deployer duties in operation are in chapter 15.Art. 27: the FRIA’s cross-reference to a GDPRArt. 35DPIA is developed in the DPIA for AI systems (chapter 19).Art. 72: the monitoring plan has a post-market monitoring plan schema.Art. 3(1): the definitional decision record is built field by field in from definition element to registry field (chapter 11).Art. 15(4): feedback loops are monitored in monitoring fairness in production (chapter 16), and for agents in memory and context governance (chapter 23);Art. 16(l)has accessible explanations.Art. 17(1)(m): the accountability framework is a lifecycle RACI (chapter 12);Art. 43(4)is substantial modification in chapter 14;Arts. 22to24are the EU operator roles in chapter 18.Art. 26(2)to26(11): the deployer’s paragraphs run through chapter 15, from checking the data and the people to records retention and external communications; chapter 17 covers informing the provider and suspending use (Art. 26(5)) and freezing before fixing (Art. 73(6)), and chapter 23 approval design for agent checkpoints.Art. 52: the compute ledger and the two-week notification are in systemic risk: threshold, notification, designation (chapter 18);Art. 53(1)(c)is copyright and training data (chapter 20).Art. 86: the explanation record is specified in the EU AI Act, Articles 13 and 86 (chapter 16) and explanation and notice to affected people (chapter 18);Art. 87is met by a channel for raising concerns (chapter 12).
The Omnibus also changed rows the table compresses to one line22. For Art. 6, a safety
component must now have the purpose of preventing or mitigating risks to health and safety, or be
one whose failure endangers them (Art. 3(14), Art. 6(1a) to 6(1c)); that narrowing applies to
the Annex I route from 2 August 2028, and machinery moved from Section A to Section B of Annex I. The
Annex VIII, Section B registration record for systems that rely on the Art. 6(3) filter lost the
summary of grounds and the list of Member States. For Art. 25, the initial provider’s duty to
cooperate now names documentation sufficient to assess compliance, known limitations and failure
modes, and targeted technical access for testing (Art. 25(2)); the information and access must be
fixed in a written agreement (Art. 25(4)), and breaches of both paragraphs are fined under
Art. 99(4)(da).
The Article 73 clock runs by incident class. The provider notifies the market-surveillance authority
of the Member State where the incident occurred immediately once it establishes a causal link
between the system and the incident, or the reasonable likelihood of one, and in any event within an
outer deadline that runs from the moment the provider or, where applicable, the deployer becomes
aware of the incident, not from the causal finding57. A deployer that identifies a serious
incident informs the provider first, then the importer or distributor and the market-surveillance
authority; if it cannot reach the provider, Article 73 applies to the deployer mutatis mutandis
(Art. 26(5))57:
| Incident class | Reporting deadline | Who reports | Artefact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Serious incident (general) | Immediately on a causal link or its reasonable likelihood; no later than 15 days after awareness | Provider → national MSA; the deployer if it cannot reach the provider (Art. 26(5)) | Incident triage pipeline; reporting-clock automation |
| Widespread infringement, or serious and irreversible disruption of critical infrastructure | Immediately; no later than 2 days after awareness | Provider → national MSA; the deployer if it cannot reach the provider (Art. 26(5)) | Same pipeline, escalated-severity path |
| Death of a person | Immediately on establishing or suspecting a causal link; no later than 10 days after awareness | Provider → national MSA; the deployer if it cannot reach the provider (Art. 26(5)) | Same pipeline, priority path |
The Omnibus left these deadlines unchanged. For high-risk systems under the AI Office’s exclusive
competence, its new Art. 75(1a) sends the report to the AI Office instead, with Art. 73(2) to
(9) applying mutatis mutandis, and the AI Office passes it on to the market-surveillance authority
of the Member State where the provider is established22. An incident rarely starts only one
clock: chapter 17 lays the Article 73 clock beside the GDPR, NIS2, DORA, CRA and GPAI clocks in
the overlapping clocks, and the
incident record schema holds the timestamps each one
needs.
Two cross-cutting provisions frame the penalties. Under Art. 101, the Commission may fine GPAI
providers up to 3% of worldwide annual turnover or EUR 15 million, whichever is higher34. Under
the Omnibus’s new Art. 75a–75d, the AI Office gains investigation powers, binding
commitments and non-compliance decisions over the AI systems for which the amended Art. 75(1) makes
it exclusively competent (systems built on a GPAI model by the same provider or undertaking, and
systems in designated very large online platforms or search engines), not over GPAI models in
general. Periodic penalty payments reach up to 5% of average daily income or worldwide annual
turnover per day for a continuing breach (Art. 75c(5)). The Omnibus entered into force on 27 July
2026, and Chapter IX, where these articles sit, applies from 2 August 2026 under Art. 113822.
High-risk administrative fines run under Art. 99 (ceilings of 7%, 3% and 1% of turnover depending
on the breach), imposed by national authorities4. Chapter 18 sets out
who supervises what and
the AI Office’s direct powers.
Text description
The serious-incident reporting windows for high-risk systems under Article 73, by incident class. A widespread infringement: 2 days. On the death of a person: 10 days. Otherwise: no later than 15 days. The engineering artefact that meets them is the incident detection and triage pipeline with reporting-clock automation and evidence capture, which must classify the incident before it can report.
Text description
Three enforcement tracks, as of 2026-09-24. GPAI providers answer to the AI Office: Commission enforcement powers have been live since 2 August 2026; under Art. 101 the Commission may fine GPAI providers up to 3% of worldwide annual turnover or EUR 15 million, whichever is higher; and the Omnibus's new Art. 75a to 75d give the AI Office investigation powers backed by periodic penalty payments of up to 5% of average daily turnover per day for a continuing breach, in force since 27 July 2026. High-risk systems answer to national market-surveillance authorities, which each Member State chooses (Spain, for example, set up AESIA); their administrative fines run under Art. 99, with ceilings of 7%, 3% and 1% of turnover depending on the breach. Large frontier developers under California's SB 53 answer to the Attorney General, with penalties of up to USD 1 million per violation.
GPAI Code of Practice
The GPAI Code of Practice, published 10 July 2025, is the voluntary instrument providers use to demonstrate compliance with the GPAI obligations until harmonised standards exist. It has three chapters910.
| Chapter | What it asks for | Engineering artefact | Layer |
|---|---|---|---|
| Safety and Security (systemic-risk models only) | A Safety and Security Framework; model evaluations incl. adversarial testing; systemic-risk assessment and mitigation; serious-incident reporting; model and infrastructure security | Eval and red-team suite; adversarial testing harness; incident pipeline; weight-security controls | 3 · 4 · 5 |
| Transparency | Up-to-date model documentation for the AI Office and downstream deployers | Model cards; structured model documentation; AIBOM | 2 |
| Copyright | A policy to comply with Union copyright law, incl. respecting reservations of rights | Training-data provenance and licence records; policy-as-code for source filtering | 1 · 2 |
| Safety and Security, Commitment 9 (serious-incident reporting) | Report serious incidents to the AI Office within 2, 5, 10 or 15 days by incident class, with intermediate reports at least every four weeks while unresolved and a final report within 60 days of resolution; keep the records at least five years 65 | Incident pipeline on the Commission template fields; per-class clocks; five-year retention policy; downstream reporting channel | 4 · 5 |
| Safety and Security, Appendix 1.3 and 1.4 (autonomy, tool use, loss of control) | Sources of systemic risk to consider include the capability to operate autonomously, propensities such as colluding with other AI systems, and affordances such as access to tools and physical systems and the level of human oversight; loss of control is a specified systemic risk 65 | Provider evaluations of autonomy and tool use, requested at the vendor due-diligence gate and filed with the agent registry entry | 3 · 5 |
The Code is voluntary; signing it is one route to demonstrating compliance, not a legal presumption of conformity9. Signatory status is dynamic and counted per the Commission’s official list10.
For serious-incident reporting specifically, the Commission published a reporting template on 4 November 2025 for serious incidents involving GPAI models with systemic risk. It aligns to the Article 55 reporting duty and to Commitment 9 of the Code’s Safety and Security chapter, and is the concrete artefact the incident pipeline emits, the same template named in the Article 55 row above26. One internal incident record can feed this template and every other regime’s report. Commitment 9 of the Safety and Security chapter sets the clocks (2, 5, 10 or 15 days by incident class, intermediate reports at least every four weeks, a final report within 60 days of resolution) and a retention of at least five years, and its Appendix 1 lists the capability to operate autonomously and access to tools among the sources of systemic risk and loss of control among the specified risks, which is why the two rows above matter to anyone who deploys agents on a GPAI model65. Chapter 17 sets Commitment 9 beside the other regimes in the overlapping clocks, and chapter 23 reads Appendix 1 for agents in EU AI Act hooks for agents.
Data protection and other EU law
An AI system placed on the EU market meets more law than the AI Act on day one. The rows below index the obligations the v0.5.0 chapters teach: the GDPR, the cyber-security and incident-reporting regimes, and the liability, copyright, consumer and sector law that already reaches AI. They answer to their own supervisors (data protection authorities, CSIRTs and financial supervisors, courts and consumer authorities), not to the AI Act’s market-surveillance authorities, and several apply through national transposition, so the “Applies” column says so. Mappings are illustrative, not a claim of conformity.
The GDPR
The GDPR has applied since 25 May 201866. Chapter 19 walks every row below, with the EDPB’s
anonymity test for trained models67, in privacy and data protection law applied to
AI; chapter 16 builds the explanation and contest
records of Arts. 15(1)(h) and 22 in
data protection: the GDPR and the UK regime.
| Article | What it asks for | Engineering artefact | Layer | Who is bound | Applies |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Art. 5(1)(b) and 6(4) | Personal data are collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and not further processed incompatibly; Art. 6(4) sets the compatibility test for reuse, such as training on data collected for another purpose 66 | Purpose tags on datasets; purpose-match policy in training and indexing pipelines; compatibility assessment record | 1 · 2 | Controller | 2018-05-25 |
Art. 6 | A lawful basis for each processing operation, assessed separately for training, fine-tuning, retrieval and inference 6667 | Basis registry per dataset and stage; versioned legitimate-interest assessment | 2 | Controller | 2018-05-25 |
Art. 7 | Where consent is the basis, the controller can demonstrate it, and withdrawing consent is as easy as giving it 66 | Consent-purpose log joined to datasets and model versions; withdrawal propagated to the pipelines | 2 · 5 | Controller | 2018-05-25 |
Art. 9 | Processing special-category data, incl. biometric data for unique identification, is prohibited unless an Art. 9(2) condition applies, which reaches sensitive data a model infers 66 | Proxy test in CI; inference policy with a runtime output classifier; Art. 9(2) condition record | 1 · 3 · 4 | Controller | 2018-05-25 |
Arts. 13–14 | Inform data subjects of purposes, bases, recipients and retention and, for automated decision-making, give meaningful information about the logic involved (Arts. 13(2)(f), 14(2)(g)) 66 | Notice generated from the registry entry; model card; automated-decision notice per system | 2 | Controller | 2018-05-25 |
Art. 15(1)(h) | On request, confirm automated decision-making and give meaningful information about the logic involved and its significance and envisaged consequences 66 | Per-request explanation generated from the decision record; system-level automated-decision notice | 4 · 5 | Controller | 2018-05-25 |
Arts. 15–17 and 21 | Access, rectification, erasure and objection requests reach every place the data lives: corpus, snapshots, retrieval index, logs and, where it holds personal data, the model 66 | Request workflow across corpus, snapshots, retrieval index, logs and weights; fulfilment record | 4 · 5 | Controller | 2018-05-25 |
Art. 22 | A right not to be subject to a decision based solely on automated processing with legal or similarly significant effects, except on contract, law or explicit consent; then human intervention, the right to express a view and to contest (Art. 22(3)) 66 | Decision record with reason codes; contest channel and human review log; appeal outcomes by group | 4 · 5 | Controller | 2018-05-25 |
Art. 5(1)(c) and 25 | Adequate, relevant and limited data, with technical and organisational measures built in at design and set by default 66 | Feature justification record; PII and special-category filters; retention as code | 1 · 3 | Controller | 2018-05-25 |
Art. 5(2) | A controller that claims a trained model holds no personal data must be able to demonstrate it; the EDPB sets an anonymity test and the evidence it expects 6667 | Anonymity evidence pack; membership-inference and extraction evals in the eval gate | 3 · 5 | Controller (model developer) | 2018-05-25 |
Art. 28 | Use only processors with sufficient guarantees, under a contract that fixes instructions, sub-processors, security, assistance and deletion 66 | AI vendor clause checklist in the due-diligence gate (no training, retention, region, sub-processors, change notice) | 2 · 5 | Controller; processor | 2018-05-25 |
Art. 30 | Controllers and processors keep a record of the processing activities under their responsibility 66 | Records generated per processing moment from the registry and data cards | 2 · 5 | Controller; processor | 2018-05-25 |
Arts. 33–34 | Notify the supervisory authority without undue delay and, where feasible, within 72 hours of awareness; tell data subjects without undue delay when the breach is likely to result in a high risk 66 | Personal-data-breach branch of the incident pipeline with its own 72-hour timer; data-subject notice template | 4 · 5 | Controller (the processor notifies the controller) | 2018-05-25 |
Arts. 35–36 | Assess the impact before processing likely to result in a high risk, and consult the supervisory authority where the residual risk stays high 66 | AI DPIA template with AI-specific fields, cross-referenced by the FRIA; recorded decision when no DPIA is needed | 1 · 2 | Controller | 2018-05-25 |
Arts. 44–49 | Transfers outside the EEA only on an adequacy decision, appropriate safeguards (such as standard contractual clauses or binding corporate rules) or a narrow derogation; sending personal data to a model hosted outside the EEA can be a transfer 66 | Transfer register; residency and routing policy as code; transfer impact assessment | 1 · 4 · 5 | Controller; processor | 2018-05-25 |
Cyber-security and incident-reporting law
NIS2 binds essential and important entities through national law, which Member States apply from 18 October 202468; DORA has applied to financial entities since 17 January 202569, with the incident time limits fixed in Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/30170; and the Cyber Resilience Act’s reporting duty applies from 11 September 2026, ahead of the rest of that Regulation on 11 December 202771. An AI incident can start several of these clocks at once: chapter 17 lays them side by side in the overlapping clocks, and chapter 15 covers continuity when the provider fails.
| Article | What it asks for | Engineering artefact | Layer | Who is bound | Applies |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
NIS2 Art. 21(2)(c)–(d) | Risk-management measures include business continuity (backup, disaster recovery, crisis management) and supply-chain security with direct suppliers and service providers, which covers AI and model services 68 | Continuity plan for AI dependencies with tested fallbacks; supplier assessments for model and platform providers | 4 · 5 | Essential and important entities | 2024-10-18, through national law |
NIS2 Art. 23 | An early warning within 24 hours of becoming aware of a significant incident, an incident notification within 72 hours and a final report within one month of the notification, incl. the root cause 68 | Per-regime clock on the incident record; significance determination with an owner; cause coding reused in the final report | 5 | Essential and important entities | 2024-10-18, through national law |
DORA Art. 19 | Report major ICT-related incidents: initial notification within 4 hours of classification as major and no later than 24 hours from awareness (within 4 hours of a classification made after those 24 hours), intermediate report within 72 hours of the initial notification, final report within one month of the latest intermediate report 6970 | Classification record with a timestamp; per-regime clock; consistent cause coding for recurring-incident aggregation | 5 | Financial entities | 2025-01-17 |
DORA Art. 28(3), 28(8) | Keep a register of information on all contractual arrangements for ICT services from third-party providers, and exit strategies for ICT services that support critical or important functions 69 | Register entries for AI and model services; exit plan and exit-drill record | 2 · 5 | Financial entities | 2025-01-17 |
CRA Art. 14 | Notify actively exploited vulnerabilities and severe incidents through the single reporting platform: early warning within 24 hours, notification within 72 hours, final report 14 days after a fix is available (vulnerability) or one month after the notification (incident) 71 | Vulnerability and incident clocks on the incident record; submission through the single reporting platform | 4 · 5 | Manufacturers of products with digital elements | 2026-09-11; the rest from 2027-12-11 |
Liability, copyright, consumer and sector law
The revised Product Liability Directive treats software, AI systems included, as a product and applies
to products placed on the market after 9 December 202672. The text-and-data-mining exception of the
DSM Directive yields to a rightholder’s reservation73, which is the rule Art. 53(1)(c) of the AI Act
points to. The Digital Services Act, the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, the Platform Work
Directive and the revised Consumer Credit Directive add duties for platforms, traders, digital labour
platforms and creditors74757677. Chapter 20 teaches them: copyright and training
data, the EU Product Liability
Directive, duty to warn after
updates, the EU: UCPD, DSA and the AI
Act, employment and
credit and lending.
| Article | What it asks for | Engineering artefact | Layer | Who is bound | Applies |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
PLD Art. 4(1) | Software is a product, so the manufacturer of an AI system is strictly liable for damage caused by a defect in a product placed on the market or put into service after 2026-12-09 72 | Defect-liability review at design; contractual recourse; residual risk in the register | 1 · 5 | Manufacturers and other economic operators | Products placed on the market after 2026-12-09 |
PLD Arts. 9–10 | A court can order the defendant to disclose relevant evidence at its disposal; failing to disclose it is one of the conditions under which the product is presumed defective 72 | Defence file per release: AIBOM with hashes, eval history, failure-mode analysis, signed logs, instructions for use, kept for the liability period | 2 · 3 · 5 | Manufacturers, incl. providers of AI systems and substantial modifiers | Products placed on the market after 2026-12-09 |
PLD Art. 11(2) | The manufacturer cannot rely on the defect arising after placing on the market where it is due to software, incl. its updates or upgrades, or to missing safety updates, that remain within its control 72 | Change log; regression evals per release; patch decision records; versioned warnings | 3 · 4 · 5 | Manufacturers | Products placed on the market after 2026-12-09 |
DSM Directive Art. 4(3) | The general text-and-data-mining exception applies only where rightholders have not expressly reserved use in an appropriate manner, such as machine-readable means for content made publicly available online 73 | Crawler policy-as-code honouring reservations; training-data rights ledger with the reservation-check result, method and date | 1 · 2 | Anyone mining works, incl. model developers | Transposition deadline 2021-06-07 |
DSA Art. 25 | Online platforms do not design, organise or operate their interfaces in a way that deceives or manipulates users or impairs their free and informed decisions 74 | Interface review record; red-team eval for manipulative outputs | 3 · 5 | Providers of online platforms | 2024-02-17 |
DSA Art. 27 | Online platforms set out in their terms the main parameters of their recommender systems and any options users have to modify them 74 | Recommender parameter card generated from the ranking configuration; log of the options offered to users | 2 · 4 | Providers of online platforms | 2024-02-17 |
UCPD Arts. 5–7, Annex I | No commercial practice contrary to professional diligence, or misleading, that distorts the average consumer’s decisions, incl. AI-generated claims and chatbot answers; stating that reviews are genuine without reasonable checks, and false reviews, are blacklisted (Annex I points 23b and 23c) 75 | Claims register linked to eval results; review-provenance checks; chatbot answer evals on product claims | 1 · 3 · 4 | Traders dealing with consumers | 2007-12-12; review points since Directive (EU) 2019/2161 |
Platform Work Directive Arts. 7, 9–11 | Limits on the personal data platforms may process through automated systems, transparency about those systems, human oversight with an impact evaluation at least every two years, and explanation and human review of decisions 76 | Registry of automated systems with their main parameters; data-category deny list; two-yearly impact evaluation; explanation and human review log | 1 · 2 · 3 · 5 | Digital labour platforms | Transposition by 2026-12-02 |
CCD2 Art. 18(8) | Where the creditworthiness assessment involves automated processing, the consumer may request human intervention, a clear explanation of the assessment and its logic, and a review of the decision 77 | Explanation artefact per model version; review path and log | 3 · 4 · 5 | Creditors | 2026-11-20 |
ISO/IEC 42001, 42005 and 42006
ISO/IEC 42001:2023 is the AI management-system (AIMS) standard; its Annex A groups control objectives
into nine areas (A.2–A.10). It is a management-system standard, not the Article 17 QMS, and its
European adoption (EN ISO/IEC 42001:2026) confers no presumption of conformity1112.
| Annex A area | Focus | Engineering artefact | Layer |
|---|---|---|---|
A.2 Policies related to AI | AI policy set and its governance | Policy-as-code library; versioned policy repository | 1 |
A.3 Internal organization | Roles, responsibilities, reporting | Operating model; RACI; ownership in the registry | 1 · 2 |
A.4 Resources for AI systems | Data, tooling, compute, human resources documented | Resource inventory; AIBOM; environment manifests | 2 |
A.5 Assessing impacts of AI systems | Impact assessment process | Impact assessment as code; FRIA/DPIA linkage (ISO/IEC 42005) | 1 · 3 |
A.6 AI system life cycle | Responsible design, development, deployment | Pipeline controls; eval gates; change management | 1 · 3 · 4 |
A.7 Data for AI systems | Data quality, provenance, preparation | Data cards; lineage; data quality tests | 2 · 3 |
A.8 Information for interested parties | Transparency and reporting to stakeholders | Model/data cards; machine-readable disclosures | 2 |
A.9 Use of AI systems | Responsible-use controls and monitoring | Runtime guardrails; usage telemetry | 4 |
A.10 Third-party and customer relationships | Managing supplier and customer responsibilities | Supplier AIBOM; contractual and technical control mapping | 2 · 5 |
ISO/IEC 42005:2025 provides guidance for AI system impact assessment and is the natural companion to
Article 27 (FRIA) and Annex A.513. The operating model and RACI of the A.3 row are built in
a lifecycle RACI (chapter 12), and chapter 22 places
these standards in the ISO/IEC family as a whole.
Two further ISO/IEC standards sit alongside the AIMS. ISO/IEC 42006:2025 sets the requirements for the bodies that audit and certify AI management systems: building on ISO/IEC 17021-1, it is the answer to “who may credibly certify you to 42001”, since it fixes the competence and consistency a certification body must show. ISO/IEC 23894:2023 gives guidance on AI risk management, adapting ISO 31000 to AI; it is the risk-process companion to Article 9 and to the NIST AI RMF2728. The table also carries ISO/IEC 42005:2025, the impact-assessment guidance13, and ISO/IEC 22989:2022, the concepts and terminology standard whose AI stakeholder roles and life-cycle vocabulary a registry can reuse field for field78.
| Standard | What it is | Engineering artefact | Layer |
|---|---|---|---|
ISO/IEC 42006:2025 | Requirements for bodies auditing and certifying AI management systems (who may credibly certify you to 42001) | Accredited certification scope; auditor-competence evidence; certificate register | 5 |
ISO/IEC 23894:2023 | Guidance on AI risk management (companion to ISO 31000) | Risk register as code; AI risk taxonomy; linkage to EU AI Act Art. 9 and the NIST AI RMF | 1 · 3 |
ISO/IEC 42005:2025 | Guidance for assessing the impacts of an AI system on individuals, groups and society across its life cycle (companion to Art. 27 and Annex A.5) 13 | Impact assessment as code from a template; FRIA and DPIA cross-references; re-assessment triggers | 1 · 3 |
ISO/IEC 22989:2022 | A shared vocabulary for AI concepts, the AI system life cycle and AI stakeholder roles 78 | Registry field names and role vocabulary aligned to the standard’s terms; glossary cross-references | 2 |
Maps to: these controls are realised through layers 1, 2, 3 and 5 of the stack; the
impact-assessment control (A.5 / ISO 42005) supports EU AI Act Art. 27. Mappings are illustrative,
not a claim of conformity.
NIST AI RMF
The NIST AI Risk Management Framework 1.0 (January 2023; there is no 2.0) organises risk work into four functions. It is voluntary and US-origin, and it maps cleanly onto the five-layer stack14. As of 2026-09-24, NIST’s framework page states that AI RMF 1.0 “is being revised as part of the White House AI Action Plan”; no revised text had been published, so 1.0 remains the version to cite and to pin in control metadata59. Chapter 22 covers the NIST AI RMF in depth: the seven trustworthy characteristics, the 19 categories of the Core, the Playbook and the profiles.
| Function | What it asks for | Engineering artefact | Layer |
|---|---|---|---|
| GOVERN | A culture and structure for managing AI risk | Policy-as-code; operating model; registry ownership | 1 · 2 |
| MAP | Context and risk framing for each AI system | Threat models; use-case and impact mapping; data/model cards | 2 · 3 |
| MEASURE | Analyse, benchmark and monitor risk | Eval gates; adversarial red-team suite; metrics per failure mode | 3 |
| MANAGE | Prioritise, respond and recover | Runtime guardrails; incident pipeline; continuous assurance | 4 · 5 |
Newer NIST AI work
Beyond the RMF, three newer NIST efforts bear on the stack. Two are still in draft, and the copy says so. The AI Agent Standards Initiative, launched by NIST’s Center for AI Standards and Innovation (CAISI) on 17 February 2026, targets interoperable, secure standards for AI agents: identity, authentication, authorisation and agent security29. The draft IR 8596 Cyber AI Profile (initial preliminary draft, 16 December 2025; comments closed 30 January 2026, and still the current version as of 2026-09-24) is a Cybersecurity Framework (CSF 2.0) profile for AI, organised around Secure, Defend and Thwart30. The draft AI 800-1 (Managing Misuse Risk for Dual-Use Foundation Models; second public draft, January 2025; no final version published as of 2026-09-24) is voluntary guidance for identifying, measuring and mitigating misuse risk across the AI lifecycle31. The older Generative AI Profile, NIST AI 600-1 (26 July 2024), is the RMF’s companion for generative AI: 12 risks and suggested actions coded to the four functions, and the table carries it too79.
| NIST item | What it is | Engineering artefact | Layer |
|---|---|---|---|
| AI Agent Standards Initiative (2026) | CAISI initiative on interoperable, secure AI agents: identity, authentication, agent security | Agent registry; non-human-identity controls; agent authentication and authorisation; adversarial agent evals | 3 · 4 |
| IR 8596 Cyber AI Profile (draft) | CSF 2.0 profile for AI (Secure / Defend / Thwart) | AI-system security controls; runtime observability; threat detection mapped to CSF 2.0 | 3 · 4 |
| AI 800-1 (draft) | Managing Misuse Risk for Dual-Use Foundation Models (voluntary guidance) | Misuse red-team suite; capability and dangerous-capability evals; safety framework | 3 |
| AI 600-1 Generative AI Profile (2024) | Suggested actions for 12 risks that generative AI creates or exacerbates, coded to the Govern, Map, Measure and Manage functions 79 | Generative-AI eval suites named after the profile’s action ids (e.g. confabulation, information integrity); a risk-register entry per profile risk | 1 · 3 |
CSA AICM and STAR for AI
The Cloud Security Alliance’s AI Controls Matrix (AICM) v1.1, published 22 June 2026, defines 247 control objectives across 18 domains, and the STAR for AI programme provides the assurance scheme around it, in three levels: a Level 1 self-assessment, a Level 1 “Valid-AI-ted” automated validation, and a Level 2 that adds ISO/IEC 42001 certification1583.
| CSA artefact | What it is | Engineering artefact | Layer |
|---|---|---|---|
| AICM v1.1 | 247 control objectives across 18 domains, spanning governance, data, model and runtime | Control catalogue mapped to policy-as-code and evals; crosswalk to ISO 42001 / NIST AI RMF | 1 · 3 · 5 |
| STAR for AI | Assurance and certification programme on the AICM: Level 1 self-assessment, Level 1 Valid-AI-ted (automated validation) and Level 2 (ISO/IEC 42001 certification plus the validated assessment) 83 | Machine-readable evidence submission; continuous assurance telemetry | 5 |
| Agent controls (AICM v1.1, ATF, AARM) | Agent-specific AICM controls (e.g. IAM-18 Agent Access Restriction, AIS-11 Agents Security Boundaries), with the Agentic Trust Framework v1 (earned autonomy tiers) and the AARM runtime-interception specification 808182 | Agent-specific control definitions; policy-as-code for agent scope and tools; runtime guardrails | 1 · 4 |
| Catastrophic Risk Annex | Enhanced AICM controls for high-autonomy systems with catastrophic-risk potential | Enhanced controls for high-autonomy systems; kill switch and oversight controls; pilot-audit evidence | 4 · 5 |
Two lines of work push the AICM toward agents and frontier risk. For agents, the controls sit inside the matrix itself (for example IAM-18 Agent Access Restriction and AIS-11 Agents Security Boundaries)80, and the CSA’s agentic control-plane programme adds two published specifications, the Agentic Trust Framework (zero trust for agents with earned autonomy tiers) and AARM (interception of agent actions before they execute)328182. Earlier editions of this map listed a proposed “Agentic Control Supplement” to the AICM; it could not be matched to a CSA primary document as of 2026-09-24, so the row now names what is published (verify). For frontier risk, the Catastrophic Risk Annex adds a set of enhanced controls for high-autonomy systems, meant to be proven through pilot audits rather than asserted33.
OWASP GenAI Security Project
OWASP’s GenAI Security Project supplies the threat vocabulary the controls are built against, plus two formats (the Agent Control Standard and an AIBOM) that the stack consumes directly161754. Chapter 23 maps each agentic entry to its controls in threats mapped to controls.
| OWASP artefact | What it is | Engineering artefact | Layer |
|---|---|---|---|
| Top 10 for Agentic Applications 2026 | Agent threat catalogue (ASI01 Agent Goal Hijack … ASI10 Rogue Agents) | Agent threat model; adversarial evals; runtime guardrails; kill switch | 3 · 4 |
| Top 10 for LLM Applications 2026 | LLM threat catalogue (incl. Excessive Agency at #3) | Prompt-injection and output-handling controls; eval gate | 3 · 4 |
| Agent Control Standard (ACS) | A standard for expressing agent controls | Machine-readable control definitions for agents | 1 · 4 |
| AIBOM | AI bill-of-materials format and generator | AIBOM at build (CycloneDX ML-BOM, SPDX 3.0 AI) | 2 |
US federal and state laws
The United States has no horizontal federal AI statute; the binding AI-specific rules are state laws, and they differ in scope. Two bind only frontier developers, with the heaviest duties on the large ones; the rest reach ordinary developers, deployers and operators, and federal law that predates AI (fair lending, credit reporting, employment discrimination, the FTC Act) already reaches AI decisions. The tables below carry them all as rows. Chapter 21 teaches them: the federal layer (executive orders, the OMB memoranda that bind agencies and their vendors, and the federal push against state AI laws) and the state laws that bind private organisations, each with its scope, dates, duties and enforcement.
Frontier-developer laws
Two US state laws bind only frontier developers, with the heaviest duties on the large ones, not general deployers: a narrower scope than the EU AI Act’s risk-tiering. They ask large frontier developers to publish safety frameworks and every frontier developer to report critical safety incidents to the state181925. California’s whistleblower protection is met in practice by a channel for raising concerns (chapter 12). The frontier safety frameworks crosswalk maps three published frameworks to the NIST AI RMF and ISO/IEC 42001, as a coverage map rather than a conformity claim.
| Law | Scope | Obligation | Engineering artefact | Layer |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| California SB 53 (TFAIA), in force 2026-01-01 | Frontier developers (models trained above ~10^26 FLOP); the framework duty binds large frontier developers (developer revenue over USD 500M) | Publish a frontier AI framework; report critical safety incidents to the Office of Emergency Services within 15 days; whistleblower protection; up to USD 1M per violation, AG-enforced 56 | Published safety framework; incident pipeline reporting to the state; transparency artefacts | 5 · 4 |
| California SB 53 whistleblower protections (Labor Code 1107–1107.2), in force 2026-01-01 | Frontier developers; the anonymous process binds large frontier developers | No rule, policy or contract that prevents covered employees from disclosing catastrophic-risk concerns, and no retaliation; notice of rights; large frontier developers run an anonymous internal process with monthly updates to the reporter, shared with officers and directors at least quarterly 56 | Anonymous internal reporting channel with status updates; notice acknowledgment records; quarterly summary to officers and directors | 1 · 5 |
| New York RAISE Act (S6953B), signed 2025-12-19 | Frontier developers (models trained above 10^26 operations) report incidents within 72 hours; the framework duty binds large frontier developers (annual revenue over USD 500M); thresholds of the chapter amendment signed 2026-03-27 | Publish a frontier AI safety and security framework; disclose safety incidents within 72 hours. A chapter amendment signed 2026-03-27 sets the effective date at 2027-01-01 and creates an oversight office within the New York Department of Financial Services (DFS) 192425 | Published frontier AI safety framework; 72-hour incident and disclosure pipeline reporting to the DFS oversight office | 5 · 4 |
Other state AI laws
These state laws reach beyond frontier developers to ordinary developers, deployers and operators: Texas and Colorado; California’s training-data, provenance and companion-chatbot laws; New York’s companion rules; Illinois; New York City’s Local Law 144; and Utah5584858688899091. Chapter 21 sets each one out with its enforcement in its table of state laws, and compares the hiring rules in one hiring tool, four regimes.
| Law | Scope | Obligation | Engineering artefact | Layer |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Texas TRAIGA (HB 149), in force 2026-01-01 | Developers and deployers doing business in Texas | Intent-based prohibitions on developing or deploying AI (behaviour manipulation, unlawful discrimination); social scoring banned for governmental entities; AI-use disclosure by government agencies and health care providers; a regulatory sandbox; Attorney-General enforcement; local AI rules preempted 35 | Prohibited-use policy-as-code; AI-use disclosure controls; complaint and incident handling | 1 · 4 |
| Colorado SB 26-189 (automated decision-making technology), effective 2027-01-01, replacing SB 24-205 | Developers and deployers of ADMT in consequential decisions | Developer documentation to deployers and notice of material updates; deployer notice of ADMT use; a plain-language explanation within 30 days of an adverse outcome; correction, human review and reconsideration; records kept at least three years. SB 26-189 (signed 2026-05-14) repealed and re-enacted SB 24-205, whose duty of care against algorithmic discrimination had been delayed to 2026-06-30 and whose enforcement a federal court had blocked 3655 | ADMT inventory; developer documentation pack; notice and adverse-outcome explanation templates; human-review queue; three-year record store | 2 · 4 · 5 |
| California AB 2013 (training-data transparency), due 2026-01-01 | Developers of generative AI systems released since 2022-01-01 | Developers post a summary of the datasets used to train a generative AI system made available to Californians (sources, size, data types, IP and personal information, synthetic data) on or before 2026-01-01 and on each substantial modification 84 | Data card per dataset, published at release; training-data rights ledger | 2 |
| California AI Transparency Act (SB 942 as amended by AB 853), operative 2026-08-02 | Covered providers of public generative AI systems; large online platforms; capture-device makers | Covered providers offer a free AI-detection tool and embed latent disclosures, with an optional manifest disclosure, in generated image, video and audio; large online platforms and capture devices follow later 85 | Provenance pipeline writing latent metadata; public detection endpoint; platform-side provenance display | 3 · 4 |
| California SB 243 (companion chatbots), chaptered 2025-10-13 | Operators of companion chatbots | Disclose AI where a reasonable person could be misled; for known minors, remind at least every three hours and prevent sexually explicit content; run a suicide and self-harm protocol with crisis referral; annual reports from 2027-07-01 86 | Companion-mode policy; reminder timer; crisis-referral classifier and log; annual report | 1 · 4 · 5 |
| New York GBL Article 47 (AI companion models), in force 2025-11-05 (verify) | Operators of AI companions | Detect suicidal ideation and self-harm and refer users to crisis services; tell users they are not talking to a human at the start and at least every three hours 88 | Crisis-referral classifier and log; notice timer | 4 · 5 |
| Illinois HB 3773 (Human Rights Act amendment), effective 2026-01-01 | Employers | Employers may not use AI with a discriminatory effect on protected classes in recruitment, hiring, promotion, discipline or other terms of employment, nor ZIP codes as a proxy, and must notify employees and applicants 89118 | AI-in-HR inventory; adverse-impact eval per protected class; notice record | 2 · 3 · 4 |
| NYC Local Law 144 (automated employment decision tools), enforced since 2023-07-05 | Employers and employment agencies using AEDTs for New York City roles | An independent bias audit within one year before use, a published summary of the results, and notice to candidates and employees 10 business days before use 90 | Impact-ratio eval by sex, race/ethnicity and intersectional category; published audit summary; notice record | 3 · 5 |
| Utah AI disclosure law (SB 226), effective 2025-05-07 | Suppliers using generative AI in consumer transactions; regulated occupations | Disclose generative AI when a person clearly and unambiguously asks; regulated occupations disclose it prominently in a high-risk AI interaction; clear disclosure at the outset is a safe harbour 91 | Disclosure component with an interaction-risk flag; conversation log showing the disclosure | 4 |
State privacy and sector laws
State privacy statutes reach AI through profiling opt-outs, assessments, consent and review rights, and one sector law reaches insurers’ models. Chapter 19 compares them in the United States and chapter 20 covers housing, insurance and public services.
| Law | Scope | Obligation | Engineering artefact | Layer |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| California CPPA regulations (ADMT), duties from 2027-01-01 | Businesses subject to the CCPA | Businesses using ADMT for significant decisions give a pre-use notice, an opt-out or a human appeal, and access to information about the ADMT 87 | ADMT register; pre-use notice; opt-out or appeal workflow; ADMT access response | 2 · 4 · 5 |
| California CPPA regulations (risk assessments), effective 2026-01-01 | Businesses subject to the CCPA | A risk assessment before processing that presents significant risk, incl. using ADMT for significant decisions; attestations and summaries submitted to the Agency 87 | Risk assessment per triggering activity; submission record | 5 |
| Virginia CDPA (§ 59.1-580), from 2023-01-01 | Controllers | Controllers document data protection assessments for targeted advertising, sale, profiling that presents a reasonably foreseeable risk, and sensitive data, for processing created after 2023-01-01, and give them to the Attorney General on request 93 | Assessment template per processing activity; profiling register | 1 · 5 |
| Colorado Privacy Act (SB21-190), effective 2023-07-01 | Controllers | Consumers may opt out of profiling in furtherance of decisions with legal or similarly significant effects, incl. through a universal opt-out mechanism; controllers run data protection assessments for processing that presents a heightened risk 94 | Opt-out flag honoured at inference; assessment template; intake data-class flags | 1 · 2 · 4 · 5 |
| Minnesota CDPA (§ 325M.14), effective 2025-07-31 | Controllers | A consumer may question the result of profiling, be told the reason, review the personal data used, correct it and have the decision re-evaluated 95 | Reason-and-review workflow with re-evaluation on corrected data | 4 · 5 |
| Illinois BIPA (740 ILCS 14), in force 2008-10-03 | Private entities | Informed written consent before collecting biometric identifiers, a retention and destruction schedule, and secure storage; a private right of action with statutory damages 96119 | Written-consent capture; retention schedule as code; destruction log | 1 · 2 |
| Washington My Health My Data Act (RCW 19.373), from 2024-03-31 | Regulated entities | Consent to collect and separate consent to share consumer health data, incl. data derived or extrapolated by algorithms or machine learning, and a signed authorisation for any sale 97 | Separate consent records for collection and sharing; signed sale authorisation; intake flags for derived health data | 1 · 2 |
| Colorado SB21-169 (insurers), effective 2021-09-07 | Insurers | Insurers may not unfairly discriminate through external consumer data, algorithms or predictive models; they keep a risk-management framework, test for unfair discrimination and file a chief-risk-officer attestation under rules adopted per line of insurance 92 | Inventory of external data sources and models; disparity testing; chief-risk-officer attestation record | 2 · 3 · 5 |
Federal law that already reaches AI
Federal agencies are bound by OMB memoranda9899. For private organisations the federal rules that reach AI are older, technology-neutral law: adverse-action notices in lending and credit reporting, disparate impact in employment, the FTC Act’s ban on deceptive practices, and the TAKE IT DOWN Act’s removal duty100101102103104105106. Chapter 21 covers the federal layer; chapter 16 builds the reason codes of credit adverse-action notices and the four-fifths rule; chapter 20 covers claims substantiation and deepfakes and synthetic media.
| Law | Scope | Obligation | Engineering artefact | Layer |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| OMB M-25-21 (federal use of AI), issued 2025-04-03 | US federal agencies (their AI vendors by contract) | Federal agencies apply minimum practices to high-impact AI: pre-deployment testing, an AI impact assessment, ongoing monitoring, operator training, human oversight with a fail-safe where practicable, remedies or appeals, and consultation of end users, documented within 365 days 98 | Use-case inventory entry; pre-deployment test report; AI impact assessment; monitoring plan; appeal path | 2 · 3 · 4 · 5 |
| OMB M-26-04 (LLM procurement), issued 2025-12-11 | US federal agencies and LLM vendors | Solicitations for large language models request, as a minimum, the vendor’s acceptable use policy, model, system or data cards, end-user resources and a feedback mechanism 99 | Acceptable use policy; model, system or data cards; end-user resources; feedback channel | 2 · 5 |
ECOA Regulation B (12 CFR 1002.9) | Creditors | A creditor that takes adverse action gives a statement of specific principal reasons, or the right to one within 30 days; citing internal standards or a failed score is insufficient, whatever model made the decision 100 | Reason-code service versioned with the model; reason-code fidelity eval; notice template | 3 · 4 · 5 |
FCRA (15 U.S.C. 1681m(a)) | Users of consumer reports | A user of a consumer report that takes adverse action gives notice, discloses the numerical credit score used and its key factors, names the reporting agency and states the right to a free report and to dispute 101 | Score and key-factor record per adverse decision; notice template | 4 |
Title VII s. 703(k) and UGESP (29 CFR 1607.4(D)) | Employers | A selection procedure with disparate impact is unlawful unless job-related and consistent with business necessity, and a less discriminatory alternative can still be required; a selection rate under four-fifths of the highest group’s rate is generally regarded as evidence of adverse impact 102103 | Adverse-impact-ratio eval per group with counts and confidence intervals; job-relatedness validation; alternatives search log | 3 · 5 |
FTC Act s. 5 (15 U.S.C. 45) | Businesses making AI claims | Deceptive acts or practices are unlawful: claims about an AI system’s accuracy, performance or fairness need competent and reliable evidence before they are made 104105 | Claims register linked to current eval runs; substantiation gate on release copy | 1 · 3 · 5 |
| TAKE IT DOWN Act (Public Law 119-12), process due 2026-05-19 | Covered platforms | Covered platforms run a notice-and-removal process and remove reported non-consensual intimate images, incl. AI-generated forgeries, and known identical copies within 48 hours of a valid request 106 | Takedown pipeline with a 48-hour clock, owner and log; matching of identical copies | 4 · 5 |
Federal audit and oversight
Auditors bring their own lens. The GAO AI Accountability Framework (GAO-21-519SP, 30 June 2021) binds no one, but it is what the US Government Accountability Office, inspectors general and third-party assessors use to audit an AI system, and it holds “other entities” to the same practices as federal agencies120. It has four principles (governance, data, performance, monitoring) and 31 key practices, each with questions for the entity and audit procedures for the assessor. An entity that can answer those questions from its own records is ready for the audit. It does not replace the NIST AI RMF (the operational risk process) or a binding law such as the EU AI Act; it is the check applied to both.
| Framework | Scope | What it asks for | Engineering artefact | Layer |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| GAO AI Accountability Framework, principle 1 (governance), practices 1.1 to 1.9 | Federal agencies and other entities; auditors and third-party assessors | Clear goals, roles and delegation of authority, values, a multidisciplinary workforce, stakeholder involvement and an AI-specific risk management plan, plus documented technical specifications, compliance with applicable law and transparency to external stakeholders 120 | Registry entry with owner and intended purpose; RACI; risk register as code; compliance mapping; published system card | 1 · 2 · 5 |
| GAO AI Accountability Framework, principle 2 (data), practices 2.1 to 2.8 | Federal agencies and other entities; auditors and third-party assessors | Document the sources and origins of development data and assess their reliability, categorisation, variable selection and any synthetic, imputed or augmented data; assess the dependencies, bias, security and privacy of the data used in operation 120 | Dataset datasheet with lineage; data-quality and representativeness evals; data-flow map | 2 · 3 |
| GAO AI Accountability Framework, principle 3 (performance), practices 3.1 to 3.9 | Federal agencies and other entities; auditors and third-party assessors | Catalogue components, define precise, consistent and reproducible metrics, assess each component and the whole system against them, identify biases and define procedures for human supervision 120 | Eval suite with versioned metrics per component and system; bias eval; human-oversight procedure | 3 · 4 |
| GAO AI Accountability Framework, principle 4 (monitoring), practices 4.1 to 4.5 | Federal agencies and other entities; auditors and third-party assessors | Plan continuous or routine monitoring, set the acceptable range of data and model drift, document monitoring results and corrective actions, and reassess the system’s utility and the conditions for scaling it 120 | Monitoring plan with drift thresholds; monitoring log with corrective actions; periodic review record | 4 · 5 |
Other jurisdictions
The map’s spine is the EU AI Act, but a governance function working across borders answers to more than one regime. These rows are stamped as of 2026-09-24; where a rule is still moving, the copy says so.
| Jurisdiction / instrument | Status (as of 2026-09-24) | What it asks for | Engineering artefact | Layer |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| South Korea: AI Basic Act | In force 2026-01-2234, with its Enforcement Decree62; the ministry (MSIT) announced a guidance period of at least one year in which fact-finding and fines are held back except in exceptional cases, while the duties apply58; detail in chapter 21 | Baseline duties for AI operators, heightened duties for “high-impact” AI in sensitive sectors, and AI-content labelling | Risk register for high-impact AI; AI-use notification; AI-content labelling | 1 · 2 · 4 |
| Singapore: IMDA Model AI Governance Framework for Generative AI | Voluntary; published May 2024 39 | Governance dimensions incl. testing, transparency, incident reporting, security and content provenance | Eval suite; model cards; content provenance and watermarking | 2 · 3 · 4 |
| ETSI EN 304 223 (Securing AI) | Published (V2.1.1, Dec 2025) 40 | Baseline cyber-security requirements across the AI lifecycle (13 principles over five stages) | AI-system security controls across the lifecycle; supply-chain and AIBOM checks; runtime hardening | 4 |
| Singapore: IMDA Model AI Governance Framework for Agentic AI (identity and authorisations) | Voluntary; version 1.5 published 2026-05-20 107 | Each agent has a unique, accounted-for identity, catalogued and centrally managed; authorisations are scoped, time- or session-bound, non-transferable and bounded by the authorising human | Agent registry with a workload identity per agent; delegated, short-lived credentials never broader than the user | 2 · 4 |
| Singapore: IMDA Model AI Governance Framework for Agentic AI (human checkpoints) | Voluntary; version 1.5 published 2026-05-20 107 | Significant checkpoints for high-stakes, irreversible, outlier and user-defined actions, with approvals that are contextual and digestible and enforced through system-level controls | Checkpoint classes in the tool gateway; approval log; oversight metrics | 4 · 5 |
| Canada: Directive on Automated Decision-Making (federal institutions) | In effect since 2019-04-01; modified 2025-06-24 108 | Complete, approve and publish an algorithmic impact assessment before production; apply the Appendix C requirements for the impact level (notice, explanation, peer review, human intervention); offer recourse and report on effectiveness | Published AIA rendered from a shared impact fact base; notice and explanation templates; peer-review record; recourse path; re-assessment triggers as code | 1 · 2 · 5 |
Brazil: LGPD Art. 20 (review of automated decisions) | In force 2020-09-18 (verify); sanctions from 2021-08-01 109 | A data subject may request review of decisions taken solely on automated processing that affect their interests, incl. profiling, and the controller gives clear information on the criteria and procedures used | Review workflow; statement of criteria and procedures per system | 4 · 5 |
South Korea, article by article
The AI Basic Act’s operator duties sit in Articles 31 to 36, with the mechanics in the Enforcement Decree3462. All of them have applied since 22 January 2026; what MSIT holds back during its guidance period of at least one year is fact-finding and fines, not the duties58. Chapter 21 walks each article in South Korea: the AI Basic Act.
| Article | Who is bound | What it asks for | Engineering artefact | Layer |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Art. 31(1) | AI business operators | Tell users in advance that a product or service runs on high-impact or generative AI, in the product, the terms, the screen or the place of supply (Decree Art. 23(1)); a missing notice is finable (Art. 43) 3462 | Notice component in UI, terms and contracts; notice inventory per user surface | 2 · 4 |
Art. 31(2)–(3) | Operators providing generative AI | Indicate that outputs are AI-generated, and notify or label realistic synthetic sound, images or video so users can recognise them; a machine-readable mark alone needs at least one text or voice notice (Decree Art. 23(2)–(3)) 3462 | Provenance pipeline: visible label or machine-readable mark plus at least one text or voice notice | 3 · 4 |
Art. 32 | Operators of qualifying high-compute systems | Systems with at least 10^26 FLOP of cumulative training compute, built with the most advanced technology and posing broad and serious risk (Decree Art. 24), identify, assess and mitigate risks across the lifecycle and report the results to MSIT 3462 | Lifecycle risk register; safety-incident monitoring; results report to MSIT | 3 · 4 · 5 |
Art. 33 | AI business operators | Review in advance whether a system is high-impact AI and optionally ask MSIT to confirm; MSIT replies within 30 days, extendable once (Decree Art. 25) 3462 | Classification decision record per system: Art. 2(4) area, risk rationale, training-data overview, MSIT reply | 1 · 2 |
Art. 34 | Operators of high-impact AI | A risk management plan, an explanation plan, a user-protection plan, human management and supervision, and documents showing the measures; publish the main content and keep the evidence for five years (Decree Art. 27) 3462 | Risk management, explanation and user-protection plans; named human overseer; published summary; five-year evidence store | 1 · 2 · 4 · 5 |
Art. 35 | Operators of high-impact AI | Endeavour to assess the effect on fundamental rights before providing high-impact AI, covering the seven elements of Decree Art. 28 3462 | Impact assessment carrying the seven decree elements | 1 · 5 |
Art. 36 | Foreign AI business operators above a threshold | An operator with no address or establishment in Korea that meets a decree threshold (revenue, AI-service revenue, daily users or a past fine; Decree Art. 29) designates a domestic representative in writing and reports it to MSIT 3462 | Designation filed with MSIT; evidence-access runbook for the representative | 5 |
United Kingdom
The UK has no horizontal AI act. It governs AI through existing sector regulators (the ICO, the FCA, the MHRA and others), coordinated centrally, plus the AI Security Institute (renamed from the AI Safety Institute in February 2025) for frontier-model evaluation38. For automated decision-making, the Data (Use and Access) Act 2025 replaced UK GDPR Article 22 with new Articles 22A–22D (in force 5 February 2026): a permission-plus-safeguards model for significant, solely automated decisions, with tighter conditions where special-category data is used. The safeguards (a meaningful-human-review path, a channel to make representations and to contest, and a decision notice) are the artefact the engineer builds37. Chapter 19 sets Articles 22A–22D beside the GDPR and the US regimes in the regimes side by side, and chapter 16 turns the safeguards into explanation and contest records in data protection: the GDPR and the UK regime. UK consumer law reaches AI-generated reviews: the Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act 2024 bans fake and concealed-incentive reviews from 6 April 2025111, taught in chapter 20 under the United Kingdom: DMCC Act.
| Jurisdiction / instrument | Status (as of 2026-09-24) | What it asks for | Engineering artefact | Layer |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| UK: Data (Use and Access) Act 2025, UK GDPR Arts. 22A–22D | In force 2026-02-05 37 | A permission-plus-safeguards model for significant, solely automated decisions, with tighter conditions where special-category data is used | ADM safeguards: meaningful-human-review path, contest and representation channel, decision notice | 4 · 2 |
| UK: Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act 2024, s. 225 and Sch. 20 para. 13 | In force 2025-04-06 111 | Unfair commercial practices are prohibited, and Schedule 20 bans submitting or commissioning fake consumer reviews and concealed-incentive reviews, which reaches reviews generated by AI | Policy blocking review generation; review-provenance log | 1 · 4 |
China
China governs AI in two tiers, and this map keeps them apart. The binding tier is a set of departmental rules issued by the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) with co-issuers, on algorithmic recommendation (2022), deep synthesis (2023), generative AI services (2023) and the labelling of AI-generated synthetic content (2025); several are territorial, and the Interim Measures for Generative AI Services apply only to services offered “to the public within the PRC”434445. The labelling duty is backed by a mandatory national standard, GB 45438-2025, that carries the metadata fields the measure requires4647. The voluntary tier is the recommended standard GB/T 45654-2025 48 and the TC260 AI Safety Governance Framework4142. The Cybersecurity Law, amended by the NPC Standing Committee on 2025-10-28 and in force 2026-01-01, adds a programmatic Article 20 on AI that does not by itself create operator duties49; the most recent binding rule, the Interim Measures for Anthropomorphic Interaction Services (in force 2026-07-15), is narrow in scope (services that offer sustained emotional interaction); it has a row below and chapter 21 sets it out under China: what chapter 08 does not already cover50. Personal information is governed by the Personal Information Protection Law, whose Article 24 on automated decision-making also has a row110. The framework 3.0 (14 September 2026) is a TC260 technical document published under CAC guidance and described as “a reference for developers, providers and users”: it sets a three-block risk taxonomy (inherent, application and secondary), grades risk qualitatively by scenario, intelligence level and scale with no compute or parameter threshold, treats open-source models as a distinct risk profile and names computing-power security as a risk category, and its Appendix 2 walks the agent lifecycle from design to decommissioning42. Practitioner commentary reported agents and physically interactive systems as the headline change in the new version51.
The instruments above resolve to obligation-to-artefact rows in the same shape as the other jurisdictions:
| Jurisdiction / instrument | Status (as of 2026-09-20) | What it asks for | Engineering artefact | Layer |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| China: Provisions on the Administration of Algorithmic Recommendation in Internet Information Services (CAC, MIIT, MPS and SAMR Order No. 9) | Binding; in force 2022-03-01 43 | Algorithm filing for services with public-opinion attributes or social-mobilisation capacity, security assessment, display of the filing number, and a user option to switch off personalised recommendation | Algorithm inventory with filing record and number; security-assessment evidence pack; opt-out control at runtime | 1 · 2 · 4 |
| China: Provisions on the Administration of Deep Synthesis in Internet Information Services (CAC, MIIT and MPS Order No. 12) | Binding; in force 2023-01-10 44 | Conspicuous labels where synthetic content could mislead the public and non-removable technical marks; training-data management; separate consent for face and voice editing; filing and security assessment for opinion-shaping functions | Content-provenance pipeline (visible label plus metadata mark); training-data governance record; consent gate; pre-release security assessment | 2 · 3 · 4 |
| China: Interim Measures for the Administration of Generative AI Services (CAC and six other bodies, Order No. 15) | Binding; in force 2023-08-15; applies to services offered to the public within the PRC 45 | Lawful-source training data and foundation models; content labelling under the deep-synthesis rules; security assessment and algorithm filing for opinion-shaping services; stop, remove, retrain and report on illegal content | Data-lineage and licensing record; eval gate on generated content; incident pipeline with a retraining loop; filing record | 2 · 3 · 4 · 5 |
| China: Measures for Labelling AI-Generated Synthetic Content, with mandatory standard GB 45438-2025 | Binding; in force 2025-09-01, the standard implemented the same day 4647 | Explicit labels (text, audio or graphic) and implicit metadata labels carrying the provider’s name or code and a content number; distribution platforms verify metadata and flag suspected AI content | Provenance and watermarking pipeline emitting the GB 45438 metadata fields; platform-side detection and flagging | 3 · 4 |
| China: GB/T 45654-2025 Basic security requirements for generative AI services | Recommended (voluntary) national standard; implemented 2025-11-01 48 | Training-corpus source and content screening, model-safety requirements and the evaluation methods that underpin the security assessment | Corpus-screening record; eval question banks; security-assessment report | 3 · 5 |
| China: TC260 AI Safety Governance Framework 3.0 | Voluntary; published 2026-09-14, building on 1.0 (2024) and 2.0 (2025) 4142 | A three-block risk taxonomy (inherent, application, secondary), technological and governance countermeasures and role-based guidelines; operators keep logs for at least six months and audit them, monitor risk in real time, keep a traceable chain of responsibility and assess resilience (§5.3) | Risk register keyed to the framework’s taxonomy; log-retention policy (six months) with audit; real-time risk monitoring; resilience assessment | 1 · 4 · 5 |
| China: Personal Information Protection Law, Arts. 24 and 55–56 | Binding; in force 2021-11-01 110 | Automated decisions stay transparent and fair, with no unreasonable differential treatment in prices or terms; targeted pushes offer a non-personalised option or an easy refusal; individuals may request an explanation and refuse solely automated decisions with a significant impact; an impact assessment beforehand, kept at least three years | Explanation service and manual-decision route; non-personalised option at runtime; impact assessment record kept three years | 2 · 4 · 5 |
| China: Interim Measures for the Administration of Anthropomorphic Interaction Services (CAC, NDRC, MIIT, MPS and SAMR) | Binding; in force 2026-07-15 50 | A minors’ mode; AI signals and a reminder after two hours of continuous use; an easy exit; a security assessment at 1 million registered or 100,000 monthly active users; filing | Minors’-mode configuration; reminder timer; user-count threshold monitor; security-assessment report; filing record | 1 · 2 · 4 · 5 |
| China: TC260 Framework 3.0, Appendix 2 (agentic AI risk management) | Voluntary; published 2026-09-14 42 | Unique identity and least-privilege permissions per agent by decision mode; human checkpoints with tamper-proof approval logs and deny-by-default; tool and skill verification; runtime guardrails (alert, restrict, intercept, suspend, terminate); memory isolation with no credentials in memory; mutual authentication; sandbox validation, red teaming and re-validation on major change; controlled decommissioning | Agent registry with identity and scope; approval-log store; tool allow-list with integrity checks; runtime guardrails and kill switch; memory-scope policy; decommissioning runbook | 2 · 3 · 4 · 5 |
Appendix 2’s agent controls line up with the two agentic references this chapter already carries, the OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications 16 and the NIST AI Agent Standards Initiative29:
| Agent control | TC260 Framework 3.0, Appendix 2 42 | OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications 2026 16 | NIST AI Agent Standards Initiative 29 | Layer |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Identity and least privilege | II.2: unique identity per agent, permissions by decision mode, credentials revoked at task end | ASI03 Identity and Privilege Abuse | Agent identity, authentication, authorisation | 2 · 4 |
| Human checkpoints and approval logs | II.3: tiered controls, human control checkpoints, tamper-proof approval logs, deny by default | ASI09 Human-Agent Trust Exploitation; ASI01 Agent Goal Hijack | None | 4 · 5 |
| Tools, skills and supply chain | II.4: tool verification, fair tool selection, anomaly detection, skill management | ASI02 Tool Misuse and Exploitation; ASI04 Agentic Supply Chain Vulnerabilities | Agent security | 2 · 4 |
| Runtime guardrails and execution limits | II.5(1)(2)(5)(6): input control, guardrails, step/frequency/duration limits, sandbox isolation | ASI01 Agent Goal Hijack; ASI05 Unexpected Code Execution (RCE); ASI08 Cascading Failures; ASI10 Rogue Agents | None | 4 |
| Memory | II.5(3): retention windows, isolation across users and tasks, no credentials in memory | ASI06 Memory & Context Poisoning | None | 3 · 4 |
| Agent–model–tool communication | II.5(4): mutual authentication, integrity, replay resistance | ASI07 Insecure Inter-Agent Communication | Authentication | 4 |
| Monitoring, audit, sandbox, red teaming, incident response | II.6: anomaly blocking, log management, security auditing, sandbox validation, red teaming, emergency plans, re-validation on major change | Cross-cutting | Adversarial agent evals | 3 · 5 |
| Decommissioning | II.7: complete shutdown, data backup, environment cleanup | ASI10 Rogue Agents (residual agents) | None | 2 · 4 |
Chapter 23 compares these agent-control sources with the CSA’s and Singapore’s in frameworks written for agents.
Treaty and international soft law
Three international instruments carry duties an engineer can evidence. The Council of Europe Framework Convention (CETS No. 225) binds Parties, not companies, and is not yet in force; inside the EU it is implemented through the AI Act112113. The OECD AI Principles, revised on 3 May 2024, and the G7 Hiroshima Code of Conduct of 30 October 2023 are voluntary114115. Chapter 22 teaches them in what the Convention asks for, the five principles and five recommendations and the G7 Hiroshima Process.
| Instrument and clause | Status (as of 2026-09-24) | What it asks for | Engineering artefact | Layer |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Council of Europe Convention Art. 14(2)(a)–(b) | Not in force (as of 2026-09-24) 112113 | Document relevant information about systems that can significantly affect human rights, sufficient for affected people to contest the decisions | Decision record per consequential output; contest path with the record attached | 2 · 5 |
Council of Europe Convention Art. 15(2) | Not in force (as of 2026-09-24) 112113 | Notify people that they are interacting with an AI system, as appropriate | Interaction disclosure enforced at runtime | 4 |
Council of Europe Convention Art. 16(1)–(2)(a)–(f) | Not in force (as of 2026-09-24) 112113 | Iterative, graduated risk and impact management: context, severity and probability, stakeholder views, monitoring and documentation | Risk register as code; impact assessment linked to the registry; monitoring against a baseline | 1 · 2 · 4 |
Council of Europe Convention Art. 16(2)(g) | Not in force (as of 2026-09-24) 112113 | Test systems before first use and when they are significantly modified, where appropriate | Eval gate on release and on material change | 3 |
| OECD AI Principles, principle 1.4(b) | Non-binding; revised 2024-05-03 114 | Mechanisms let AI systems that risk undue harm be overridden, repaired and/or decommissioned safely | Tested kill switch; decommissioning record in the registry | 2 · 4 |
| OECD AI Principles, principle 1.5(b)–(c) | Non-binding; revised 2024-05-03 114 | Traceability of datasets, processes and decisions, and systematic risk management at each phase of the lifecycle | Evidence store keyed to registry ids; risk register as code; supplier records | 1 · 5 |
| G7 Hiroshima Code of Conduct, action 1 | Voluntary; agreed 2023-10-30 115 | Identify, evaluate and mitigate risks across the lifecycle, incl. testing before deployment | Adversarial red-team suite; eval gate | 3 |
| G7 Hiroshima Code of Conduct, actions 2 and 4 | Voluntary; agreed 2023-10-30 115 | Identify and mitigate vulnerabilities, incidents and misuse after deployment, and share information and report incidents responsibly | Runtime monitoring; incident pipeline with an external-sharing branch | 4 · 5 |
| G7 Hiroshima Code of Conduct, action 3 | Voluntary; agreed 2023-10-30 115116 | Publicly report capabilities, limitations and appropriate and inappropriate uses; the OECD reporting framework has collected such reports since 2025 | Model card published from the registry | 2 |
| G7 Hiroshima Code of Conduct, action 7 | Voluntary; agreed 2023-10-30 115 | Deploy content authentication and provenance mechanisms where feasible | Provenance marking at output; verification test | 4 |
Mappings are illustrative, not a claim of conformity.
What is NOT harmonised yet
The map has a hole, and it is important to state it plainly rather than paper over it.
- No harmonised standard is cited in the Official Journal. As of 2026-09-24, Article 40’s presumption of conformity is available to no one, because no harmonised standard has been OJ-cited20.
- EN 18286 is published but not cited. The Article 17 QMS standard EN 18286:2026 was published in July 2026 (the first JTC 21 AI Act standard to reach publication), but it is not yet cited in the Official Journal, so it carries no presumption of conformity2021.
- The other JTC 21 drafts are at or before Enquiry. As of 2026-09-24, as reported by a
pan-European standards information point, the Enquiry votes on prEN 18228 (
Art. 9, risk management) and prEN 18282 (Art. 15, cybersecurity) closed on 30 Jul 2026 and on prEN 18229-1 (Art. 12, logging) on 20 Aug 2026; prEN 18229-3 (Art. 14, human oversight) entered Enquiry on 30 Jul 2026; and prEN 18229-4 and -5 (Art. 15, accuracy and robustness) were approved as new projects on 24 Jun 202660, consistent with the public tracker that had them at Enquiry in mid-202653. CEN and CENELEC may publish a priority deliverable directly after a positive Enquiry vote and target them for Q4 202661; publication would still not be an OJ citation. Chapter 22 tracks every deliverable and the status of the JTC 21 harmonised standards, and explains how the presumption of conformity works. - ISO/IEC 42001 is not the Article 17 QMS. Certifying to EN ISO/IEC 42001:2026 evidences an AI management system; it does not confer an AI Act presumption of conformity, because it is not a harmonised standard and its scope differs from the Article 17 QMS1112.
- The Code of Practice is voluntary. Signing the GPAI Code is a way to demonstrate compliance with GPAI obligations; it is not a legal presumption of conformity9.
- China’s framework does not cross-reference the Western instruments. The TC260 AI Safety Governance Framework 3.0 cites no ISO/IEC 42001, ISO/IEC 23894, NIST AI RMF or EU AI Act (its named reference points are the Global AI Governance Initiative and UN-centred channels), and it does not name China’s own binding rules either42. A crosswalk between the two stacks is something the engineer builds; neither side’s documents supply it.
The register carries the three JTC 21 deliverables the book relies on, with their status as of 2026-09-24202160:
| Deliverable | What it is | Status (as of 2026-09-24) | Engineering artefact | Layer |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| EN 18286:2026 | Quality-management-system requirements supporting Art. 17; published but not cited in the Official Journal, so it carries no presumption of conformity | Published July 2026; not OJ-cited 2120 | QMS processes run as pipeline stages; design and change-control evidence | 1 · 5 |
| prEN 18228 | Draft harmonised standard for the risk management system of Art. 9 | Draft; Enquiry vote closed 2026-07-30, as reported 60 | Provider risk file per system; acceptability criteria as code; control monitoring | 1 · 3 · 5 |
| prEN 18229-1 | Draft harmonised standard for the record-keeping of Art. 12 | Draft; Enquiry vote closed 2026-08-20, as reported 60 | Logging specification per system; structured, signed event logs mapped to the draft | 4 |
The practical reading: for the period this edition covers, you cannot buy a presumption of conformity off the shelf. The obligation-to-artefact rows above are how a governance function evidences the obligation on its own merits while the harmonised standards are still being written.
Maps to: this chapter is the reverse index for the whole book; every EU AI Act article, the GPAI Code of Practice, the GDPR, NIS2, DORA, the CRA, the Product Liability, DSM, Unfair Commercial Practices, Platform Work and Consumer Credit Directives, the DSA, ISO/IEC 42001, 42005, 42006, 23894 and 22989, NIST AI RMF and the newer NIST AI work, CSA AICM, OWASP GenAI/Agentic, the CEN-CENELEC JTC 21 deliverables, the US federal and state laws, the other jurisdictions and the treaty and soft-law instruments named above map onto the five-layer stack (chapter 04) and the pattern catalogue (chapter 05). Mappings are illustrative, not a claim of conformity.
What you can do this week
- Find your rows. For one system, list the rows of this map that apply to it, by role and risk class, with the date from which each applies.
- Name one artefact per row. Next to each row, write the artefact that evidences it today, or mark the gap.
- Put the dates in the pipeline. Store each applicable date as data that your policy checks read, so an obligation that starts to apply shows up as a failing check, not a surprise.
- Evidence one obligation on its merits. For the obligation you most expected a harmonised standard to cover, write down how you evidence it today without a presumption of conformity.
- Re-read on change. When a date or a row in this map changes, re-run the first step for your systems and record the difference.
Sources
- [1] “AI Omnibus enters into force” (Reg. (EU) 2026/1744, in force 2026-07-27; Annex III high-risk → 2 Dec 2027; Annex I → 2 Aug 2028; legacy public-authority → 2 Aug 2030). European Commission. 2026-07-27. https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/news/ai-omnibus-enters-force (verified: primary)
- [2] Regulation (EU) 2026/1744 (Digital Omnibus on AI), Art. 1 amendments to Reg. (EU) 2024/1689: new Art. 4a (special-category data for bias detection, pseudonymisation, deletion once bias is corrected); new Art. 5(1)(ba)–(bb) NCII and CSAM bans from 2 Dec 2026; Art. 111(2) public-authority systems by 2 Aug 2030; new Art. 111(4) Art. 50(2) marking by 2 Dec 2026 for systems placed on the market before 2 Aug 2026; Art. 113 dates. Publications Office of the EU (EUR-Lex). 2026-07-24. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2026/1744/oj/eng (verified: primary)
- [3] Commission enforcement powers over GPAI providers apply from 2 August 2026; obligations since 2 August 2025 (fines up to 3% of worldwide turnover or EUR 15M under Art. 101). European Commission, AI Act Service Desk. 2026-08-02. https://ai-act-service-desk.ec.europa.eu/en/ai-act/faq/commissions-enforcement-powers-related-ai-act-obligations-providers-most-advanced-models (verified: primary)
- [4] Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 (AI Act), Art. 101 (Commission fines for GPAI providers: up to 3% or EUR 15M) and Art. 99 (penalties by national authorities: 7% / 3% / 1% ceilings). Publications Office of the EU (EUR-Lex). 2024-07-12. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1689/oj/eng (verified: primary)
- [5] “Safer and more transparent AI” (Art. 50 transparency live 2 Aug 2026). European Commission. 2026-08-02. https://commission.europa.eu/news-and-media/news/safer-and-more-transparent-ai-2026-08-02_en (verified: primary)
- [6] “AI literacy, the Digital Omnibus and Article 4 of the AI Act” (Art. 4 reworded to “support the development of” AI literacy; the reworded text applies from 27 Jul 2026). Law & Technology. 2026. https://lawandtechnology.eu/en/ai-literacy-digital-omnibus-article-4-ai-act/ (verified: secondary)
- [7] Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 (AI Act), Art. 27 (FRIA for deployers of Annex III high-risk; Art. 27(4) cross-reference to a GDPR Art. 35 DPIA). Publications Office of the EU (EUR-Lex). 2024-07-12. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1689/oj/eng (verified: primary)
- [8] Regulation (EU) 2026/1744 (Digital Omnibus on AI), new Arts. 75a–75d of the AI Act: AI Office investigation powers, binding commitments, non-compliance decisions and periodic penalty payments up to 5% of average daily income or worldwide annual turnover per day (Art. 75c(5)). Publications Office of the EU (EUR-Lex). 2026-07-24. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2026/1744/oj/eng (verified: primary)
- [9] The General-Purpose AI Code of Practice (published 10 Jul 2025; a voluntary tool; three chapters: Transparency, Copyright, Safety and Security). European Commission. 2025-07-10. https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/contents-code-gpai (verified: primary)
- [10] GPAI Code of Practice: contents and signatories (Safety & Security applies to systemic-risk models; official signatory list). European Commission. 2026. https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/contents-code-gpai (verified: primary)
- [11] “ISO/IEC 42001 and the AI Act: why certification is not yet a presumption of conformity” (ISO 42001 AIMS ≠ Art. 17 QMS). Law & Technology. 2026. https://lawandtechnology.eu/en/iso-iec-42001-and-the-ai-act-why-certification-is-not-yet-a-presumption-of-conformity/ (verified: secondary)
- [12] CSA research note on EU AI Act, prEN 18286 and ISO/IEC 42001 (scope difference; EN ISO/IEC 42001:2026 not a harmonised standard). Cloud Security Alliance. 2026-04-28. https://labs.cloudsecurityalliance.org/research/csa-research-note-eu-ai-act-pren-18286-iso-42001-20260428-cs/ (verified: secondary)
- [13] ISO/IEC 42005:2025, AI system impact assessment (companion to Art. 27 and ISO 42001 Annex A.5). ISO/IEC. 2025-05. https://www.iso.org/standard/44545.html (verified: secondary)
- [14] AI Risk Management Framework 1.0 (functions: Govern, Map, Measure, Manage). NIST. 2023-01-26. https://www.nist.gov/itl/ai-risk-management-framework (verified: primary)
- [15] AI Controls Matrix (AICM) v1.1 (247 control objectives, 18 domains) and STAR for AI. Cloud Security Alliance. 2026-06-22. https://cloudsecurityalliance.org/artifacts/ai-controls-matrix-v1-1 (verified: primary)
- [16] OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications for 2026 (ASI01 Agent Goal Hijack; ASI02 Tool Misuse and Exploitation; ASI03 Identity and Privilege Abuse; ASI04 Agentic Supply Chain Vulnerabilities; ASI05 Unexpected Code Execution (RCE); ASI06 Memory & Context Poisoning; ASI07 Insecure Inter-Agent Communication; ASI08 Cascading Failures; ASI09 Human-Agent Trust Exploitation; ASI10 Rogue Agents; names as in the document’s contents, read 2026-09-24). OWASP GenAI Security Project. 2025-12-09. https://genai.owasp.org/resource/owasp-top-10-for-agentic-applications-for-2026/ (verified: primary)
- [17] 2026 Top 10 for LLM Applications (released 3 Aug 2026; Excessive Agency is LLM03:2026) and the Agent Control Standard (ACS), donated to the project. OWASP GenAI Security Project. 2026-09-01. https://genai.owasp.org/2026/09/01/owasp-genai-security-project-unveils-2026-top-10-for-llm-applications-new-agent-control-standard-and-sponsors-as-community-tops-30000-members/ (verified: primary)
- [18] “California’s SB 53: the first frontier AI law explained” (frontier developers: trained a foundation model with more than 10^26 operations; large frontier developers: also more than USD 500M in annual gross revenue; up to USD 1M per violation; AG enforcement). Future of Privacy Forum (Justine Gluck). 2025-10-03. https://fpf.org/blog/californias-sb-53-the-first-frontier-ai-law-explained/ (verified: secondary)
- [19] “Governor Hochul Signs Nation-Leading Legislation to Require AI Frameworks for AI Frontier Models” (RAISE Act, S6953B/A6453B, signed 19 Dec 2025; agreed chapter amendment; creates an oversight office within the Department of Financial Services; 72-hour incident reporting). Governor Kathy Hochul (New York State). 2025-12-19. https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-hochul-signs-nation-leading-legislation-require-ai-frameworks-ai-frontier-models (verified: primary)
- [20] Standardisation of the AI Act (no harmonised standard yet referenced in the Official Journal, so no Art. 40 presumption; page last updated 2026-08-03; no Commission implementing decision citing one found in the Publications Office index on 2026-09-24). European Commission. 2026-08-03. https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/ai-act-standardisation (verified: primary)
- [21] “EN 18286 in the Spotlight: Supporting Compliance with the AI Act” (EN 18286:2026, Art. 17 QMS, published; the first standard in support of the AI Act). CEN-CENELEC. 2026-07-31. https://www.cencenelec.eu/news-events/news/2026/en-in-the-spotlight/2026-07-30-ai-quality-management/ (verified: primary)
- [22] Regulation (EU) 2026/1744 (Digital Omnibus on AI), of 8 July 2026, amending Reg. (EU) 2024/1689 et al.; OJ L, 24 July 2026; in force 27 Jul 2026; amends Art. 3(14), 6(1a)–(1c), 25(2) and (4), 75(1), new 75(1a) (serious incidents of systems under the AI Office’s competence reported to the AI Office), 99(4)(da), Annex I (machinery to Section B) and Annex VIII Section B (points 7 and 9 deleted); Art. 73 not amended; Art. 113(a) Chapters I and II apply from 2 Feb 2025; Art. 113(c) as replaced: Chapter III, Sections 1, 2 and 3, except Art. 6(5), apply from 2 Dec 2027 (Annex III) and 2 Aug 2028 (Annex I). Publications Office of the EU (EUR-Lex). 2026-07-24. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2026/1744/oj/eng (verified: primary)
- [23] Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 (AI Act), Art. 25 (responsibilities along the AI value chain; conditions under which a value-chain actor becomes a provider; information flow to downstream actors). Publications Office of the EU (EUR-Lex). 2024-07-12. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1689/oj/eng (verified: primary)
- [24] NY State Senate Bill 2025-S6953B (RAISE Act; signed 19 Dec 2025 as Chapter 699; frontier model = trained with over 10^26 operations costing over USD 100M; safety protocols and 72-hour incident disclosure; Attorney General and Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Services; superseded in scope by the 2026 chapter amendment, which drops the cost test, adds a USD 500M revenue test and moves oversight to the DFS [25]). New York State Senate. 2025-12-19. https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/bills/2025/S6953/amendment/B (verified: primary)
- [25] “New York Finalizes RAISE Act for Frontier AI Models; Law Takes Effect January 1, 2027” (chapter amendment introduced 6 Jan 2026, passed 11 Mar 2026, signed 27 Mar 2026; effective 1 Jan 2027; SB 53’s thresholds: frontier model above 10^26 operations, large frontier developer above USD 500M annual revenue; large frontier developers publish the framework, all frontier developers report critical safety incidents; DFS oversight office). Wiley. 2026-04-03. https://www.wiley.law/alert-New-York-Finalizes-RAISE-Act-for-Frontier-AI-Models-Law-Takes-Effect-January-1-2027 (verified: secondary)
- [26] “AI Act: Commission publishes a reporting template for serious incidents involving general-purpose AI models with systemic risk” (template for serious-incident reporting under Art. 55; aligned to Commitment 9 of the GPAI Code). European Commission. 2025-11-04. https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/ai-act-commission-publishes-reporting-template-serious-incidents-involving-general-purpose-ai (verified: primary)
- [27] ISO/IEC 42006:2025, Requirements for bodies providing audit and certification of AI management systems (builds on ISO/IEC 17021-1; who may credibly certify to 42001). ISO/IEC. 2025. https://www.iso.org/standard/42006 (verified: secondary)
- [28] ISO/IEC 23894:2023, Guidance on AI risk management (adapts ISO 31000 to AI). ISO/IEC. 2023-02. https://www.iso.org/standard/77304.html (verified: secondary)
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- [30] NIST IR 8596 (initial preliminary draft; comments closed 2026-01-30; no later version on CSRC on 2026-09-24): Cybersecurity Framework Profile for Artificial Intelligence (Cyber AI Profile); Secure / Defend / Thwart. NIST. 2025-12-16. https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/ir/8596/iprd (verified: primary)
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- [32] “Securing the Agentic Control Plane: Key Progress at the CSAI Foundation” (names the Agentic Trust Framework, AARM, the Catastrophic Risk Annex and STAR for AI; no “Agentic Control Supplement” is named, checked 2026-09-24). Cloud Security Alliance. 2026-04-29. https://cloudsecurityalliance.org/blog/2026/04/29/securing-the-agentic-control-plane-key-progress-at-the-csai-foundation (verified: primary)
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- [34] Basic Act on the Development of Artificial Intelligence and the Establishment of a Foundation for Trust (인공지능 발전과 신뢰 기반 조성 등에 관한 기본법; Act No. 20676, promulgated 2025-01-21, in force 2026-01-22; high-impact AI duties in Arts. 31 to 36; fact-finding in Art. 40; fines in Art. 43). Korean Law Information Center (MOLEG). 2026-01-22. https://www.law.go.kr/LSW/lsInfoP.do?lsiSeq=268543 (verified: primary)
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- [55] SB26-189 Automated Decision-Making Technology (signed by the Governor 14 May 2026; Session Laws chapter 131). Colorado General Assembly. 2026-05-14. https://leg.colorado.gov/bills/sb26-189 (verified: primary)
- [56] SB 53, Artificial intelligence models: large developers (Transparency in Frontier Artificial Intelligence Act; approved by the Governor 29 Sep 2025; frontier AI framework; critical safety incidents to the Office of Emergency Services within 15 days; civil penalty up to USD 1M per violation, Attorney General only). California Legislature. 2025-09-29. https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=202520260SB53 (verified: primary)
- [57] Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 (AI Act): Art. 26(5) (a deployer that identifies a serious incident informs the provider first, then the importer or distributor and the market-surveillance authority; Art. 73 applies mutatis mutandis if it cannot reach the provider) and Art. 73(1)–(4) (report immediately on a causal link or its reasonable likelihood, and no later than 15, 2 or 10 days after the provider or, where applicable, the deployer becomes aware). Publications Office of the EU (EUR-Lex). 2024-06-13. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1689/oj/eng (verified: primary)
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- [60] Project stages for JTC 21 deliverables read on 2026-09-24 (prEN 18228 and prEN 18282 Enquiry votes closed 2026-07-30; prEN 18229-1 closed 2026-08-20; prEN 18229-3 at Enquiry from 2026-07-30; prEN 18229-4 and -5 new projects 2026-06-24). Genorma (pan-European standards information point with national standards bodies). 2026-09-24. https://genorma.com/en/standards/pren-18228 (verified: secondary)
- [61] “Update on CEN and CENELEC’s decision to accelerate the development of standards for artificial intelligence” (direct publication after a positive Enquiry vote; Q4 2026 target). CEN-CENELEC. 2025-10-23. https://www.cencenelec.eu/news-events/news/2025/brief-news/2025-10-23-ai-standardization/ (verified: primary)
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- [63] Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 (AI Act), consolidated text of 27 July 2026 incorporating Regulation (EU) 2026/1744 (Art. 3(1) AI system; Art. 6(3)–(4) documented non-high-risk assessment and Art. 49(2) registration; Art. 15(3)–(4) declared accuracy metrics and feedback loops; Art. 16(l) accessibility; Art. 17(1)(m) accountability framework; Art. 18 documentation kept 10 years; Art. 19 logs kept at least six months; Art. 20 corrective actions; Arts. 22–24 authorised representatives, importers and distributors; Art. 26(1)–(11) deployer duties; Art. 43(4) new assessment on substantial modification; Art. 48 CE marking; Art. 52 notification within two weeks; Art. 53(1)(c) copyright policy; Art. 54 authorised representative of GPAI providers; Art. 73(6) investigation without altering the system; Art. 86 right to explanation; Art. 87 Directive (EU) 2019/1937 applies; Art. 111(3) GPAI models placed on the market before 2 August 2025 comply by 2 August 2027; Art. 113). Publications Office of the EU (EUR-Lex). 2026-07-27. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1689/2026-07-27/eng (verified: primary)
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