What AI harms, and what catches it.

Start from a named harm, not a feature list. Each row gives the level it lands on, the mechanism behind it, a failure mode you can test for, the control and stack layer that catch it, the evidence that control leaves, and incidents that show it is not hypothetical.

Harm at five levels Five harm levels from one person to the environment, each with an example harm from the atlas and the control, by stack layer, that catches it. Where harm lands, level by level Individual one person Discrimination in consequential decisions caught by Eval Gate in CI Group a group or community as such Exclusion through under-representation in data caught by Model Card as Control Evidence Organisation builds, buys or deploys Security compromise through prompt injection caught by Runtime Guardrail Society shared systems Job displacement and task transformation caught by Workforce impact assessment Environment the physical environment Energy demand and emissions of training and inference caught by Energy and emissions telemetry Harms atlas incidents, failure mode, control, evidence Chip colour: the control's layer Layer 01 Govern-as-Code Layer 02 Inventory & Transparency Layer 03 Evals & Red Teaming as Evidence Layer 04 Runtime Controls & Observability Layer 05 Assurance & Continuous Compliance
Harm at five levels Where AI harm lands, from one person to the physical environment, with one example harm per level from the harms atlas and the control that catches it, coloured by its stack layer. Calibrate your severity scale against every level, not only against harm to one person. Drawn from chapter 13. Permalink, downloads and citation
Text description

Five levels at which harm lands, with one example per level from the harms atlas. Individual: harm to one person, their rights, money, liberty, autonomy or body; for example discrimination in consequential decisions, caught by the Eval Gate in CI (Layer 03 Evals & Red Teaming as Evidence). Group: harm that falls on a group or community as such, not only on its members one by one; for example exclusion through under-representation in data, caught by Model Card as Control Evidence (Layer 02 Inventory & Transparency). Organisation: risk to the organisation that builds, buys or deploys the system; for example security compromise through prompt injection, caught by the Runtime Guardrail (Layer 04 Runtime Controls & Observability). Society: harm to shared systems such as information, elections, work, equality and essential services; for example job displacement and task transformation, caught by a workforce impact assessment (Layer 01 Govern-as-Code). Environment: harm to the physical environment from building and running AI systems; for example energy demand and emissions of training and inference, caught by energy and emissions telemetry (Layer 05 Assurance & Continuous Compliance). The harms atlas holds every harm with real incident records, the failure mode an engineer can test for, the control that catches it and the evidence that control leaves.

The atlas

25 harms across five levels, 35 incident records. Read each card as a sentence: this harm happens through this failure mode, is caught by this control in this layer, and leaves this evidence.

Cross-reference: incident cases · the pattern catalogue · the obligation index.

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Where each harm landsThe 25 harms of the atlas, each in the ring of the level it lands on and the sector of its MIT AI Risk Repository domain, coloured by the stack layer of the control that catches it.Ring 5: EnvironmentRing 4: SocietyRing 3: OrganisationRing 2: GroupRing 1: IndividualAIsystem12345ABCDEFGDiscrimination in consequential decisions · Individual · Discrimination & toxicityWrongful identification and loss of liberty · Individual · Discrimination & toxicityPrivacy intrusion and biometric surveillance · Individual · Privacy & securityManipulation, dependence and loss of autonomy · Individual · Human-computer interactionPhysical injury from systems that act in the world · Individual · AI system safety, failures & limitationsUnequal treatment of a group by public risk profiling · Group · Discrimination & toxicityExclusion through under-representation in data · Group · Discrimination & toxicityJudging individuals by their group's history · Group · Discrimination & toxicityReputational damage from harmful or unlawful public outputs · Organisation · Discrimination & toxicityRegulatory enforcement and forced suspension · Organisation · Privacy & securityLeakage of confidential data into external AI services · Organisation · Privacy & securitySecurity compromise through prompt injection · Organisation · Privacy & securitySupply-chain compromise through AI-suggested components · Organisation · Privacy & securityLegal liability for what the system tells customers · Organisation · MisinformationFraud losses from synthetic impersonation · Organisation · Malicious actors & misuseOperational disruption by an agent acting beyond its mandate · Organisation · AI system safety, failures & limitationsFinancial loss from a model under distribution shift · Organisation · AI system safety, failures & limitationsPollution of the information ecosystem · Society · MisinformationElection interference with synthetic voices and media · Society · Malicious actors & misuseOver-reliance on generated output in institutions · Society · Human-computer interactionJob displacement and task transformation · Society · Socioeconomic & environmental harmsInequality in who bears the cost: hidden data labour · Society · Socioeconomic & environmental harmsDisruption to critical infrastructure and emergency services · Society · AI system safety, failures & limitationsEnergy demand and emissions of training and inference · Environment · Socioeconomic & environmental harmsLocal pollution and resource burden near AI infrastructure · Environment · Socioeconomic & environmental harmsRings: the level the harm lands on, fromthe individual out1Individual2Group3Organisation4Society5EnvironmentSectors: MIT AI Risk Repository domainADiscrimination & toxicityBPrivacy & securityCMisinformationDMalicious actors & misuseEHuman-computer interactionFSocioeconomic & environmentalharmsGAI system safety, failures &limitationsColour: stack layer of the control thatcatches it01 Govern-as-Code02 Inventory03 Evals04 Runtime Controls05 AssuranceSource: harms atlas; MIT AI RiskRepository domains (CC BY 4.0)
Where each harm landsThe 25 harms of the atlas, each in the ring of the level it lands on and the sector of its MIT AI Risk Repository domain, coloured by the stack layer of the control that catches it.Ring 5: EnvironmentRing 4: SocietyRing 3: OrganisationRing 2: GroupRing 1: IndividualAIsystem12345Discrimination &toxicityPrivacy & securityMisinformationMalicious actors &misuseHuman-computerinteractionSocioeconomic &environmental harmsAI system safety,failures & limitationsDiscrimination in consequential decisions · Individual · Discrimination & toxicityWrongful identification and loss of liberty · Individual · Discrimination & toxicityPrivacy intrusion and biometric surveillance · Individual · Privacy & securityManipulation, dependence and loss of autonomy · Individual · Human-computer interactionPhysical injury from systems that act in the world · Individual · AI system safety, failures & limitationsUnequal treatment of a group by public risk profiling · Group · Discrimination & toxicityExclusion through under-representation in data · Group · Discrimination & toxicityJudging individuals by their group's history · Group · Discrimination & toxicityReputational damage from harmful or unlawful public outputs · Organisation · Discrimination & toxicityRegulatory enforcement and forced suspension · Organisation · Privacy & securityLeakage of confidential data into external AI services · Organisation · Privacy & securitySecurity compromise through prompt injection · Organisation · Privacy & securitySupply-chain compromise through AI-suggested components · Organisation · Privacy & securityLegal liability for what the system tells customers · Organisation · MisinformationFraud losses from synthetic impersonation · Organisation · Malicious actors & misuseOperational disruption by an agent acting beyond its mandate · Organisation · AI system safety, failures & limitationsFinancial loss from a model under distribution shift · Organisation · AI system safety, failures & limitationsPollution of the information ecosystem · Society · MisinformationElection interference with synthetic voices and media · Society · Malicious actors & misuseOver-reliance on generated output in institutions · Society · Human-computer interactionJob displacement and task transformation · Society · Socioeconomic & environmental harmsInequality in who bears the cost: hidden data labour · Society · Socioeconomic & environmental harmsDisruption to critical infrastructure and emergency services · Society · AI system safety, failures & limitationsEnergy demand and emissions of training and inference · Environment · Socioeconomic & environmental harmsLocal pollution and resource burden near AI infrastructure · Environment · Socioeconomic & environmental harmsRings: the level the harm lands on, from the individual out1Individual2Group3Organisation4Society5EnvironmentSectors: MIT AI Risk Repository domainColour: stack layer of the control that catches it01 Govern-as-Code02 Inventory03 Evals04 Runtime Controls05 AssuranceSource: harms atlas; MIT AI Risk Repository domains (CC BY 4.0)
Where each harm lands One dot per harm, in the ring of the level it lands on and the sector of its MIT AI Risk Repository domain, coloured by the stack layer of the control that catches it; select a dot to open its card. Organisation holds 9 and Society holds 6; the 4 harms filed under two MIT domains sit in the first their row lists.
Data table
Each harm with its level, MIT domain and the layer of its control
HarmLevelMIT domainLayer
Discrimination in consequential decisionsIndividualDiscrimination & toxicityLayer 03
Wrongful identification and loss of libertyIndividualDiscrimination & toxicityLayer 04
Privacy intrusion and biometric surveillanceIndividualPrivacy & securityLayer 02
Manipulation, dependence and loss of autonomyIndividualHuman-computer interactionLayer 04
Physical injury from systems that act in the worldIndividualAI system safety, failures & limitationsLayer 04
Unequal treatment of a group by public risk profilingGroupDiscrimination & toxicityLayer 01
Exclusion through under-representation in dataGroupDiscrimination & toxicityLayer 02
Judging individuals by their group's historyGroupDiscrimination & toxicityLayer 04
Operational disruption by an agent acting beyond its mandateOrganisationAI system safety, failures & limitationsLayer 04
Legal liability for what the system tells customersOrganisationMisinformationLayer 04
Regulatory enforcement and forced suspensionOrganisationPrivacy & securityLayer 01
Financial loss from a model under distribution shiftOrganisationAI system safety, failures & limitationsLayer 05
Fraud losses from synthetic impersonationOrganisationMalicious actors & misuseLayer 04
Reputational damage from harmful or unlawful public outputsOrganisationDiscrimination & toxicityLayer 03
Leakage of confidential data into external AI servicesOrganisationPrivacy & securityLayer 02
Security compromise through prompt injectionOrganisationPrivacy & securityLayer 04
Supply-chain compromise through AI-suggested componentsOrganisationPrivacy & securityLayer 02
Pollution of the information ecosystemSocietyMisinformationLayer 02
Election interference with synthetic voices and mediaSocietyMalicious actors & misuseLayer 02
Job displacement and task transformationSocietySocioeconomic & environmental harmsLayer 01
Inequality in who bears the cost: hidden data labourSocietySocioeconomic & environmental harmsLayer 02
Over-reliance on generated output in institutionsSocietyHuman-computer interactionLayer 04
Disruption to critical infrastructure and emergency servicesSocietyAI system safety, failures & limitationsLayer 04
Energy demand and emissions of training and inferenceEnvironmentSocioeconomic & environmental harmsLayer 05
Local pollution and resource burden near AI infrastructureEnvironmentSocioeconomic & environmental harmsLayer 02
Mechanism, level and layerHow the mechanisms behind the 25 harms lead to the level each lands on, and the stack layer of the control that catches it, counted as pairs.Mechanism to LevelBias (5)Individual: 2Group: 3Misalignment (2)Individual: 1Organisation: 1Opacity (2)Group: 1Organisation: 1Over-reliance (2)Individual: 1Society: 1Robustness (4)Individual: 1Organisation: 2Society: 1Misuse (5)Individual: 1Organisation: 2Society: 2Security (3)Organisation: 3Drift (1)Organisation: 1Scale (9)Individual: 1Group: 1Organisation: 1Society: 4Environment: 2Level to Control layerIndividual (5)L2 Inventory: 1L3 Evals: 1L4 Runtime Controls: 3Group (3)L1 Govern-as-Code: 1L2 Inventory: 1L4 Runtime Controls: 1Organisation (9)L1 Govern-as-Code: 1L2 Inventory: 2L3 Evals: 1L4 Runtime Controls: 4L5 Assurance: 1Society (6)L1 Govern-as-Code: 1L2 Inventory: 3L4 Runtime Controls: 2Environment (2)L2 Inventory: 1L5 Assurance: 1Source: harms atlas rows on thispage
Mechanism, level and layerHow the mechanisms behind the 25 harms lead to the level each lands on, and the stack layer of the control that catches it, counted as pairs.MechanismLevelControl layerBias to Individual level: 2 pairsBias to Group level: 3 pairsBias: 5 pairsBias5Misalignment to Individual level: 1 pairMisalignment to Organisation level: 1 pairMisalignment: 2 pairsMisalignment2Opacity to Group level: 1 pairOpacity to Organisation level: 1 pairOpacity: 2 pairsOpacity2Over-reliance to Individual level: 1 pairOver-reliance to Society level: 1 pairOver-reliance: 2 pairsOver-reliance2Robustness to Individual level: 1 pairRobustness to Organisation level: 2 pairsRobustness to Society level: 1 pairRobustness: 4 pairsRobustness4Misuse to Individual level: 1 pairMisuse to Organisation level: 2 pairsMisuse to Society level: 2 pairsMisuse: 5 pairsMisuse5Security to Organisation level: 3 pairsSecurity: 3 pairsSecurity3Drift to Organisation level: 1 pairDrift: 1 pairDrift1Scale to Individual level: 1 pairScale to Group level: 1 pairScale to Organisation level: 1 pairScale to Society level: 4 pairsScale to Environment level: 2 pairsScale: 9 pairsScale9Individual level to L2 Inventory & Transparency: 1 pairIndividual level to L3 Evals & Red Teaming as Evidence: 1 pairIndividual level to L4 Runtime Controls & Observability: 3 pairsIndividual level: 7 pairsIndividual7Group level to L1 Govern-as-Code: 1 pairGroup level to L2 Inventory & Transparency: 1 pairGroup level to L4 Runtime Controls & Observability: 1 pairGroup level: 5 pairsGroup5Organisation level to L1 Govern-as-Code: 1 pairOrganisation level to L2 Inventory & Transparency: 2 pairsOrganisation level to L3 Evals & Red Teaming as Evidence: 1 pairOrganisation level to L4 Runtime Controls & Observability: 4 pairsOrganisation level to L5 Assurance & Continuous Compliance: 1 pairOrganisation level: 11 pairsOrganisation11Society level to L1 Govern-as-Code: 1 pairSociety level to L2 Inventory & Transparency: 3 pairsSociety level to L4 Runtime Controls & Observability: 2 pairsSociety level: 8 pairsSociety8Environment level to L2 Inventory & Transparency: 1 pairEnvironment level to L5 Assurance & Continuous Compliance: 1 pairEnvironment level: 2 pairsEnvironment2L1 Govern-as-Code: 3 pairsL1 Govern-as-Code3L2 Inventory & Transparency: 8 pairsL2 Inventory8L3 Evals & Red Teaming as Evidence: 2 pairsL3 Evals2L4 Runtime Controls & Observability: 10 pairsL4 Runtime Controls10L5 Assurance & Continuous Compliance: 2 pairsL5 Assurance2Source: harms atlas rows on this page
Mechanism, level and layer How each mechanism leads to the levels harm lands on, and which layer's controls catch those harms. A harm can have two mechanisms, so the left-hand links count 33 harm-mechanism pairs for 25 harms, and a level's block counts the larger of its two sides: Individual's reads 7 for its 5 harms, Group's reads 5 for its 3 harms, Organisation's reads 11 for its 9 harms, Society's reads 8 for its 6 harms. The target above counts each harm once.
Data table
Harm-mechanism pairs per level and harm-layer pairs per level
FromToPairs
BiasIndividual level2
BiasGroup level3
MisalignmentIndividual level1
MisalignmentOrganisation level1
OpacityGroup level1
OpacityOrganisation level1
Over-relianceIndividual level1
Over-relianceSociety level1
RobustnessIndividual level1
RobustnessOrganisation level2
RobustnessSociety level1
MisuseIndividual level1
MisuseOrganisation level2
MisuseSociety level2
SecurityOrganisation level3
DriftOrganisation level1
ScaleIndividual level1
ScaleGroup level1
ScaleOrganisation level1
ScaleSociety level4
ScaleEnvironment level2
Individual levelL2 Inventory & Transparency1
Individual levelL3 Evals & Red Teaming as Evidence1
Individual levelL4 Runtime Controls & Observability3
Group levelL1 Govern-as-Code1
Group levelL2 Inventory & Transparency1
Group levelL4 Runtime Controls & Observability1
Organisation levelL1 Govern-as-Code1
Organisation levelL2 Inventory & Transparency2
Organisation levelL3 Evals & Red Teaming as Evidence1
Organisation levelL4 Runtime Controls & Observability4
Organisation levelL5 Assurance & Continuous Compliance1
Society levelL1 Govern-as-Code1
Society levelL2 Inventory & Transparency3
Society levelL4 Runtime Controls & Observability2
Environment levelL2 Inventory & Transparency1
Environment levelL5 Assurance & Continuous Compliance1
Filter by level

Individual

5 harms

Harm to one person: their rights, money, liberty, autonomy or body.

  • Discrimination in consequential decisions

    • Bias

    A model that scores people for jobs, credit, care or benefits treats a protected group worse at equal merit or need, usually because it learned from past decisions or from a proxy target. In one widely used health-risk algorithm, removing the disparity would have raised the share of Black patients flagged for extra help from 17.7% to 46.5% 6.

    Failure mode
    The training label or a feature is a proxy (past hiring, past spending) that encodes the disparity the decision must not repeat.
    Caught by
    Eval Gate in CI L3
    Evidence
    A disaggregated eval report per release (selection or flag rate and calibration by group) with the gate verdict that passed or blocked the build.
    MIT taxonomy
    • 1.1 Unfair discrimination and misrepresentation (1 Discrimination & toxicity)
    • 1.3 Unequal performance across groups (1 Discrimination & toxicity)
    Incidents
    Cases
  • Wrongful identification and loss of liberty

    • Bias
    • Over-reliance

    A face-recognition match is a ranked probability, not an identification. When investigators act on a match without independent corroboration, a system error becomes the arrest of the wrong person.

    Failure mode
    A candidate list from a probabilistic matcher is treated as a positive identification, with no mandatory corroboration step before action.
    Caught by
    Human-in-the-loop Gate L4
    Evidence
    An approval record naming the reviewer, the corroborating evidence and the decision, written before any action is taken on a match.
    MIT taxonomy
    • 1.3 Unequal performance across groups (1 Discrimination & toxicity)
    • 5.1 Overreliance and unsafe use (5 Human-computer interaction)
    Incidents
  • Privacy intrusion and biometric surveillance

    • Scale
    • Misuse

    Scraping images at internet scale and turning each face into a biometric template exposes people to identification they never agreed to. The Dutch data protection authority fined one such provider EUR 30.5 million and found it should never have built the database 9.

    Failure mode
    Personal and biometric data are collected without a lawful basis, and buyers integrate the resulting service without asking where its data came from.
    Caught by
    Vendor / Model Due-Diligence Gate L2
    Evidence
    A due-diligence record holding the provider's lawful-basis and data-provenance answers, the DPIA reference and the approve or reject decision.
    MIT taxonomy
    • 2.1 Compromise of privacy by obtaining, leaking, or correctly inferring sensitive information (2 Privacy & security)
    Incidents
    Cases
  • Manipulation, dependence and loss of autonomy

    • Misalignment

    Conversational systems tuned for engagement can foster emotional dependence and steer vulnerable users, minors among them, when nothing at runtime recognises the risk. The incident record here is an allegation 3.

    Failure mode
    The system optimises for continued conversation and has no runtime check for self-harm signals, age or escalating dependence.
    Caught by
    Runtime Guardrail L4
    Evidence
    Guardrail decision logs for self-harm and age signals, each with the escalation or hand-off it triggered.
    MIT taxonomy
    • 5.1 Overreliance and unsafe use (5 Human-computer interaction)
    • 5.2 Loss of human agency and autonomy (5 Human-computer interaction)
    Incidents
  • Physical injury from systems that act in the world

    • Robustness

    Automated driving and other embodied systems turn a perception or planning error into bodily harm. The records include a pedestrian killed by a test vehicle and a pedestrian dragged by a driverless taxi 3.

    Failure mode
    The system meets a situation outside its validated envelope and has no safe fallback that stops it or hands over before harm.
    Caught by
    Kill Switch / Circuit Breaker L4
    Evidence
    A tested stop mechanism with drill records, and telemetry showing when the fallback fired and which safe state the system entered.
    MIT taxonomy
    • 7.3 Lack of capability or robustness (7 AI system safety, failures & limitations)
    Incidents

Group

3 harms

Harm that falls on a group or community as such, not only on its members one by one.

  • Unequal treatment of a group by public risk profiling

    • Bias
    • Scale

    Risk models used to police benefits concentrate suspicion on groups defined by nationality, income or neighbourhood, and every false flag lands on a household. The Dutch tax administration used Dutch or non-Dutch nationality as an indicator in a system that designated childcare-benefit applications as risky 8.

    Failure mode
    A protected or proxy attribute enters the risk model, and flags drive adverse action with no group-level outcome monitoring.
    Caught by
    FRIA-as-Code L1
    Evidence
    A versioned fundamental-rights impact assessment naming the affected groups, the permitted features and the monitoring metric, signed before deployment.
    MIT taxonomy
    • 1.1 Unfair discrimination and misrepresentation (1 Discrimination & toxicity)
    Incidents
    Cases
  • Exclusion through under-representation in data

    • Bias

    A group that is thin in the training data gets a worse service. Five commercial speech-recognition systems averaged a word error rate of 0.35 for Black speakers against 0.19 for white speakers 7.

    Failure mode
    Performance is reported as one average, so the gap for a minority group never reaches a release decision.
    Caught by
    Model Card as Control Evidence L2
    Evidence
    A model card with performance disaggregated by the groups the system serves, and a data card describing who is in the training set.
    MIT taxonomy
    • 1.3 Unequal performance across groups (1 Discrimination & toxicity)
    Incidents
  • Judging individuals by their group's history

    • Bias
    • Opacity

    When a model predicts an outcome distribution for a group and then places individuals within it, a person's result depends on the past record of their school, postcode or cohort. England's 2020 grading model predicted each centre's grade distribution from its history and used teachers' rank orders to assign grades within it 13.

    Failure mode
    Acceptance tests are aggregate (distribution accuracy, group equality), so no test asks whether an individual outcome can be justified from evidence about that individual.
    Caught by
    Human-in-the-loop Gate L4
    Evidence
    A review queue and decision log for outlier cases (large adjustments, small cohorts), plus a contestation channel with its resolution records.
    MIT taxonomy
    • 1.1 Unfair discrimination and misrepresentation (1 Discrimination & toxicity)
    Incidents
    Cases

Organisation

9 harms

Risk to the organisation that builds, buys or deploys the system: operational, legal, financial, reputational, security and supply chain.

Society

6 harms

Harm to shared systems: information, elections, work, equality and essential services.

  • Pollution of the information ecosystem

    • Scale
    • Misuse

    Cheap synthetic text, images and audio make it harder to tell what is real, which erodes trust in authentic evidence as well as in fakes. NIST lists information integrity among its twelve generative-AI risks 12.

    Failure mode
    Generated media leave the system with no provenance signal that a platform or a reader could check.
    Caught by
    Content provenance and labelling (not yet a catalogued pattern) L2
    Evidence
    Provenance metadata and labels attached at generation, with the share of outputs that carried them.
    MIT taxonomy
    • 3.2 Pollution of information ecosystem and loss of consensus reality (3 Misinformation)
    • 4.1 Disinformation, surveillance, and influence at scale (4 Malicious actors & misuse)
    Incidents
  • Election interference with synthetic voices and media

    • Misuse

    Synthetic audio of a candidate does most damage just before a vote, when there is no time to rebut it. The records include a fake presidential voice in robocalls before a US primary and deepfake recordings spread before Slovakia's 2023 election 3.

    Failure mode
    Voice cloning is available without a consent check on whose voice is cloned, and the output carries no durable mark.
    Caught by
    Content provenance and labelling (not yet a catalogued pattern) L2
    Evidence
    Consent records for every cloned voice, and watermark or provenance checks on generated audio.
    MIT taxonomy
    • 4.1 Disinformation, surveillance, and influence at scale (4 Malicious actors & misuse)
    Incidents
  • Job displacement and task transformation

    • Scale

    Generative AI changes what many jobs consist of. The ILO estimates that one in four workers globally are in an occupation with some generative-AI exposure, and finds transformation of jobs more likely than outright replacement 10. This harm is structural, so no single incident record stands for it.

    Failure mode
    Deployment decisions count the productivity gain but not who loses tasks, income or bargaining power, and affected workers are not consulted.
    Caught by
    Workforce impact assessment (not yet a catalogued pattern) L1
    Evidence
    An impact assessment listing the roles and tasks affected, the consultation held and the transition measures agreed.
    MIT taxonomy
    • 6.2 Increased inequality and decline in employment quality (6 Socioeconomic & environmental harms)
    Incidents
    No single incident record: the evidence is the study cited above.
  • Inequality in who bears the cost: hidden data labour

    • Scale

    The gains from AI flow to its builders and users while part of the cost falls on low-paid workers who label data, sometimes exposed to graphic material. The record here alleges that annotators in Kenya were exposed to graphic content while labelling for a model developer 3.

    Failure mode
    Data-supply contracts are bought on price with no labour or welfare standard, and nobody audits them.
    Caught by
    Vendor / Model Due-Diligence Gate L2
    Evidence
    A supplier assessment covering annotator pay, exposure limits and support, renewed with the contract.
    MIT taxonomy
    • 6.2 Increased inequality and decline in employment quality (6 Socioeconomic & environmental harms)
    • 6.1 Power centralization and unfair distribution of benefits (6 Socioeconomic & environmental harms)
    Incidents
  • Over-reliance on generated output in institutions

    • Over-reliance

    Professionals under time pressure accept fluent output without checking it. The records include fabricated case law filed in a US court and errors introduced into a child-protection report 3.

    Failure mode
    Generated content enters a consequential record with no verification step and no disclosure that AI was used.
    Caught by
    Human-in-the-loop Gate L4
    Evidence
    A sign-off record showing who verified each generated passage against its source before filing.
    MIT taxonomy
    • 5.1 Overreliance and unsafe use (5 Human-computer interaction)
    • 3.1 False or misleading information (3 Misinformation)
    Incidents
  • Disruption to critical infrastructure and emergency services

    • Robustness
    • Scale

    When AI systems run transport, utilities or emergency response, one failure repeats across a whole fleet at once. The records include driverless cars that stalled in traffic after losing their server connection, and one that blocked a fire truck on an emergency call 3.

    Failure mode
    A shared dependency (connectivity, a model update) fails for every unit at once, and there is no degraded mode that clears the way.
    Caught by
    Kill Switch / Circuit Breaker L4
    Evidence
    Fleet-level stop and safe-state drills, with records of when the breaker fired and how long recovery took.
    MIT taxonomy
    • 7.3 Lack of capability or robustness (7 AI system safety, failures & limitations)
    Incidents

Environment

2 harms

Harm to the physical environment from building and running AI systems.

  • Energy demand and emissions of training and inference

    • Scale

    Training and serving models draws electricity, and so emissions, at data-centre scale. The IEA projects that data-centre electricity demand will more than double by 2030 to around 945 TWh, slightly more than Japan's consumption today 11. NIST lists environmental impacts among the generative-AI risks 12.

    Failure mode
    Model and deployment choices are made without measuring energy use, so the cheapest adequate option is never compared.
    Caught by
    Energy and emissions telemetry (not yet a catalogued pattern) L5
    Evidence
    Per-model energy and emissions figures, recorded for training and per unit of inference, published in the model card.
    MIT taxonomy
    • 6.6 Environmental harm (6 Socioeconomic & environmental harms)
    Incidents
    No single incident record: the evidence is the study cited above.
  • Local pollution and resource burden near AI infrastructure

    • Scale

    The power generation and cooling that AI data centres need can burden the communities around them. The record here alleges that a supercomputer site in Memphis ran unpermitted gas turbines 3.

    Failure mode
    Capacity is added faster than permitting and community consultation, and buyers of compute never ask where or how it is powered.
    Caught by
    Vendor / Model Due-Diligence Gate L2
    Evidence
    The provider's answers on energy source, permits and location, kept with the procurement decision.
    MIT taxonomy
    • 6.6 Environmental harm (6 Socioeconomic & environmental harms)
    Incidents

Sources and attribution

Harm categories use the Domain Taxonomy of the MIT AI Risk Repository (Slattery et al., 2026), licensed under CC BY 4.0: https://airisk.mit.edu/ (https://doi.org/10.1016/j.patter.2026.101517). Codes and names are reproduced unchanged; the mapping of each harm to a subdomain is ours.

  1. [1] The AI Risk Repository: a meta-review, database, and taxonomy of risks from artificial intelligence (Domain Taxonomy of 7 domains and 24 subdomains; published under CC BY 4.0). Slattery, P., Saeri, A. K., Grundy, E. A. C., et al., Patterns (Cell Press). 2026. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.patter.2026.101517 (verified: primary)
  2. [2] MIT AI Risk Repository (the living database of AI risks classified by the Domain Taxonomy; CC BY 4.0). MIT AI Risk Initiative. 2026. https://airisk.mit.edu/ (verified: primary)
  3. [3] AI Incident Database (incident records cited as AIID <number>). Responsible AI Collaborative. 2026. https://incidentdatabase.ai/ (verified: primary)
  4. [4] AIAAIC Repository (AI, algorithmic and automation incidents and controversies). AIAAIC. 2026. https://www.aiaaic.org/aiaaic-repository (verified: primary)
  5. [5] AI Incidents and Hazards Monitor (AIM) (news-derived incident records). OECD.AI. 2026. https://oecd.ai/en/incidents (verified: primary)
  6. [6] Dissecting racial bias in an algorithm used to manage the health of populations (Science 366(6464):447-453; remedying the disparity would raise Black patients receiving additional help from 17.7% to 46.5%). Obermeyer, Z., Powers, B., Vogeli, C., Mullainathan, S.. 2019-10-25. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aax2342 (verified: primary)
  7. [7] Racial disparities in automated speech recognition (PNAS 117(14):7684-7689; five commercial systems, average word error rate 0.35 for Black speakers and 0.19 for white speakers). Koenecke, A., Nam, A., Lake, E., et al.. 2020-04-07. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1915768117 (verified: primary)
  8. [8] Tax Administration fined for discriminatory and unlawful data processing (EUR 2.75 million fine; nationality used as an indicator in a system that designated childcare-benefit applications as risky). Autoriteit Persoonsgegevens (Dutch Data Protection Authority). 2021-12-07. https://www.autoriteitpersoonsgegevens.nl/en/current/tax-administration-fined-for-discriminatory-and-unlawful-data-processing (verified: primary)
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