AICM: agent controls with the CSA Agentic Trust Framework and AARM specification

Agent-specific AICM controls (e.g. IAM-18 Agent Access Restriction, AIS-11 Agents Security Boundaries), with the Agentic Trust Framework v1 (earned autonomy tiers) and the AARM runtime-interception specification

From clause to evidenceThe chain from CSA AICM Agent controls (AICM v1.1, ATF, AARM) to its evidence record, in 6 steps; the text alternative lists them and the facts under the figure state each in full.Clause: CSA AI Controls Matrix (AICM) v1.1, Agent controls (AICM v1.1, ATF, AARM)ClauseCSA AICMAgent controlsDuty holder: not statedDuty holderNot statedApplies from: no date (Voluntary)Applies fromNo dateVoluntaryArtefact: Agent-specific control definitions; policy-as-code for agent scope and tools; runtime guardrailsArtefactAgent-specificcontrol…Layers: Layer 01 Govern-as-Code and Layer 04 Runtime Controls & ObservabilityLayersLayer 01Layer 04Evidence record: the common evidence record (Evidence record v1)Evidence recordEvidence recordv1Same topic elsewhere: no crosswalk topic files this clause yetAs of 2026-09-24 · illustrative, not a claim of conformity From clause to evidenceThe chain from CSA AICM Agent controls (AICM v1.1, ATF, AARM) to its evidence record, in 6 steps; the text alternative lists them and the facts under the figure state each in full.Clause: CSA AI Controls Matrix (AICM) v1.1, Agent controls (AICM v1.1, ATF, AARM)ClauseCSA AICM · Agent controlsDuty holder: not statedDuty holderNot statedApplies from: no date (Voluntary)Applies fromNo date · VoluntaryArtefact: Agent-specific control definitions; policy-as-code for agent scope and tools; runtime guardrailsArtefactAgent-specific control definitionsLayers: Layer 01 Govern-as-Code and Layer 04 Runtime Controls & ObservabilityLayersLayer 01Layer 04Evidence record: the common evidence record (Evidence record v1)Evidence recordEvidence record v1Same topic elsewhere: no crosswalk topicfiles this clause yetAs of 2026-09-24illustrative, not a claim of conformity
From clause to evidence Build the artefact, then file every output it produces as a record that names AIGE-OBL-CSA-AICM-AGENTIC. Drawn from chapter 08.
Text alternative
  • Clause: CSA AICM, Agent controls.
  • Duty holder: Not stated.
  • Applies from: No date, Voluntary.
  • Artefact: Agent-specific control definitions.
  • Layers: Layer 01, Layer 04.
  • Evidence record: Evidence record v1.
  • Record schema: Evidence record.
  • No crosswalk topic files this clause yet.
Id
AIGE-OBL-CSA-AICM-AGENTIC
Instrument
CSA AI Controls Matrix (AICM) v1.1 controls
Clause
Agent controls (AICM v1.1, ATF, AARM)
Applies from
No date Voluntary · AICM v1.1 published 2026-06-22, Agentic Trust Framework v1 in February 2026; the "Agentic Control Supplement" of earlier editions could not be matched to a CSA primary document as of 2026-09-24 (to be confirmed)

The artefact that evidences it

Agent-specific control definitions; policy-as-code for agent scope and tools; runtime guardrails.

What this obligation connects toAgent controls (AICM v1.1, ATF, AARM) and its 14 relations: 14 open controls.DirectColour: stack layer of the pattern or control02 Inventory04 Runtime ControlsAgent controls (AICM v1.1, ATF,AARM)Open controls (14)AIGE-CTL-AGENT-025 Accountability across hops · DirectAccountability across hopsAIGE-CTL-EVAL-001 Authorization Boundary · DirectAuthorization BoundaryAIGE-CTL-AGENT-015 Checkpoints on irreversible actions, failing closed · DirectCheckpoints on irreversible…AIGE-CTL-AGENT-022 Delegation, never impersonation · DirectDelegation, never impersonationAIGE-CTL-AGENT-002 Its own identity · DirectIts own identityAIGE-CTL-AGENT-020 MCP authorisation (spec 2026-07-28) · DirectMCP authorisation+8 more+8 more: AIGE-CTL-AGENT-017 Output and egress filter, AIGE-CTL-AGENT-021 Replace long-lived secrets with short-lived credentials, AIGE-CTL-AGENT-039 Restrictions tested by attempting what is denied, AIGE-CTL-AGENT-007 Runtime guardrail on every tool call, AIGE-CTL-AGENT-026 Stopping third-party agents at your boundary, AIGE-CTL-AGENT-037 The person types the secrets, AIGE-CTL-AGENT-005 Tool allow-list, deny by default, AIGE-CTL-AGENT-036 Typed messages and limited shared memory between agents
What this obligation connects toAgent controls (AICM v1.1, ATF, AARM) and its 14 relations: 14 open controls.DirectColour: stack layer of the pattern or control02 Inventory04 Runtime ControlsOpen controls (14)AIGE-CTL-AGENT-025 Accountability across hops · DirectAccountability across hopsAIGE-CTL-EVAL-001 Authorization Boundary · DirectAuthorization BoundaryAIGE-CTL-AGENT-015 Checkpoints on irreversible actions, failing closed · DirectCheckpoints on irreversible…AIGE-CTL-AGENT-022 Delegation, never impersonation · DirectDelegation, never impersonationAIGE-CTL-AGENT-002 Its own identity · DirectIts own identityAIGE-CTL-AGENT-020 MCP authorisation (spec 2026-07-28) · DirectMCP authorisation+8 more+8 more: AIGE-CTL-AGENT-017 Output and egress filter, AIGE-CTL-AGENT-021 Replace long-lived secrets with short-lived credentials, AIGE-CTL-AGENT-039 Restrictions tested by attempting what is denied, AIGE-CTL-AGENT-007 Runtime guardrail on every tool call, AIGE-CTL-AGENT-026 Stopping third-party agents at your boundary, AIGE-CTL-AGENT-037 The person types the secrets, AIGE-CTL-AGENT-005 Tool allow-list, deny by default, AIGE-CTL-AGENT-036 Typed messages and limited shared memory between agentsAgent controls(AICM v1.1,ATF, AARM)
What this obligation connects to Solid edges are direct relations, dashed ones looser (a case that cites the same article, a framework whose clauses only touch the topic); patterns and controls take the colour of their stack layer. Select a node to open it; the lists below give every relation in full.
Data table: every relation
Relations of AIGE-OBL-CSA-AICM-AGENTIC
FamilyItemRelation
Open controlsAIGE-CTL-AGENT-025 Accountability across hopsDirect
Open controlsAIGE-CTL-EVAL-001 Authorization BoundaryDirect
Open controlsAIGE-CTL-AGENT-015 Checkpoints on irreversible actions, failing closedDirect
Open controlsAIGE-CTL-AGENT-022 Delegation, never impersonationDirect
Open controlsAIGE-CTL-AGENT-002 Its own identityDirect
Open controlsAIGE-CTL-AGENT-020 MCP authorisation (spec 2026-07-28)Direct
Open controlsAIGE-CTL-AGENT-017 Output and egress filterDirect
Open controlsAIGE-CTL-AGENT-021 Replace long-lived secrets with short-lived credentialsDirect
Open controlsAIGE-CTL-AGENT-039 Restrictions tested by attempting what is deniedDirect
Open controlsAIGE-CTL-AGENT-007 Runtime guardrail on every tool callDirect
Open controlsAIGE-CTL-AGENT-026 Stopping third-party agents at your boundaryDirect
Open controlsAIGE-CTL-AGENT-037 The person types the secretsDirect
Open controlsAIGE-CTL-AGENT-005 Tool allow-list, deny by defaultDirect
Open controlsAIGE-CTL-AGENT-036 Typed messages and limited shared memory between agentsDirect

Patterns that build it

No pattern in the catalogue names this clause on its "Maps to" line yet; the artefact above is the engineering answer.

Open controls that evidence it

Draft controls in the open control profiles that map to this row: each states a requirement and the evidence it must leave behind.

Source

Chapter 08, section CSA AICM and STAR for AI, checked against its sources on the review date above.

Machine-readable

Cite this obligation

García Aibar, J. (2026). AICM: agent controls with the CSA Agentic Trust Framework and AARM specification (AIGE-OBL-CSA-AICM-AGENTIC). In AI Governance Engineering: The Thesis & Body of Knowledge (v0.5.0). https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.22956197. https://aigovernanceengineer.com/obligations/aige-obl-csa-aicm-agentic. CC BY 4.0

BibTeX

@misc{aige2026obligation,
  author       = {Jorge García Aibar},
  title        = {{AICM: agent controls with the CSA Agentic Trust Framework and AARM specification (AIGE-OBL-CSA-AICM-AGENTIC)}},
  howpublished = {In AI Governance Engineering: The Thesis \& Body of Knowledge},
  year         = {2026},
  version      = {0.5.0},
  doi          = {10.5281/zenodo.22956197},
  url          = {https://aigovernanceengineer.com/obligations/aige-obl-csa-aicm-agentic},
  note         = {Version 0.5.0}
}