{
  "notice": "Illustrative mapping from the AI Governance Engineer Body of Knowledge v0.5.0 (not a claim of conformity)",
  "version": "0.5.0",
  "license": "CC BY 4.0",
  "licenseUrl": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/",
  "schemaVersion": 1,
  "schema": "https://aigovernanceengineer.com/api/v1/schemas/control.json",
  "self": "https://aigovernanceengineer.com/api/v1/controls/aige-ctl-agent-039.json",
  "source": "https://aigovernanceengineer.com/controls/agent-runtime#aige-ctl-agent-039",
  "citation": {
    "title": "AI Governance Engineering: The Thesis & Body of Knowledge",
    "authors": [
      "Jorge García Aibar"
    ],
    "parentDoi": "https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.22956197",
    "conceptDoi": "https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.22857084"
  },
  "control": {
    "id": "AIGE-CTL-AGENT-039",
    "profile": "agent-runtime",
    "url": "https://aigovernanceengineer.com/controls/agent-runtime#aige-ctl-agent-039",
    "json": "https://aigovernanceengineer.com/api/v1/controls/aige-ctl-agent-039.json",
    "title": "Restrictions tested by attempting what is denied",
    "version": "0.2",
    "status": "draft",
    "reviewerStatus": "open",
    "depth": "derived",
    "objective": "Before deployment, and whenever the allow-list or the checkpoints change, the agent is made to attempt disallowed actions (a tool off the list, a scope beyond the grant, an irreversible call with no approval), and each attempt must be denied or routed to a person.",
    "failureModes": [
      "ASI02: The agent uses tools it is allowed to use in unsafe ways: destructive parameters, chains of calls nobody intended, or exfiltration through a permitted channel.",
      "A disallowed tool call, an out-of-scope call or an unapproved irreversible call succeeds in testing, or was never tried.",
      "The allow-list or the checkpoints change and the tests that attempt what is denied are not rerun."
    ],
    "scope": "Every agent that calls tools, in production or in an evaluation harness.",
    "enforcementPoints": [
      "pre_merge",
      "deploy"
    ],
    "verification": [],
    "evidence": [
      {
        "artefact": "Negative test cases and the denials they produced",
        "schemaId": null,
        "schema": null,
        "layer": 3
      }
    ],
    "failureResponse": {
      "effect": "alert",
      "text": "To be specified."
    },
    "layer": 3,
    "secondaryLayers": [],
    "patterns": [
      {
        "slug": "adversarial-red-team-suite",
        "title": "Adversarial Red-Team Suite",
        "url": "https://aigovernanceengineer.com/patterns/adversarial-red-team-suite"
      }
    ],
    "seeds": [
      {
        "id": "restrictions-tested",
        "title": "Restrictions tested by attempting what is denied",
        "url": "https://aigovernanceengineer.com/bok/governing-agents#the-tool-allow-list"
      }
    ],
    "derivedFrom": [],
    "mappings": {
      "obligations": [
        {
          "id": "AIGE-OBL-EUAIA-ART14",
          "name": "EU AI Act Art. 14 human oversight",
          "url": "https://aigovernanceengineer.com/obligations/aige-obl-euaia-art14"
        },
        {
          "id": "AIGE-OBL-EUAIA-ART15",
          "name": "EU AI Act Art. 15 accuracy, robustness and cybersecurity",
          "url": "https://aigovernanceengineer.com/obligations/aige-obl-euaia-art15"
        },
        {
          "id": "AIGE-OBL-OWASP-AGENTIC",
          "name": "Top 10 for Agentic Applications 2026",
          "url": "https://aigovernanceengineer.com/obligations/aige-obl-owasp-agentic"
        },
        {
          "id": "AIGE-OBL-CSA-AICM-AGENTIC",
          "name": "AICM agent controls with the CSA Agentic Trust Framework and AARM specification",
          "url": "https://aigovernanceengineer.com/obligations/aige-obl-csa-aicm-agentic"
        }
      ],
      "iso42001": [
        {
          "id": "A.6.2.6",
          "title": "AI system operation and monitoring"
        },
        {
          "id": "A.9.2",
          "title": "Processes for responsible use of AI systems"
        }
      ],
      "nistAiRmf": [],
      "owasp": [
        {
          "id": "asi02",
          "externalId": "ASI02",
          "name": "Tool Misuse and Exploitation",
          "url": "https://aigovernanceengineer.com/resources/threats#threat-asi02"
        }
      ],
      "atlas": [],
      "aiuc1": [],
      "csaAicm": [],
      "other": [
        {
          "framework": "IMDA MGF for Agentic AI v1.5",
          "ref": "2.3.2 Before deploying, test agents, p.38",
          "note": "Partial fit: Testing policy compliance and tool calls with the right permissions; attempting disallowed actions appears in IMDA's own worked example (p.14)"
        }
      ]
    },
    "references": [
      {
        "n": 10,
        "title": "Governing AI agents",
        "text": "Governing AI agents (AI Governance Engineering Body of Knowledge v0.5.0, chapter 23, section \"The tool allow-list\"). AI Governance Engineer (Jorge García Aibar). 2026-09.",
        "url": "https://aigovernanceengineer.com/bok/governing-agents#the-tool-allow-list",
        "verified": "primary"
      },
      {
        "n": 20,
        "title": "Governing AI agents",
        "text": "Governing AI agents (AI Governance Engineering Body of Knowledge v0.5.0, chapter 23, section \"Threats mapped to controls\"). AI Governance Engineer (Jorge García Aibar). 2026-09.",
        "url": "https://aigovernanceengineer.com/bok/governing-agents#threats-mapped-to-controls",
        "verified": "primary"
      },
      {
        "n": 2,
        "title": "OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications for 2026",
        "text": "OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications for 2026 (ASI01 Agent Goal Hijack to ASI10 Rogue Agents). OWASP GenAI Security Project. 2025-12-09.",
        "url": "https://genai.owasp.org/resource/owasp-top-10-for-agentic-applications-for-2026/",
        "verified": "primary"
      },
      {
        "n": 3,
        "title": "ISO/IEC 42001:2023, AI management systems, Annex A",
        "text": "ISO/IEC 42001:2023, AI management systems, Annex A (reference control objectives and controls A.2 to A.10, cited by id and short title). ISO/IEC. 2023.",
        "url": "https://www.iso.org/standard/81230.html",
        "verified": "secondary"
      },
      {
        "n": 4,
        "title": "Model AI Governance Framework for Agentic AI, v1.5",
        "text": "Model AI Governance Framework for Agentic AI, v1.5 (published 2026-05-20, updated 2026-06-05; four dimensions: assess and bound the risks upfront, make humans meaningfully accountable, implement technical controls and processes, enable end-user responsibility). IMDA. 2026-06-05.",
        "url": "https://www.imda.gov.sg/-/media/imda/files/about/emerging-tech-and-research/artificial-intelligence/mgf-for-agentic-ai.pdf",
        "verified": "primary"
      }
    ],
    "implementationNotes": [
      "Keep the attempts in the red-team suite, tagged with their MITRE ATLAS technique ids, so a failed denial traces to the control it breaks."
    ],
    "openQuestions": [
      "Verification procedure and evidence schema to be specified; requires technical review."
    ],
    "observation": null,
    "observationSchema": "https://aigovernanceengineer.com/schemas/control-observation.v1.json",
    "examples": []
  }
}