{
  "notice": "Illustrative mapping from the AI Governance Engineer Body of Knowledge v0.5.0 (not a claim of conformity)",
  "version": "0.5.0",
  "license": "CC BY 4.0",
  "licenseUrl": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/",
  "schemaVersion": 1,
  "schema": "https://aigovernanceengineer.com/api/v1/schemas/control.json",
  "self": "https://aigovernanceengineer.com/api/v1/controls/aige-ctl-agent-011.json",
  "source": "https://aigovernanceengineer.com/controls/agent-runtime#aige-ctl-agent-011",
  "citation": {
    "title": "AI Governance Engineering: The Thesis & Body of Knowledge",
    "authors": [
      "Jorge García Aibar"
    ],
    "parentDoi": "https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.22956197",
    "conceptDoi": "https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.22857084"
  },
  "control": {
    "id": "AIGE-CTL-AGENT-011",
    "profile": "agent-runtime",
    "url": "https://aigovernanceengineer.com/controls/agent-runtime#aige-ctl-agent-011",
    "json": "https://aigovernanceengineer.com/api/v1/controls/aige-ctl-agent-011.json",
    "title": "Drilled kill switch",
    "version": "0.1",
    "status": "draft",
    "reviewerStatus": "open",
    "depth": "derived",
    "objective": "The stop levels (pause a task, narrow the scope, trip the breaker, revoke the identity, stop a class, degrade) and their triggers are defined in advance, and the stop is drilled on a schedule, with the time to stop measured and a check that the stop held.",
    "failureModes": [
      "ASI10: An agent drifts from its intended behaviour or scope (through compromise, misalignment or neglect) and keeps acting, possibly deceptively, where nobody is watching."
    ],
    "scope": "Every agent that calls tools, in production or in an evaluation harness.",
    "enforcementPoints": [
      "runtime",
      "periodic"
    ],
    "verification": [],
    "evidence": [
      {
        "artefact": "Drill record: time to stop; no calls or writes after the pull",
        "schemaId": null,
        "schema": null,
        "layer": 4
      }
    ],
    "failureResponse": {
      "effect": "deny",
      "text": "The agent is stopped at the predefined level; no calls or writes follow the pull."
    },
    "layer": 4,
    "secondaryLayers": [],
    "patterns": [
      {
        "slug": "kill-switch-circuit-breaker",
        "title": "Kill Switch / Circuit Breaker",
        "url": "https://aigovernanceengineer.com/patterns/kill-switch-circuit-breaker"
      }
    ],
    "seeds": [
      {
        "id": "drilled-kill-switch",
        "title": "Drilled kill switch",
        "url": "https://aigovernanceengineer.com/bok/governing-agents#kill-switch-and-per-agent-circuit-breakers"
      }
    ],
    "derivedFrom": [],
    "mappings": {
      "obligations": [
        {
          "id": "AIGE-OBL-EUAIA-ART14",
          "name": "EU AI Act Art. 14 human oversight",
          "url": "https://aigovernanceengineer.com/obligations/aige-obl-euaia-art14"
        },
        {
          "id": "AIGE-OBL-EUAIA-ART26",
          "name": "EU AI Act Art. 26 deployer obligations for high-risk systems",
          "url": "https://aigovernanceengineer.com/obligations/aige-obl-euaia-art26"
        },
        {
          "id": "AIGE-OBL-EUAIA-ART72",
          "name": "EU AI Act Art. 72 post-market monitoring",
          "url": "https://aigovernanceengineer.com/obligations/aige-obl-euaia-art72"
        },
        {
          "id": "AIGE-OBL-OWASP-AGENTIC",
          "name": "Top 10 for Agentic Applications 2026",
          "url": "https://aigovernanceengineer.com/obligations/aige-obl-owasp-agentic"
        }
      ],
      "iso42001": [
        {
          "id": "A.6.2.6",
          "title": "AI system operation and monitoring"
        },
        {
          "id": "A.6.2.8",
          "title": "AI system recording of event logs"
        }
      ],
      "nistAiRmf": [
        {
          "id": "MANAGE 2.4",
          "title": "Mechanisms to supersede, disengage or deactivate AI systems"
        }
      ],
      "owasp": [
        {
          "id": "asi10",
          "externalId": "ASI10",
          "name": "Rogue Agents",
          "url": "https://aigovernanceengineer.com/resources/threats#threat-asi10"
        }
      ],
      "atlas": [],
      "aiuc1": [],
      "csaAicm": [],
      "other": []
    },
    "references": [
      {
        "n": 14,
        "title": "Governing AI agents",
        "text": "Governing AI agents (AI Governance Engineering Body of Knowledge v0.5.0, chapter 23, section \"Kill switch and per-agent circuit breakers\"). AI Governance Engineer (Jorge García Aibar). 2026-09.",
        "url": "https://aigovernanceengineer.com/bok/governing-agents#kill-switch-and-per-agent-circuit-breakers",
        "verified": "primary"
      },
      {
        "n": 2,
        "title": "OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications for 2026",
        "text": "OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications for 2026 (ASI01 Agent Goal Hijack to ASI10 Rogue Agents). OWASP GenAI Security Project. 2025-12-09.",
        "url": "https://genai.owasp.org/resource/owasp-top-10-for-agentic-applications-for-2026/",
        "verified": "primary"
      },
      {
        "n": 3,
        "title": "ISO/IEC 42001:2023, AI management systems, Annex A",
        "text": "ISO/IEC 42001:2023, AI management systems, Annex A (reference control objectives and controls A.2 to A.10, cited by id and short title). ISO/IEC. 2023.",
        "url": "https://www.iso.org/standard/81230.html",
        "verified": "secondary"
      },
      {
        "n": 15,
        "title": "Artificial Intelligence Risk Management Framework (AI RMF 1.0), NIST AI 100-1",
        "text": "Artificial Intelligence Risk Management Framework (AI RMF 1.0), NIST AI 100-1 (MANAGE 2.4: mechanisms to supersede, disengage or deactivate AI systems whose performance or outcomes are inconsistent with intended use). NIST. 2023-01-26.",
        "url": "https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ai/NIST.AI.100-1.pdf",
        "verified": "primary"
      }
    ],
    "implementationNotes": [
      "Define the triggers in advance: a manual pull, a budget or unauthorised-call threshold, an anomaly, an upstream notice such as a vendor incident, or a legal instruction.",
      "Check that the stop held: no tool calls after the breaker tripped, no credentials issued after revocation, and no writes from long-running tasks on credentials issued before the pull."
    ],
    "openQuestions": [
      "Verification procedure and evidence schema to be specified; requires technical review."
    ],
    "observation": null,
    "observationSchema": "https://aigovernanceengineer.com/schemas/control-observation.v1.json",
    "examples": []
  }
}